By: Adrian Gomez
Edited by: Andrew Bongiovanni
Introduction
Natural disasters are becoming more common and severe, and when it comes to disaster response strategies, any misstep or miscalculation can have deadly consequences. There were eighteen named storms in the United States in 2024––which includes the deadliest hurricane since Hurricane Katrina.1 Hurricane Helene made national headlines as it caused untold devastation from catastrophic flooding and high winds that resulted in over 150 deaths.2 With the rising threat of climate change, storms such as this are expected to become the norm, necessitating a plan to handle the complexities of coordinating a response effort that is effective and collaborative. The National Resilience Guidance (NRG) that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released in August 2024 would allow organizations to be better prepared in their response to natural disasters and other disruptions that may negatively impact their communities.3 The NRG uses a systems thinking approach to promote community resilience through active collaboration and engagement with individuals and families, communities, non-governmental organizations, businesses, and governmental organizations of all levels.4
Central to this guidance is the concept of community resilience, defined as “the ability of a community to prepare for anticipated natural hazards, adapt to changing conditions, and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”5 This is a proactive approach that leverages the expertise of local stakeholders to create strategies to respond to various threats and disasters. In November 2023, the Subcommittee on Emergency Management and Technology Chairman, Anthony D’Esposito, emphasized the importance of federal coordination with stakeholders at the local level, stating that it is vital to work with those “who are already on the ground, and who know their communities best.”6 The NRG’s proactive approach would greatly benefit FEMA and other federal agencies in bringing stakeholders together and supporting them in creating and implementing disaster response and recovery strategies tailored to their communities. To illustrate the potential effectiveness of the NRG in disaster response, I will explore what the impact of the NRG may have been in 2005 had it been implemented during the response to Hurricane Katrina.
Background: Hurricane Katrina
First, it is important to understand the magnitude of the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall as a Category 3 storm on August 29, 2005.7 This was the largest hurricane to strike the Gulf Coast since 1969, with wind gusts in excess of 200 mph and the highest storm surge in United States history being recorded.8 The hurricane caused billions of dollars of damage across the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Florida, and Alabama.9 Additionally, due to infrastructure failures from levees in the New Orleans area, extreme flooding displaced hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed over 300,000 homes throughout the states of Louisiana and Mississippi, which were most heavily impacted.
Katrina is the third deadliest hurricane to hit the United States, with a total death toll greater than 1,300. However, most of these deaths were in the State of Louisiana, where 1,067 lives were lost.10 In New Orleans in particular, African American and low-income residents faced severe challenges, as they were more likely to live in flood-prone areas and many were left homeless or found themselves isolated from their families and communities.11 2005 was already an unprecedented year for hurricanes, with new records being set for the number of hurricanes, named storms, Category 5 hurricanes, and major hurricanes that made landfall in the United States.12 Due to a longer-than-average hurricane season, there were fifteen hurricanes recorded in the Northern Atlantic area by the end of 2005, which was much higher than the expected average of five at the time.13
Background: FEMA in 2005
Many of those who lived through the initial devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina found little reprieve in the following days, weeks, months, and even years. The long recovery was largely attributed to the poor federal response stemming from inadequate leadership and the haphazard manner in which services were coordinated. An analysis of 1,590 articles from local and national newspapers, starting from the first mention of the hurricane––which predicted its possible impact on the Gulf Coast region––and ending on September 25, 2006, found that 40% of the articles were centered around the accountability of the federal government in the disaster.14 Much of these challenges stemmed from a realignment of FEMA’s organizational structure.
This realignment was connected to the “National Strategy for Homeland Security,” which was issued in July 2002 in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center that took place on September 11, 2001.15 Ironically, this change was intended to strengthen effective coordination with state and local governments in the context of emergency response situations. As part of this strategy, FEMA was incorporated into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 along with 180,000 employees from twenty-two separate departments, agencies, and offices.16 Unfortunately, this realignment created issues in FEMA’s effectiveness in responding to disasters due to a complete restructuring of the organization.17
Furthermore, operational aspects of FEMA, such as planning and coordination responsibilities and powers, were reallocated to various offices and bureaus across DHS.18 These changes led to major challenges within FEMA’s regional offices, as they were further isolated from major decision-makers––many of whom were now based in Washington D.C. rather than in the regional offices themselves.19 The regional offices were responsible for assisting states in disaster planning, the development of programs to assist with mitigation, and providing additional support where needed.20 However, this proved to be a challenge as the physical distance between regional staff and their leadership increased. Additionally, programs like the State and local liaisons and all those responsible for grants were now in the nation’s capital, and thus unable to develop deep, meaningful relationships with local governments and partner organizations that result from proximity and an ability to collaborate and train together more frequently.21 Rapport-building is important in any collaborative system so that when an emergency strikes, those local organizations working with FEMA trust that their strengths will be leveraged and their needs listened to. By moving around programs and personnel with no thought as to the negative cascading effects, it created gaps in communication and collaboration that would make responding to Hurricane Katrina much more difficult.
To make matters worse, when Katrina hit, eight out of the ten FEMA regional offices had Acting Directors, and four of the six Directors at the operational division at FEMA headquarters were also in an acting capacity.22 Many of the members of FEMA’s executive staff were political appointees with little experience in handling natural disasters.23 Career FEMA employee Eric Tolbert stated in a Senate Report that “in the senior ranks of FEMA there was nobody that even knew FEMA’s history, much less understood the profession and the dynamics and the roles and responsibilities of the states and local governments.”24 This included former FEMA Director Michael Brown, who was publicly praised by former President George W. Bush during a now infamous tour of the disaster area in 2005 and resigned 10 days later after public backlash.25 The lack of stable and competent leadership in FEMA caused an increased burden on staff who were already stretched thin from short staffing and a lack of adequate resources.
Coordination Across Systems
Even though FEMA had supplies pre-positioned for emergencies, they were woefully inadequate to handle the scale of the devastation from Hurricane Katrina. Approximately 250,000 people were relying on shipments of food and water to survive, and many lacked access to proper medical care. Emergency responders were increasingly demanding more resources, such as medical supplies and diesel fuel for generators to meet the rising demand for medical care.26 Even as challenges increased, Director Brown assured the public that the organization could meet the complex logistical challenges of the situation.27
Despite his optimism, FEMA struggled to procure and allocate the necessary supplies, and the agency found itself quickly overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of resources that were being requested. The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for Mississippi, William Carwile, said that there was a gap “between what we required on the ground and what they were sending us,” as local officials found that their requests for critical resource items such as generators would not be fulfilled for weeks.28 Overall, the ability to coordinate with so many partners proved difficult, with one study finding that over 500 different organizations were involved in disaster recovery efforts in the weeks following the hurricane.29 FEMA struggled to coordinate effectively with these various partner organizations within the private, non-profit, and public sectors, as well as internationally.
Private Sector
Although FEMA had contracts with private companies to provide supplies, these were only suited for small disasters and could not meet the needs for destruction of this scale.30 Additionally, when it came to coordinating tasks and transferring knowledge, FEMA struggled to share information, and outside organizations found it difficult to identify a point of contact within FEMA. This created barriers to collaboration that impacted the response effort. For example, initially, Federal Procurement Officers (FPOs) failed to work with private industries to utilize their existing supply chains. In one case, there was a rising need for tarps to cover roofs damaged in the hurricane, and although there was a private sector company that had 600,000 tarps available, they were not leveraged as a resource.31
Another private sector partner, the American Bus Association, was also highly motivated to aid, but after a day of wasted effort calling one person after another, they were unable to establish a point of contact within FEMA to coordinate the deployment of their buses.32 FEMA also struggled when it came to contracting with private agencies, as it found itself scrambling for supplies, which led to wasteful spending. 4,000 beds purchased for $3 million went unused and the same was true for $100 million worth of ice and 25,000 mobile homes that cost approximately $900 million.33 The mobile homes went unused specifically because of bureaucratic red tape. FEMA’s own regulations restricted the use of mobile homes in flood plains, and most victims of Hurricane Katrina lived in flood plains, which is why they found themselves in a position where they needed temporary housing.34
Government Agencies
Federal agencies did not fare any better in coordinating with one another, as they faced many challenges in collaboration. This was despite the creation of a National Response Plan (NRP) that had been adopted in December 2004 to establish a single comprehensive framework to manage disasters across federal, state, and local governments.35 This plan was inspired by the principles of American federalism, where situations are initially addressed at the local level and escalate to the state and federal level as necessary. However, local agencies found themselves in a similar situation as FEMA, being similarly understaffed and under-resourced at the time. This resulted in local organizations that were ill-prepared to handle a disaster of this magnitude and partners at the federal level who were unable to offer adequate support.
The New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness, for example, only had a staff of three at the time and had suffered chronic turnover in their leadership, with five different directors in 12 years.36 Louisiana’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOSHEP) also had issues with capacity, having only 60% of the staff of similar organizations in other states.37 LOSHEP faced a litany of issues during the crisis surrounding staffing shortages. They were unable to finalize a plan that would establish a pre-evacuation agreement with the New Orleans Medical Director, and they did not update State emergency plans.38 Although they were chiefly responsible for coordinating the state and federal response through the establishment of an Emergency Operation Center, they had to rely on assistance from National Guard personnel to staff the center––many of whom lacked the training required to fulfill their responsibilities.39 Overall, local agencies were suffering from the same lack of resources and insufficient staffing that plagued FEMA. These issues could have been recognized early with a strategy created or assistance granted, but without FEMA staff in the regional offices working closely with local authorities, there were no direct channels to share information.
The NRP recognized the need for federal agencies to take a proactive approach in disaster response but did nothing to put this idea into operation, which is why so many different agencies all within the same system found themselves unprepared to work with one another.40 This was largely due to unfamiliarity with each other’s systems; for example, the USDA “had difficulty in getting FEMA to take advantage of the resources available to them because of the unfamiliarity of some FEMA employees with USDA programs. Likewise, many USDA employees were unfamiliar with FEMA programs and procedures.”41 Other agencies such as the Departments of the Interior, Veteran Affairs, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Agriculture collectively offered thousands of housing units that could be used as temporary shelters for evacuees, but FEMA’s regulations on the conditions of the shelters made it so that they were unable to accept many of the housing resources.⁴² From top-to-bottom, government agencies of all levels were overwhelmed by the logistical challenges created by Hurricane Katrina, and their inability to share information and resources only prolonged recovery efforts and offered little relief to disaster victims.
International Partners
Issues in resource sharing were not confined to the borders of the United States; international allies experienced similar frustrations as many others in the private and public sectors had domestically. By April 2007, 20 months after Hurricane Katrina, $854 million had come in from international allies along with much-needed supplies such as medicine and communication systems.43 Unfortunately, only $40 million had been used up until that point, and many of the supplies were either wasted or not accepted for use. A State Department report from 2006 stated that Canada, Britain, and Israel, three of our strongest allies, had made 77 recorded offers of aid and were declined 54 times by the United States.44 Even in the cases when supplies were accepted, they were not always handled properly.
Such was the case with Italy, where medical supplies they had donated were left exposed to the elements and were no longer usable, leading one US official to write in a disgusted tone, “Tell them we blew it.”45 Over 150 countries pledged to make donations, but most of that funding had to be diverted to private charities, such as the Red Cross, rather than the United States government. International allies also faced challenges acquiring knowledge about the situation on the ground. Governments and individuals around the world were seeking information regarding the safety of their citizens, friends, or family members affected by the hurricane. The flurry of requests from international partners and private citizens created confusion, as there was no centralized system to manage them.46 Both the dearth of information and difficulties in accepting and handling offers of foreign aid fueled a sense of frustration from international allies and made it so that the United States was unable to utilize badly needed resources and supplies that could have alleviated the suffering of disaster victims.47
National Resilience Guidance
The systems thinking approach presented in FEMA’s National Resilience Guidance would have greatly improved the Hurricane Katrina response and recovery efforts. One benefit of this framework that could have enhanced the response to Hurricane Katrina is its understanding of the interconnectedness between systems and the need for collaboration between different individuals and organizations. Six systems are directly identified in the NRG and include: community and social, economic and financial, infrastructure, environmental, governance, and housing.48 As an example of the benefit this guidance could have provided, one can look at the efforts to provide housing to disaster victims. First, there could have been increased collaboration between different housing systems from the beginning, which would have assisted tens of thousands of households who found themselves still relying on FEMA for housing assistance almost two years after Hurricane Katrina.49 This led to efforts to get victims into permanent housing through the creation of the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP): a joint effort between HUD and FEMA that largely relied on partnerships with local public housing agencies, further highlighting the need for a systems-based approach. Additionally, community knowledge would have assisted in better understanding the demographics who were more severely affected by the disaster since the average annual income of DHAP recipients was $18,500.50
Due to a lack of understanding of the socioeconomic situations of disaster victims in need of housing support, more than half of DHAP participants were still receiving housing vouchers by 2011, and by 2015, 35% were still receiving assistance from HUD.51 Increased knowledge of environmental and infrastructure systems would have allowed for a more thorough understanding of the threat posed by a hurricane like Katrina, which areas would be most affected, and how they would be affected. In this case, thirty-eight percent of those receiving housing assistance from HUD in 2015 were in the Orleans Parish area, and twenty-one percent were in other areas of the state of Louisiana.52 Furthermore, if governmental systems were connected to one another and with community and social systems, they could have been more aware of the staffing and resource shortages in these areas and provided additional support where it was most needed. Lastly, economic and financial systems could have been better leveraged to provide vital supplies, and perhaps even support victims as they attempted to find employment or acquire housing to begin rebuilding their lives.
Conclusion
The case of Hurricane Katrina shows how interconnected each of these systems are, and how important it is to establish frameworks like the NRG that work to understand and leverage the knowledge and expertise within each of these systems. This approach could have greatly benefited the federal response to Hurricane Katrina by improving communication, coordination, trust, and understanding between various stakeholders. Of course, intentional efforts to lead the organization through this change in strategy, such as creating a sense of urgency, forming a coalition, developing and communicating a shared vision, and removing barriers to action would be needed to make this work in a practical sense.53 By releasing the NRG, FEMA has already worked to develop and communicate their vision. However, they still need to ensure that each regional office is working to communicate this change to local partner organizations in all sectors, while creating a sense of urgency for why the new framework is needed. This sense of urgency can come from case examples such as this that show the impacts of not using a systems thinking framework in disaster situations. Next, they need to be sure to bring all stakeholders together under their new vision and remove any potential barriers to collaboration. This piece has explored a few examples where––despite organizations’ willingness to partner or assist in recovery efforts––the bureaucratic barriers they encountered proved to be insurmountable. These steps can aid FEMA in implementing this change at all levels, while bringing their partners along with them to ensure better preparedness in responding to the rising threat posed by more severe natural disasters.
Works Cited
1. World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Devastating Atlantic Hurricane Season Comes to an End. https://wmo.int/media/news/devastating-atlantic-hurricane-season-comes-end.
2. Ibid.
3. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2024. National Resilience Guidance: A Collaborative Approach to Building Resilience. August. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_national-resilience-guidance_august2024.pdf.
4. Ibid.
5. Department of Homeland Security. 2024. Community Resilience | National Risk Index. https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/community-resilience.
6. Homeland Security Committee. 2023. Subcommittee Chairman D’Esposito: Federal Coordination with Local Governments Who “Know Their Communities Best” is Crucial for Disaster Mitigation. November 28. https://homeland.house.gov/2023/11/28/subcommittee-chairman-desposito-federal-coordination-with-local-governments-who-know-their-communities-best-is-crucial-for-disaster-mitigation/.
7. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. February. https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/govdocs/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf.
8. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2006.Summary Report on Building Performance: Hurricane Katrina. https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/fema_548_summary_report_building_performance_hurricane_katrina_2005.pdf.
9. Richardson, Tonya. 2021.A Look Back at Hurricane Katrina. HUD User. September 21. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/pdredge/pdr-edge-frm-asst-sec-092121.html.
10. FEMA. 2006. Summary Report on Building Performance.
11. Rhodes, J., C. Chan, C. Paxson, C. E. Rouse, M. Waters, and E. Fussell. 2010. “The Impact of Hurricane Katrina on the Mental and Physical Health of Low-Income Parents in New Orleans.”American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 80, no. 2: 237–247. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3276074/.
12. FEMA. 2006. Summary Report on Building Performance.
13. World Meteorological Organization. 2024. Devastating Atlantic Hurricane Season Comes to an End.
14. Barnes, Michael D., C. L. Hanson, L. M. B. Novilla, A. T. Meacham, E. McIntyre, and B. C. Erickson. 2008. “Analysis of Media Agenda Setting During and After Hurricane Katrina: Implications for Emergency Preparedness, Disaster Response, and Disaster Policy.”American Journal of Public Health 98, no. 4: 604–610. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2376984/.
15. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
16. Ibid.
17. Booz Allen Hamilton. 2003. The Four Bases of Organizational DNA. Strategy+Business. https://www.strategy-business.com/article/03406.
18. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Edwards, Chris. 2015. Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures. Cato Institute. August 28. https://www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-remembering-federal-failures.
24. Moynihan, Donald P. 2009. The Response to Hurricane Katrina. International Risk Governance Council. https://beta.irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Hurricane_Katrina_full_case_study_web.pdf.
25. Chuck, Elizabeth. 2015. Where is Disgraced Former FEMA Chief Michael Brown Now? NBC News. August 27. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-katrina-anniversary/heck-job-brownie-where-disgraced-fema-head-now-n400436.
26. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
27. Chuck. 2015. Where is Disgraced Former FEMA Chief Michael Brown Now?
28. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
29. Moynihan. 2009. The Response to Hurricane Katrina.
30. White House Archives. 2006.The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Woods, William T. 2006. Hurricane Katrina: Improving Federal Contracting Practices in Disaster Recovery Operations. U.S. Government Accountability Office. https://www.gao.gov/assets/a113788.html.
34. Ibid.
35. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
36. Moynihan. 2009. The Response to Hurricane Katrina.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. White House Archives. 2006.The Response to Hurricane Katrina.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Solomon, John, and Spencer S. Hsu. 2007.S. Didn’t Accept Most Foreign Katrina Aid. NBC News. April 29. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna18341744.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. White House Archives. 2006. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina.
47. Ibid.
48. FEMA. 2024. National Resilience Guidance.
49. Richardson. 2021. A Look Back at Hurricane Katrina.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Kotter, John P. 2013. Leading Change. New York: Macmillan Audio.
