Written by: Reagan Spexarth
Peace Operations Overview
The United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UN DPO) is the arm of the UN that plans and oversees peacekeeping missions. The primary goal of peacekeeping missions is to “help countries torn by conflict create conditions for sustainable peace.”1 In general, peacekeeping operations are primarily centered around the protection of civilians and maintaining or creating conditions for peace. To achieve these mandates, the UN DPO conducts activities to monitor and improve human rights, increase the administrative and judicial capacity of the mission host-state, conduct military operations to protect civilians, and carry out disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) activities.1
DDR activities are some of the most crucial undertakings of UN DPO missions. The confiscation and destruction of small arms are one of the primary goals of UN peacekeeping operations. The presence of large numbers of small arms in conflict areas is one of the primary factors that can serve to both extend the length of the conflict and increase the severity of violence against civilians.2 Furthermore, small arms account for 90% of civilian casualties- including women and children- in conflict zones.3 As such, the DPO regularly conducts disarmament operations to confiscate weapons from illegal actors. After confiscation, these arms are either destroyed, stored, or transported to a secure location.
However, the disarmament process is not a perfect one. Each year, thousands of weapons disappear from the above-ground global supply chain.4 The UN DPO has long been under scrutiny for its management of small arms. Reports have estimated that the UN DPO has lost thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of ammunition within the past decade.4 These losses present a problem for the UN DPO because small arms such as pistols, rifles, and machine guns directly contribute to over 200,000 deaths in combat zones each year.3 This means that small arms contribute more to the annual global combat death toll than all other types of weapons combined. Additionally, these weapons are the weapon of choice for human rights violations, including the murder of children and gender-based violence.3
Arms losses from the UN DPO can take a myriad of forms.5 Due to issues with reporting in combat zones, estimates of arms loss from both the UN and NGOs vary wildly depending on the context and danger of the mission host-state. While this uncertainty makes understanding the root causes of arms loss difficult, there are still trends in the data that allow for the identification of a few key factors. The most common forms of UN DPO arms losses are as follows:
- Voluntary turnover by peacekeepers due to threats from armed groups
- Involuntary turnover by peacekeepers during a base attack
- Theft and looting during transport
- Illegal sale of arms by peacekeepers
This paper will look at each of situations and then analyze the current risk management practices conducted by the UN DPO. This paper will then make policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness of UN DPO risk management policies as they pertain to small arms and ammunition losses.
Problems in UN DPO Weapons Risk Management
One of the largest reasons for unintended arms loss by the UN DPO is the voluntary turnover of arms by peacekeepers. This can occur when peacekeepers are threatened by armed groups. In Sudan, for instance, many weapons disappear from patrols and convoy protection units.6 This occurs when a number of armed or unarmed attacks surround a group and threaten bodily harm if they do not surrender their weapons. Often these ambushes are undertaken by a few armed fighters. Even though these insurgents would be easily defeated if a conflict were to occur, it is often the decision of individual convoys to voluntarily give up weapons rather than risk their lives or bodily harm in a shoot-out. This presents a difficult situation from a risk management perspective as decision-makers need to weigh the cost of peacekeeper lives against the harm caused by rebel group acquisition of weapons. Peacekeepers should be well educated on the risks of harm to civilians should rebel groups gain access to illegal arms.
Another risk of arms loss comes from the involuntary turnover of weapons by peacekeepers during an attack on a base. This is one of the most frequent causes of arms loss, but also one of the least preventable. Because peacekeeping missions are intentionally conducted in conflict areas, there will always be a risk of base attacks. However, these risks have been partially mitigated through the UN DPO’s efforts to develop control measures, improve reconnaissance, and strengthen peacekeeper training. Currently, the UN DPO Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual specifies equipment safety and functionality standards. These stipulate that all major equipment must be inspected and services at regular intervals and that all major losses are reported to the UN office. The mandated reporting of all major losses is critical to determining the optimal level of security for storage facilities.
Another common arms loss situation occurs when arms are being transported from a field location to a secure location. This situation most often arises after a DDR confiscation raid when the arms are en route to a major base.7 Arms in the transit process are particularly vulnerable to theft. When in caravans, arms are less strongly protected than they are in secure storage locations. The nimble numbers required to avoid drawing attention to a caravan are often the same small numbers that prevent the cargo from being properly protected. These vulnerabilities are difficult to overcome, as leaving arms in unsecured locations is often even more undesirable than transporting them. Similar to the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual, the UN details standards for transporting arms in the Movement Control Manual in order to mitigate this risk.7
However, such manuals are only used as a guideline for missions. Because these standards are not required, they are unevenly applied and adopted. While these frameworks are important in minimizing arms losses, the UN DPO should do more to enforce these standards in mission-settings. The unequal enforcement of their own risk management frameworks leaves the UN DPO open to higher-than-recommended risks in arms storage and transport.
The final major source of weapons loss occurs due to the intentional sale of arms by peacekeepers. A study by Human Rights Watch uncovered a “guns for gold” scheme operated by peacekeepers serving in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.8 This operation involved the intentional proliferation of small arms to one of the most deadly militias in the Congo in exchange for illegally mined gold.9 Once uncovered, this situation led to a serious degradation of trust between the Congolese government and the UN DPO. It took several years of careful diplomacy for the UN to resume normal operations and to rebuild relationships in the country.
However, these arms laundering schemes are rare. Peacekeeper fraud is a relatively uncommon form of arms loss, as all peacekeepers are vetted by their own country to determine their suitability for service. In 2018 the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services conducted audits on the equipment management of several peacekeeping missions, finding that inspection and reporting standards were almost all properly instituted, even in the DRC.10 However, even though process integrity was upheld, some locations lacked dedicated storage facilities.10 As of yet, the UN does not officially require dedicated storage facilities, as space is a sparse commodity on many peacekeeping bases.10 The transient nature of peacekeeping missions makes it difficult to have dedicated purpose-built facilities for arms storage. There are also other personnel quality risks. Rotating peacekeeper deployments mean that it can be difficult to maintain background records and behavioral citations. Additionally, peacekeepers are not required to disclose weapons found in non-DDR activities, such as military operations and humanitarian aid protection, leaving the door open for untraced smuggling.
Policy Recommendations
After identifying high-risk loss situations and showing the efforts the UN DPO has already taken to mitigate the risk of weapons loss, I have developed a set of recommendations to improve weapons risk management. My first recommendation would be for the UN DPO to
adopt tighter weapons standards and make them a required component of mission planning. As I discussed earlier in the paper, current standards at the discretion of each mission director. Because of this, standards are not applied evenly to each mission, greatly contributing to the risk of arms loss through theft and transport. A more even application of these standards would strengthen weapons storage and transport standards.
Another recommendation would be to require dedicated storage facilities for all weapons and ammunition. Currently, the UN DPO has no requirements on weapon storage facilities, only recommendations. The creation of dedicated buildings is often difficult due to the temporary nature of missions. UN DPO peacekeeping bases are often made up entirely of temporary buildings. What little permanent structures do exist are often reserved for command centers or troop barracks. However, requiring better storage facilities could dramatically reduce arms loss. By making permanent storage facilities a requirement and by reappropriating funds to create such buildings, the UN would provide a much-needed security boost to confiscated weapons on bases.
Currently, there are no reporting requirements for weapons and ammunition found by peacekeepers on patrols. Troops are only required to report weapons confiscated in an official DDR capacity. Because of this, there are often many more weapons on-base and subsequently lost than are reported. Tightening reporting requirements could empower UN DPO personnel to make more informed decisions about weapons protection and storage. Additionally, creating a centralized record of troop disciplinary records could help DPO personnel to better identify peacekeepers that are likely to illegally sell or smuggle weapons. Because of the evolving nature of peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers are often shuffled from one site to another. This frequent shuffling often means that records and paperwork pertaining to background checks and disciplinary records are often not moved to the new location along with the peacekeeper.
Another solution to the issue of arms loss is to increase the rate of arms destruction. One example of a lack of foresight on the destruction of small arms in the Mozambique 1992-94 campaign. The mission was able to confiscate over 200,000 weapons. However, because they did not come up with an effective destruction plan, the mission was not able to destroy any of the weapons. As a result, many of the weapons remained in long-term storage or were exported from the host-state. Many of these arms eventually disappeared from the supply chain.10 Because most of the risk associated with arms loss is either in storage or transport, increasing the destruction rate should dramatically decrease the number of arms seized by rebel groups.
However, there are many disadvantages to destroying arms as well. The methods of arms destruction are diverse and include cutting, shredding, melting, or crushing guns and ammunition. However, many of these forms can require specialized equipment and a considerable sum of money. Simple hand-saws are rarely powerful enough to fully destroy the main components of small arms. Instead, industrial shredders and smelters are the preferred tools for large-scale weapons destruction. The UN DPO should opt to purchase more of these tools in order to cut down on the need for weapons storage and transport, as well as to more easily remove small arms from circulation.
Another improvement to the current process could involve strengthening international bodies outside of the UN. This could involve regional unions, such as the African Union, as well as global NGOs and civil society groups. Many of these groups already have working relationships with both the host-state and the UN, meaning there would be few transaction costs needed to get these groups on-board. Similarly, the UN DPO could work to strengthen national rule of law institutions, such as police and gerimanderie forces, prisons, and a national weapons registry.
Endnotes
1. Department of Peace Operations. (2020). Department of Peace Operations Organization. United Nations Peacekeeping.
2. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. “Side Event on Digital Technologies and Conventional Arms Trade.” (2019, October 25).
3. Small Arms Survey. “Small Arms Survey – Armed Violence – 526,000 People Killed Violently Each Year, 75%+ in Non-Conflict.” (2018).
4. Reinl, James. “UN Peacekeeping Arms Losses Could Equip an Army: Report.” (2017, November 13).
5. Small Arms Survey. “Small Arms Survey – New Report—Making a Tough Job More Difficult: The Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations.”
6. Gibbons-Neff, T. (2015, July 8). In Sudan, peacekeepers’ weapons have repeatedly fallen into militants’ hands. Washington Post.
7. Arms Control Association. “The UN Process on Small Arms: All Is Not Lost.” 2019.
8. Al-Bayaa, A. B. (2010). The Burden of Disarmament: UN Peacekeeping Operations & Illicit Weapons. Inquiries Journal, 2(01).
9. Basanisi, M. (2008, May 23). Who Will Watch the Peacekeepers? The New York Times.
10. Brehm, Jefferson. (2018, June 15). The Loss of Arms and Ammunition in Peace Operations: Mapping and Addressing the Challenge | Global Peace Operations Review.
