Trouble Behind Frontlines: How Russia’s Occupation is Re-Molding Ukraine’s Socio-Cultural Landscape

Graphic by Norie Wright

By Sergiy Sydorenko

Edited by Grant Ewing and Courtney Schneider

Introduction

The Russo-Ukrainian War has prompted many diverse discussions among western analysts. Much attention has been given to the global economic fallout caused by the war, as well as western military assistance to Ukraine. However, few are paying attention to what takes place behind no man’s land, in the territories currently occupied by Russian forces covering most or all of the following Ukrainian oblasts: Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Figure 1). Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Moscow has steadily implemented Russification, the policy of assimilating non-Russians into Russian culture.¹ Anti-Ukrainian human rights abuses and millions of forced out-migrants are re-molding Ukraine’s socio-cultural landscape. Should Ukraine liberate its occupied territory, Kyiv will face the challenge of undoing Moscow’s administrative and societal Russification.

Figure 1 – Ukrainian oblasts under partial or full Russian occupation³⁴ (Crimea was annexed in 2014, while Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk were annexed in September 2022)

History of Russification in Ukraine

While most of modern-day Ukraine has been intermittently under Russian control since the mid-seventeenth century, Russification intensified in the 1840s¹ when Moscow became concerned about growing Ukrainian identity. Notable examples of tsarist Russification are the Valuev Circular and the Ems Decree²–laws forbidding the publication of Ukrainian books, performing Ukrainian theater, or lecturing in Ukrainian. Following the communist revolution in 1917, there was a brief reversal of this approach. In the 1920s, the Soviets implemented korenizatsiia (“indigenization”), which promoted the use of native Ukrainian languages and the practice of ethnic customs.¹ The policy aimed to make the new communist system more attractive to non-Russians, and Ukrainians – being the largest minority – were quick to benefit from it both politically and culturally.¹ 

By the 1930s, however, Stalin, fearing a rise of nationalism, reversed the indigenization policy and began purging anyone associated with it.¹ As a result, tens of thousands of Ukrainian politicians, artists, and intelligentsia – politically-influential intellectuals – were imprisoned and killed.¹ Simultaneously, five to seven million people died³ in rural Ukraine in the Holodomor – a famine caused by Stalin’s collectivization policies¹ that aimed to jumpstart the USSR’s industrialization. The Soviets also forced mass migrations:⁴ hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were deported to Siberia and Central Asia, and the barren countryside was then repopulated with ethnic Russians. Stalin’s draconian purges continued until he died in 1953, after which the persecution of minorities declined.¹ However, Russification continued quietly through the promotion and increased use of the Russian language until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.⁵

Legacy of Russification and Contemporary Ukraine

Modern-day Ukraine reflects the complex history of Russification. About one-third of the population speaks Russian and is predominantly located in Ukraine’s aforementioned southeastern oblasts: Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Figure 2). Similarly, the country’s ethnic Russians – about 17 percent of the population⁶ – reside in these same southeastern oblasts.⁷ The long period of Russification has also led to political rifts and contributed to the region’s voting habits. Since Ukrainian independence, Moscow has relied on its vast media to help sway its Russian-leaning population in Ukraine; while the media had little effect on pro-Western Ukrainians, it helped secure pro-Russian votes of ethnic Russians and undecided voters.⁸ For instance, ethnic Russians, or those predominantly using the Russian language, were less likely to vote for pro-Western policies.⁹ Furthermore, unlike other areas of Ukraine, Russian-speaking areas are mostly concerned with the status of the Russian language¹⁰ and gaining regional autonomy. 

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Figure 2 – Language map of Ukraine³² (lighter areas represent smaller numbers of Ukrainian speakers)

Russia’s 2022 Invasion and Renewal of Russification

As of 2023, large parts of Ukrainian territory are under Russian occupation and facing a new wave of Russification. Although Moscow annexed the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts in September 2022, they were subjected to Russification far earlier in the war. From the first days of occupation, the Kremlin sent its media outlets to occupied territories to promote Russian troops as saviors, justifying their war in Ukraine as liberation from Nazis.¹¹ The occupiers also raised billboards depicting famous Russian military figures, spreading pro-Russian sentiment, and promoting the narrative of Russo-Ukrainian fraternity.¹² 

In May 2022, Russia began targeting the occupied regions’ administrative and educational ties to Kyiv: The Kremlin introduced the ruble as the new currency in Kherson, and Russian banks were scheduled to open in the city in 2023.¹³ Ukrainian books and educational materials were destroyed, and teachers throughout the occupied territories were forced to cooperate under threat of violence and death.¹⁴ In September 2022, the Kremlin introduced a new, pro-Russian curriculum that marginalizes Ukrainian identity and undermines Ukraine’s statehood.¹⁵ Further, many local teachers have fled or have been detained, and Moscow has been incentivizing Russian teachers to move to occupied Ukrainian territories.¹⁶ 

There is also a spiritual aspect to the occupation, namely the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Over the past decade, the ROC has become intertwined with the Russian government, and like the Kremlin, it has a large stake in Ukraine:¹⁷ The country has over 12,000 ROC parishes,¹⁸ which translates into vast soft power and considerable income for the ROC. After Moscow’s invasion, the ROC ordered a consolidation of all parishes in occupied areas.¹⁹ Churches in Crimea were also transferred to the direct control of the Moscow Patriarchate.²⁰

The Russification of occupied Ukraine is only half the story: The Kremlin’s Russification policy has been enhanced by population displacement resulting from the invasion. When the war started in 2014, over half a million Ukrainians were internally displaced in Ukraine and hundreds of thousands left the country.²¹ An even greater exodus occurred following Russia’s 2022 invasion: As of January 2023, there are eight million Ukrainian refugees²² and nearly six million internally displaced persons.²³ While the majority of these refugees are in western and central European countries, 2.85 million are in Russia.²⁴ It is difficult to say how many fled to Russia voluntarily, and how many were deported through filtration camps²⁵ where physical abuse, detention, and torture are frequently reported.²⁶ Russian filtration camp authorities also reportedly confiscate Ukrainian citizenship documents, replacing them with Russian passports.²⁷ 

In July 2022, the U.S. State Department reported that 260,000 Ukrainian children were “forcibly deported”²⁷ to Russia. Since the invasion, there have been numerous additional cases of forced family separation, in which Ukrainian children have been taken from their parents and placed for adoption in Russia.²⁸ Ukrainians that stayed in occupied regions, however, have not fared much better. At the onset of the invasion, tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly mobilized in the separatist-controlled Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.²⁹ The process was repeated during Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022,²⁹ this time forcing mobilization across all occupied Ukrainian territories. The result has been a double-edged sword:³⁰ those opposed to Russia’s invasion have fled, been deported, or have gone into hiding to avoid persecution, and the few remaining civilians support Russia’s war. This mirrors the outcomes following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea and the Donbas, but on a larger scale. As a result, the Kremlin has already won one victory: entrenching staunch Russian supporters in occupied territories, people who despise all things Ukraine.

Conclusion

As of February 2023, Russia occupies roughly 17 percent of Ukrainian territory³¹ (Figure 3). The Kremlin’s occupation has begun a renewed Russification of the region. These policies – aimed at assimilating Ukrainians in occupied lands and migrating Russians into areas previously inhabited by Ukrainians – have been enhanced by the migration crisis caused by the war. While the outcome of the war is not certain, one thing is: the behind-the-scenes Russification is undermining Ukrainian identity and statehood day by day. Should Ukraine liberate its lost territory, it will not only have to deal with war-torn cities, but also with the economic, administrative, and socio-cultural impacts of Russia’s occupation.

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Figure 3 – Russian Invasion of Ukraine³⁹ (as of February 26, 2023)

Endnotes

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