A Tumultuous Journey of the NAGA Peace Process

By: Dr. Rouhin Deb and Adyasa Ananya Das

Introduction

The world’s longest-running demand for successionⁱ saw a significant development with the signing of a Framework Agreement on August 3, 2015, between the Government of India (GoI) and the Naga Peopleⁱⁱ represented by its post dominant nationalist group, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isaac-Muivah (NSCN-IM)ⁱⁱⁱ. The Agreement that came after the 1997 Ceasefire brought glimmers of hope to the Naga people. The NSCN-IM managed to secure the consensus of the various Naga Nationalist groups and social entities such as the Naga HoHo, Naga Student Federation, Naga Mother’s Association, Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, and United Naga Council. They represent the indigenous inhabitants of the state concerning the framework agreement.

Many strategic affairs experts from the mainland thought this landmark deal would end the six decades of hostility between the Naga People and the Government of India. Some others also hoped that it would restore peace in the region and usher in development.^iv. However, Prof. Sanjoy Hazarika, who is a honorary research professor at the Center of Policy Research, New Delhi and has been a close observer on the North-East and its history of insurgency, cautioned by quoting the following:

“To expect that these past decades of grief, inter-group killings, anxiety, and fear will be brushed aside because of the Naga peace accord is being unrealistic. Memories are built on old wounds, and they heal slowly. So, it is important to be cautiously optimistic”^v.

Five years down the line, his prediction about the NAGA situation is well on its way to becoming a reality. The turn of events since the signing of the Naga Framework Agreement 2015 does not align with what was expected and has not been restored in the hilly region^vi. The stalemate in talks persists due to various disagreements, and there has been growing distrust among the parties. There are no signs of progress on the Naga Peace Accord even after the expiration of the deadline of October 2019^vii. The Naga Peace Accord is stuck around the NSCN (IM)’s demand for shared sovereignty in the form of a separate Naga Flag, and Constitution for Nagaland^viii. These demands are challenging for the Government of India (GoI) to concede to^ix. While the GoI maintains that there was no mention of a separate flag and constitution in the Framework Agreement, the NSCN-

IM is firm on its demands. The different interpretations regarding the concept of shared sovereignty by both parties have led to a deadlock.

In July 2019, the Armed Forces Special Powers Acts (AFSPA) was extended up to December and then again for another six months^x. The Indian Army together with the paramilitary forces, started cracking down on NSCN-IM soldiers in the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, looking for their arms, trade, and ammunition^xi. Nagaland has been under AFSPA for almost six decades now and, even the signing of the historic Framework Agreement could not bring an end to it.

This imposition of the AFSPA, despite proof of a declining trend in the insurgency, resonates negatively with the sentiments of the Naga people. The tensions further escalated when the letter written by the interlocutor and Governor of Nagaland, N Ravi, to the Chief Minister of Nagaland got leaked on June 25, 2020^xii. In the letter, Ravi alleged that the state government had been a “mute spectator” as “armed gangs” engaged in extortion and violence in the region. Ravi also alleged that “law and order” in Nagaland has collapsed^xiii. He indirectly referred to the unlawful extortions by the rebel groups in Nagaland. Besides, the contents of the confidential document of the Framework Agreement which was mutually decided by the two parties to be not released in the public domain was released by the NSCN-IM- first partially, and then a copy of the original-on August 2020. One of the reasons behind such a move is the disagreement over the present interlocutor, RN Ravi^xiv. These turn of events amidst the ongoing peace dialogue have led Naga People to believe that all their efforts have been to no avail^xv . The dream of peaceful and rapidly developing Nagaland seems perpetually suspended; hence our effort here is to review the situation and suggest policy pathways forward.

The History of India’s Longest Running Insurgency

Before the arrival of the British into Nagaland, the province had no connection with the Indian Mainland. The British annexation of Assam and Manipur in 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese war, marked the beginning of establishing colonial sovereignty over the Naga Hills^xvi. Subsequently, the Naga Hills became a part of British India in the year 1881^xvii. The first sign of Naga resistance saw a tangible form after the World War II with the formation of the Naga Club in 1918. The members of the club included mostly those who had served under the British Army during the war. In 1929 the Nagas demanded the Simon Commission to leave them alone to determine for themselves as in ancient times and insisted on their exclusion from India’s ‘reformed scheme’. Then came the Naga National Council (NNC) in the year 1946 that asserted itself under the leadership of Angami Zapu Phizo and T. Sakhrie. Alibi Imti. First, the Naga Club and then the

NNC (which included all the members of the Naga Club) continued to demand for the independence of Nagaland.

In June 1947, the Nine-Point Agreement, also known as the Akhbar Hydari Agreement, was signed between the then Governor of Assam (on behalf of the GoI), Sir Muhammad Saleh Akhbar Hydari, and the NNC. Under the Agreement, the Naga’s rightto develop themselves according to their freely expressed wishes was recognised^xviii. However, the last point of the Agreement, Clause 9, proved to be controversial^xix. Clause 9 stated that, “after ten years of the agreement’s implementation, the NNC would be asked whether it would wish to rest the agreement for a further period or it wanted to reach a new agreement for the future of the Naga people”. This provision in Clause 9 is now a subject matter of different interpretations by the parties and stakeholders to the Naga Peace Process.

According to the NNC, Clause 9 gave the Nagas the right to complete independence on the expiry of the ten years whereas, the GoI claimed that the Agreement gave Nagas the freedom to revise the administrative pattern after ten years. In the light of these interpretive disagreements, the NNC declared independence on August 14, 1947, a day before India attained independence. It also conducted a plebiscite in 1951 and claimed that 99 percent of the Naga people supported an independent Nagaland. But, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected the demand, and this subsequently led to a civil disobedience by the NNC. The Nagas also boycotted the first general elections of India in 1952^xx. Phizo then found the underground Naga Federal Government (NFG) and the Naga Federal Army (NFA) and thus began a violent secessionist movement of the Naga People. In 1956, the GoI drafted the National Army to crush the insurgency and subsequently enacted the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in 1958^xxi. Phizo dissolved the NNC in 1956 and, fled to Dacca (in East Pakistan). He subsequently went into exile in London in 1960.

Nagaland became a separate state in 1963 with the signing of the 16-point Agreement between the Naga People’s Convention and the Government of India^xxii. It led to a new round of political settlement. Article 371A of the Indian Constitution renders special powers to the state of Nagaland. It states that no act of Parliament shall apply to the state of Nagaland in respect of the religious or social practices of the Nagas, its customary law and procedure, administration of civil and criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law and ownership and transfer of land and its resources. The article shall apply to Nagaland only after the State Assembly passes a resolution to do so^xxiii. Besides, freedom fighter Jai Prakash Narayan, the then Assam Chief Minister Bimala Prasad Chaliha and Rev. Michael Scott led a Peace Mission to

Nagaland in April 1964. The signing of an agreement for Suspension of Operation (AGSOP) with Naga insurgents opened the doors for possible peace. However, NNC violated the Agreement and, the violence persisted. Thus, the Peace Mission met with a deadlock and, subsequently dissolved.

The GoI declared the NFG and NFA “unlawful associations” under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and launched massive counterinsurgency operation^xxiv.

Negotiations with the NSCN have always remained complicated since the first peace agreement signed back in 1975^xxv. After the signing of the Shillong Accord of 1975, the NFG-NFA agreed to self-surrender. But a group of activists of the NNC, who had gone to China for training, refused to surrender and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in Burma in 1980 with Thuengaling Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu and SS Khaplang as their leaders. However, in 1988, the NSCN split over an ideological difference in a violent clash and formed NSCN-IM, led by Isak Swu and Muiva, and NSCN-K, led by Khaplang. With the death of Phizo in 1990, the NNC lost its remaining influence and, NSCN-IM became the dominant nationalist separatist group^xxvi. Following the years of violence, the NSCN-IM and the Government of India signed a ceasefire agreement in 1997^xxvii. NSCN-K also reached a truce with New Delhi in 2001 but unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire in March 2015. Later, in the year 2018, it revoked its decision on the same^xxviii. Finally, after rounds of deliberations and talks among both parties, the historic Framework Agreement was signed on August 2015 that identified the unique history of Nagaland. Although the details of the Agreement were not disclosed initially, the NSCN-IM claimed that it will serve as the basis for further talks. As the situation seems, the framework agreement’s optimism has started to recede due to reasons mentioned at the beginning of the paper.

Why has the Peace Process Become So Cultured?

Many factors have contributed to difficulty in solving the Naga peace crisis. Some of these factors are linked to the history and geography of Nagaland and its tribal population. These factors make the insurgency problem in the region quite different from the other parts of India and thus difficult to reconcile. Firstly, unlike Kashmir, the Nagas had declared that they were not a part of the new map which India had inherited from the British. For this reason, the Nagas say that their movement is not a struggle for secession but a struggle to keep the history and identity of Naga culture and heritage alive. Secondly, the Nagas, with a total population of 2.8 million, are divided among 19 tribes which leads to a lot of intra and inter tribe political play in the negotiation process^xxix. Further, the stakeholders are way too many in number, ranging from the civil society, the church, the Government to the insurgent groups^xxx. The Naga claim to sovereignty is not

restricted to the state of Nagaland but parts of the Assam, Arunachal, and Manipur as its extended territory^xxxi. Due to these complexities, the sandpaper agreements since 1975 could hardly yield a consensual solution to the problem.

A host of experts have argued that blaming the Government of India to be at fault for the crisis in Nagaland is simply appropriating the blame^xxxii. The GoI has tried to protect the leaders of the Naga insurgent groups and persuade all rebel groups to unite and become partners in the peace agreement from the very beginning, which is evident from all the peace agreements that have been brought into place. However, the factors that have stopped the process are the vested political and economic interests of the various faction of rebel insurgent groups^xxxiii. The NSCN (IM) faction has tried repeatedly to politically extort the Indian Government into succumbing to demands. For instance, when we look back to the 1975 Shillong peace agreement, the Tanghul leaders under Muivah were sent to China for training and to bring in weapons that lead to repudiation of the accord, interestingly shows their lack of interest in bringing in peace in the region^xxxiv. The continuous threatening by the NSCN (IM) to open a third front of conflict amidst tensions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Line of Control (LOC) can be seen as a testimony to the undue advantage that they seek to take in the present moment of crisis.^xxxv

Further, contrary to the outrage shown by the NSCN rebel groups around the recent letter of Governor N Ravi to the Chief Minister, the public seemed to echo with the issues of extortion and corruption raised by the governor^xxxvi. The extortion tax levied by these groups on the public has been termed as “legitimate” collection as they run a parallel government. However, the authority to collect taxes to render services to the people rests with the Government. Further, the plight of the non-tribal people who have been staying in Nagaland for generations due to the extortion and frequent nagging by the local rebel groups is also a well-known reality in North-East^xxxvii. Recent times have also seen many non-tribal Hindu Bengalis and other Hindi speaking people convert to Christianity under compulsion to stay in Nagaland.^xxxviii Manimoy had alleged, “Taking advantage of their illiteracy and poverty, the tea tribe people were converted from Sanatan religion to Christianity”^xxxix. These events show the complex situation within the state and are currently impeding the implementation of meaningful peace initiatives.

The Road Ahead

The main confusion that has put a halt to the Peace Agreement between the Indian Government and the NSCN (IM) seems to be based on the difference in understanding the term “Shared Sovereignty”. For the Indian Government, shared sovereignty means sharing the sovereign powers

with the Nagas whereas, for the NSCN (IM), it meant a separate constitution and flag^xl. The demand for a separate constitution and flag has not been received well by the Indian Government and the Muivah section has been isolated from the peace talks for the moment.

Further, the history of Nagaland insurgency and how it is dealt with is also a classic case of Indian Intelligence Bureau intelligence. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) is mandated by the Prime Minister to fast track the Naga Peace Process and serves as the intermediary between the nationalist organization and the Government. The current Governor, of the state, N. Ravi, is also a part of the same lineage of IB officers who have worked closely on the issue. A new group, NNPG, has been formed which consists of rebel groups splintering away from the NSCN (IM) to continue the peace process sidelining the Muivah faction^xli. This also includes some very prominent leaders of the Naga community who are presumably on the same page on the Agreement with the Indian Government. This development has pushed back the Muivah section from the negotiations for now.

However, N. Ravi will have to think out of the box to get the Muivah section to accept a solution within the framework of the Constitution of India. As for the government, innovative political and administrative arrangements that factor in the culture and the geography of the Naga Hills should be taken into consideration. One can gauge from the current situation that there is a need to strengthen trust between both parties. The Government can initiate a dialogue demonstrating confidence in the Naga people by doing away with the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The AFSPA, which has been in force in Nagaland for years now, should be revoked so that a stable state government can take over the reins of law and order in the state. This will initiate the process to bring in a balanced agreement that accommodates the interests of the Naga people and the GoI, the Government needs to assert that it is actively working to recognize the unique history of Nagaland. Cultural organizations should be brought into place that would look after preserving the Naga History and accommodating the views of Naga people. The militants could be offered top posts in such units, and those who don’t could be given an allowance or pension. In this way, the Naga people could proactively indulge in promoting their unique history. We hope the discord in the Naga Peace accord gets sorted sooner than later, and the Nagas see the new dawn of the day, which marks a new chapter in Naga history.

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iiiMaj Gen Ashok K Mehta (Retd), “Naga Peace Talks Stall as Statkeholder Dither”, The Tribune, India, 8 July 2020. Available at https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/naga-peace-talks-stall-as-stakeholders-dither-109986.

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xviiiNaga-Akbar Hydari Accord , (Nine Point Agreement) < Kohima 26-28 June 1947.

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xx Partha Prawal, ”Understanding Naga Peace Accord”,Northeast Today, Magzter, December 2017. Available at

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https://satp.org/backgrounder/india-insurgencynortheast-assam

xxiiThe 16 Point Agreement between the Government of India and the Naga People’s Convention, July 26, 1960

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xl NSCN (IM) Sticks to Naga Integration Stand : Ravi’s Recent Statement Strongly Rebuffed” E-PAO, 2 March 2020. Available at http://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=8..030320.mar20

xli “Nagaland Hopeful of Positive Outcome of Peace Talks” The Times Of India, 1 November 2019. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/nagaland-hopeful-of-positive-outcome-of-peace-talks/articleshow/71858794.cms

Rouhin Deb

Dr. Rouhin is a development economist by training with a Ph.D. from the Indian Institute of Management, Shillong in the area of Business Policy. Apart from their academic research, Dr. Rouhin has been actively engaged in policy discussions and debates across various mediums which range from serving as an expert contributor to the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) on policy issues pertaining to North-East India to writing for some of the newspapers in the country. Dr. Rouhin writes occasionally for The Hindu Business line and The Mint (Hindustan Times) on various issues pertaining to the development of North-Eastern India. Dr. Rouhin is presently employed by the Strategic Investment Research Unit, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

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