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The Current

The Public Policy Journal
of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs

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

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Mission Statement

As the academic journal of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs (CIPA), *The Current* provides a platform for public policy discourse through the work of CIPA fellows and their mentors, with contributions from the public affairs community.

Editor's Note

After a semester of much work and, at last, satisfaction, the members of The Current are pleased to present the fall 2007 edition.

We began the semester with a plan to organize this edition around the dichotomous themes of stability and conflict. What we found, however, is that it is the nature of policy dialogue to emerge when we find ourselves on the cusp of change - that moment of great potential when we begin to take steps toward one of these two conditions. Whether reading about wetland restoration, education policy, economic development in Greece, the state of African orphans in times of crises, or factors that provoke race riots, it is evident that we are not in a steady state of either stability or conflict, but rather, poised to act. As nations, international communities, and individuals we are asked to engage in such dialogues as these and, in so doing, actively shape our world.

We are honored this semester to publish Dr. Bassam Tibi's remarks on religious pluralism in the context of Euro-Islam. He is honored around the world for his contributions to the global discourse on Islamic culture and we are proud of this opportunity to share his ideas with you.

I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to the journal's dedicated and enthusiastic editorial board, which has brought great energy and talent to these pages.

We hope you enjoy our publication!

Sincerely,
Amanda LaBelle

The Current reflects the diverse political, cultural, and personal experiences of CIPA fellows and faculty. The views presented are not necessarily the opinions of *The Current*, the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs or Cornell University.

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Manipulating the Metric:
No Child Left Behind and AYP Measurement

Paula E. Reichel

ABSTRACT:
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 set uniform thresholds for student achievement, applied and enforced through annual test-based measurement. This paper analyzes the efficacy of the law's adequate yearly progress benchmarks and evaluates three policy alternatives to NCLB's group status model: multiple-indicator based adequate yearly progress, nationalized proficiency standards, and growth model measurement. Growth models, which can be used to measure changes in individual student proficiency over time, are endorsed as the optimal solution to correct for current AYP measurement deficiencies.

In a speech given on October 18, 2006 in North Carolina's Waldo C. Falkener Elementary School, President Bush acknowledged the overriding importance of No Child Left Behind's (NCLB) evaluation provisions, tying accountability to the direct success of the law. He stated, "I believe the accountability system is the first step in making sure no child is left behind."[1] The President was correct to identify test-based accountability measures and supporting corrective remedies as the most significant pillar of NCLB. However, the President failed to acknowledge the dysfunctions of the law's accountability architecture, namely that the dominant performance measures for gauging student and school-wide academic improvement under NCLB have not shown to successfully measure progress under the law. As the bill's 100 percent compliance date of 2014 draws nearer, the impact of NCLB's imprecise measuring methodology compounds, effectively inhibiting individual school progress and undermining the efficacy of accountability-based federal education reform.

Closing NCLB's implicit achievement gap has become a top priority for the 110th Congress, which opened discussion on the topic in hopes of reauthorizing the bill in 2007. Although the Bush Administration and top-ranking House Education and Workforce Committee officials have promised a prioritized - and thus accelerated - reauthorization process, many Washington insiders and policy analysts predict that NCLB reauthorization will be postponed until after the results of the 2008 presidential election.[2] This extended negotiation period will provide Congress with the opportunity to weigh various accountability adjustment proposals, in the hopes of reaching a strong bipartisan

solution consistent with the core principles of NCLB. This report compares the costs and benefits of three policy alternatives for resolving NCLB measurement deficiencies: multiple-indicator based adequate yearly progress, nationalized proficiency standards, and growth model measurement. Growth model measurement is endorsed as the optimal solution.

Present Conditions and Accountability Failures

No Child Left Behind authorizes the federal government to ensure uniform progress for all students by setting performance-based standards in the areas of reading and math.[3] The statute imposes federal learning benchmarks in order to realize a "threshold level" of achievement for all students, specifically those in disadvantaged subgroups.[4] All public schools and school districts must meet or exceed escalating Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) benchmarks to remain compliant under the law, which calculates incremental yearly proficiency rates up to the 2013-14 target for absolute compliance.[5]

The NCLB regulatory statute is supported by a system of sanctions for noncompliance, which are applied to induce institutional reform and provide alternatives for students in underperforming schools. NCLB sanctions can be administered against the over fifty-five percent of all public schools and nearly all of the nation's school districts that receive federal funds under Title 1-A, a federal grant awarded to Local Education Agencies with high percentages of low-income students, in order to improve the "academic achievement of the disadvantaged".[6] After missing AYP for one year, a school's district and state must propose a two-year intervention plan and students are offered the right to transfer to other district public or charter schools.[7] A school missing two consecutive years of AYP is categorized as being a "school in need of improvement" (SINI) and must begin offering low-income students supplemental services such as tutoring.[8] Year three of noncompliance begins the period of corrective action, in which the school must choose to make one internal "meaningful" change from a list drafted by the Department of Education.[9] Finally, after five years of noncompliance, a school must implement alternative governance arrangements such as reopening as a charter school, replacing school administration and staff, or submitting to state takeover.[10]

NCLB standards-based evaluation is designed to close the achievement gap by disaggregating performance data and applying one single proficiency target to several recognized demographic groups.[11] This method of measurement, known as the group status model, records current year performance for several disadvantaged student

subgroups: ethnic and racial, low-income, disabled, and limited English proficiency.[12] Under NCLB, there is no distinction between schools missing AYP projections for one subgroup and those that miss in multiple categories. The law therefore obscures the scope of school failure by imposing "all or nothing" compliance labels backed by inequitable sanctions.[13]

NCLB's escalating proficiency standard has left many schools struggling to reach yearly targets. In the 2005-06 school year, the nationwide proportion of schools meeting AYP standards fell, while the percentage of schools classified as SINI rose.[14] These statistics are consonant with criticism of NCLB's goal of absolute compliance; as time elapses more schools will be unable to meet rising NCLB standards.[15] In Ohio, the number of schools meeting AYP declined from seventy-six percent in 2004-05 to sixty-one percent in 2005-06, while the percentage of SINI rose from thirteen to twenty-eight percent during the same period.[16]

The current trend of increasing noncompliance can also be attributed to the standard fluctuations of test-based accountability. Brian Stecher of RAND Corporation notes that immediate gains in achievement scores may be misleading, since initially many teachers will be pressured into boosting student scores by "teaching to the test."[17] All else being equal, this initial increase in test scores will level off. Many local and state officials worry that a majority, if not all, schools will be noncompliant under the present accountability system as the goal of absolute proficiency draws nearer.[18] NCLB's group status model method of accountability measurement, which was designed to provide schools with increased flexibility to meet individual student needs at both the state and local level, is proving to be extremely rigid in application.

In addition to the group status model, the NCLB statute authorized a secondary form of accountability measurement known as the "safe harbor provision" to account for performance improvements made below AYP proficiency levels. The safe harbor model recognizes successive group improvement by specifying the change in subgroup achievement from year to year.[19] Under safe harbor, a school will be classified as meeting AYP targets if the percentage of students scoring below proficiency decreases by ten percent from the previous year.[20] Since NCLB was enacted, this provision has been invoked relatively infrequently, conceivably because a ten percent improvement standard is too high for already underperforming groups to meet.[21] Consequently, the dual-part model of NCLB AYP measurement fails to qualify schools with larger numbers of low performing students, which remain at a disadvantage under the law.

Assessing State Standards under NCLB

NCLB has engendered a cycle of self-defeating behaviors wherein the mounting number of noncompliant schools generates an increase in the pressure placed on states' boards of education to produce results, prompting many states to lower their academic proficiency standards to shield themselves from federal accountability. This "race to the bottom" has quietly undermined the entire NCLB accountability system.[22] A study by the Fordham Institute found that since NCLB's inception in 2001, thirty-seven states have revised or replaced pre-NCLB standards in at least one subject area and twenty-seven states have modified all pre-existing benchmarks. Yet, on the whole, post-NCLB state standards were found to be no more effective than their pre-NCLB counterparts.[23]

Figure 1 : Fordham Foundation State Standards Ratings, 2000 & 2006

	2000 Average	2006 Average	2000 Honors (# of states)	2006 Honors (# of states)
English	C-	C+	19	20
Mathematics	C	D+	18	6
Science	C	C-	19	19
U.S. History	D+	D+	10	11
Geography	C-	N/A	15	N/A
World History	N/A	D+	N/A	12
All Subjects	C-	C-	9	9

Source: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, 2006 The State of State Standards

Evaluating scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a longstanding nationwide standardized test, against post-NCLB qualifying state exams has shed light on the extent and prevalence of standard modification. The NAEP, begun in 1969 as a gauge of American school proficiency in the areas of reading, writing, math, U.S. history, geography, as well as other subjects, was made compulsory for all schools receiving Title 1 funds under NCLB.[24] With its nationalized achievement categories of basic, proficient, and advanced, NAEP serves as a tool for auditing NCLB state standards.[25] The results from 2003, the first year of compulsory biennial testing, revealed the large discrepancies in state standards. While both Texas and South Carolina schools were around one quarter proficient in reading on the NAEP, Texas showed eighty-three percent reading proficiency on its state NCLB exam, while South Carolina showed only twenty-nine percent proficiency.[26] From 2003-05, twenty states showed gains on their eighth grade reading exams. This increase, however, was not reflected in any

of the states NAEP reading scores as the number of students testing proficient or above remained unchanged.[27] The results of the NAEP's audit of NCLB's state standards are inescapable. Overwhelmingly, it has been proven that there is almost no relationship between the percentage of students reaching proficiency levels on the NAEP and those deemed proficient according to state NCLB standards.[28]

The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 established federal supremacy in education policy, an area that had been traditionally reserved to the states. Prior to the National Defense Education Act of 1958, which used federal grant-in-aid power to stimulate state policy change, the role of the federal government in education policy was limited to providing aid in the form of broadly designated grants and supplying the states with specialized technical assistance.[29] The 1965 enactment of the Johnson Administration's Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) greatly expanded the realm of federal authority by authorizing the creation of federal compensatory education programs to further educational equality.[30] NCLB, which is a reauthorization of the ESEA, is an attempt at striking a balance between federal mandate and state independence by nationalizing a structure for test-based accountability, but awarding the states discretionary power to set measurement standards. Varying state standards are at the core of NCLB's accountability shortcomings. NCLB does not enforce nationalized achievement standards; rather each state determines a unique definition of proficiency, specific academic course requirements, a standardized test structure, and NCLB proficiency determinants.[31] Therefore, under current NCLB measuring methodology there can be no comparisons made between states, only within.[32]

States are also given different starting points under the law. The number of students needed to determine AYP proficiency is calculated by a specific federal formula which yields different results for each of the fifty states.[33] To meet AYP in South Carolina in 2003, for example, out of all elementary and middle school students, 17.4 percent had to score proficient in English and 15.5 percent in math.[34] That same year Delaware required 57 percent reading proficiency and 33 percent math proficiency.[35] Statewide changes in the definition of what constitutes meeting or exceeding AYP can also radically change a state's appearance under the law. From the 2003 to the 2004 school year, the percentage of Oklahoma schools failing to make AYP fell by 85 percent, not because of dramatic improvement, but because of a technical change made to the NCLB formula.[36] States also are given the flexibility to determine subgroup sample size or the number of students required for a disadvantaged group to be statistically significant under the law.[37] States with higher sample sizes will have fewer schools with student groups large enough to warrant independent AYP measurement. With fewer subgroups to be held accountable for, a school will have a higher probability of making AYP targets.

State Requests for Reform

In addition to shirking responsibility by exploiting legal loopholes, some states have passed legislation which exempts state schools from the law. In Utah, precedence is now given to state educational policy when state and federal NCLB laws conflict.[38] More than thirty states have also introduced, but not passed, bills that would release them from the requirements imposed by NCLB.[39]

States such as Florida have also sought and won state-specific legal exemptions to the No Child Left Behind law. In 2004, 75 percent of Florida schools did not make AYP, half of which had been awarded an "A" by Florida's own much heralded test-based accountability program the A+ Plan for Education.[40] To remedy this inconsistency, in 2005 the Department of Education granted Florida a new AYP designation, "Provisional AYP", which recognized the achievement of those schools under Florida's A+ Plan for Education receiving either an A or B, but which miss one or more of the thirty-nine AYP criteria.[41] The new designation had a profound impact. In 2006, out of 3,193 Florida schools receiving Title 1 funds, 906 made AYP and 1,240 made the new provisional AYP.[42] In April 2005, in reaction to multiple state appeals for state-adapted AYP classification, Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings introduced the Department's "new, common sense approach to implementation."[43] This new approach gave credence to states' calls for reform. States would now be allowed to modify their individual accountability schemes through measures such as delaying yearly performance target increases or requiring larger subgroup sample sizes. While this piecemeal approach satiated many state legislatures, to Martin West, Brookings fellow and Brown University professor of education and public policy, this new "patchwork" was yet another incomplete attempt at reform that adversely motivated states to rely on the skills of statisticians as much as those of educators.[44]

State appeals for AYP reform have been validated by studies tracking individual student progress against AYP compliance. During the 2003-04 Florida school year, student gains in reading performance for those schools making regular AYP were on average no larger than the gains of students enrolled in noncompliant schools.[45] The findings in Florida have been reflected across the country. A study of 840 schools in 22 states commissioned by the Northwest Evaluation Association proved that the loose connection between individual growth and AYP measurement was a national problem.

Demographic Discrepancies & NCLB

Distinctions between compliant and noncompliant schools reflect varying student demographic concentrations as well as levels of

educational quality, showing a bias in the way AYP is measured.[46] In 2003, schools not making AYP had on average forty percent more poor students and greater numbers of minorities than those meeting AYP.[47] Schools have been failing under NCLB, not because their students cannot learn or their teaching is inadequate, but because NCLB fails to acknowledge the progress made by schools that began the program with large numbers of low-performing students. In this way, NCLB tends to unfairly burden schools that are maximally integrated. In 2003, seventeen of nineteen Delaware school districts failed to meet NCLB targets.[48] Some speculated that this was not because of a poor statewide educational system, but because Delaware schools are some of the most highly integrated in the country.

NCLB's inadequate measurement system frustrates more than just state and local leadership. "Parents face a paradox. They have access to loads of new data, but because the yardstick keeps changing and comparability ends at the state line, they actually have little information about how their child's school is really doing."[49] This uncertainty about NCLB effectiveness was reflected in a 2006 PDK/Gallup poll which showed that nearly six in ten Americans familiar with NCLB believe it has either had no effect on schools or has harmed them.[50]

Reauthorization Without Modification

The Thomas Fordham 2006 State of the State standards report concludes that "the three-legged stool of standards, tests, and accountability must be sturdy lest the entire enterprise tip over."[51] If NCLB is reauthorized without modifications to its AYP measurement models, today's existing problems will soon intensify. With each new school year comes a higher AYP standard. As performance targets rise, more and more schools will fail to make AYP, many of which may have been labeled as successful under state measurements. Frequent dichotomous outcomes will put the legitimacy and credibility of the entire system at risk. If by 2014 most schools fail to make the rigorous 100 percent compliance rate, then, based on its own precepts, NCLB will have failed.

Solution 1: Multiple Indicator AYP Measurement

One solution that has been proposed to solve the problem of inaccurate AYP calculations is to recalculate the way AYP is measured by crediting states for improvements to indicators other than standardized test scores.[52] Proponents of this strategy, including many teachers unions, school boards, and school administrators, believe

that standardized testing does not adequately measure educational quality or student achievement and that NCLB should be restructured to encourage teachers to focus on working toward the development of well-rounded students. In 2005, Senator Dodd introduced the No Child Left Behind Reform Act which proposed altering the way states make AYP calculations by crediting states for, among other measures, improvements made to school dropout rates, advanced placement course enrollment, and student improvement over time.[53] Representative George Miller, chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, recently endorsed a multiple-indicator evaluation method in his 2007 "discussion draft" NCLB reauthorization bill.[54] Miller's draft proposes that states retain assessment tests, but be allowed the opportunity to apply to the Secretary of Education to request the incorporation of expanded performance measures.[55]

These proposals come at a time when scholarship has begun to measure the effects of NCLB on subject diversification and curriculum structure. Recent studies have shown that one result of NCLB's test-driven structure has been a decrease in instructional time devoted to subjects not covered on NCLB tests, such as social studies, the arts, and physical education.[56] Brian Stecher of Rand Corporation argues that while math and reading are important, NCLB's narrow testing focus depresses the importance of other subjects in the curriculum. Stecher notes, "Shouldn't schools be working to see that no child is left behind in writing, social studies, science, computer skills, art, music, and physical fitness as well?"[57] Stecher cites that these "other" subjects are of critical importance later in life as students go off to college, enter the workforce, and become engaged citizens. School quality, he argues, should be assessed by taking a broader look at what factors matter most "to students, parents, and society."[58]

Findings suggest that NCLB might benefit from testing a wide range of subjects, to prevent the devaluation of non-test based curriculum by educators and school districts. As education sociologist David Labarre notes, NCLB's narrow testing focus can reinforce the student mindset that information is only important if it is tested.[59] The student who focuses solely on the question "will this be on the test?" personally deemphasizes or disregards all information she or he does not believe to be valuable. To this student, value is derived from testing and reward. "Whatever is not on the test is not worth knowing and whatever is on the test need be learned only in the superficial manner that is required to achieve a passing grade."[60] Statewide testing under NCLB was designed to help teachers and school districts identify their weaknesses and begin taking measures to correct for deficiencies. However, some, including assessment expert W. James Popham, have found that many of the tests used to meet the NCLB requirement are "unable to detect even striking instructional improvements when such improvements occur."[61]

Those hoping to alter the dominant AYP model through the use of multiple indicators may have different opinions regarding what specific measures should be integrated into the assessment tool, but each shares a common understanding of the benefits of recalculation. By refocusing state NCLB tests or including factors outside of test scores in AYP calculation, student and school achievement will rise and NCLB will more accurately measure school efficacy. Educators will not feel constrained to focus on specific subject areas or spend as much time teaching specifically to the test. In a survey conducted in Wisconsin, teachers were given the opportunity to list what they believed to be both the positive and negative consequences of NCLB. One educator wrote "One huge consequence is that the testing shifts the focus, for at least a month, from learning to testing. This plays out in many ways from the time actually spent testing to loss of guidance and….administrative support."[62] Likewise, if teachers spend less time emphasizing the value of tested material, students will be more likely to abandon short-sighted academic testing mentalities.

Opponents of multiple indicator assessment believe such efforts to be a renunciation of test-based accountability, the keystone of NCLB. Success indicators such as attendance rates are a "slippery slope" toward diluting all accountability provisions.[63] Another key question becomes: to what extent would looking beyond testing change performance incentives under the law? Under this proposal, resulting variations in individual statewide allowances would be yet another factor which would impede comparability across state lines. Disagreement on the type and number of non-test related factors could lead to AYP measurement being politicized as each state debates what combination of variables would serve to most accurately represent a school's true academic performance.

Solution 2: Nationalize NCLB Standards and Testing

A more radical remedy for NCLB's AYP predicament is to eliminate state control and manipulation of AYP cut rates by mandating nationalized NCLB proficiency tests and standards. Nationalization would bring an end to the states' "race to the bottom" by precluding the modification of NCLB standards.[64] Under this model, states would be denied the right to adapt accountability plans and flexibility under the law would be narrowly construed as the capacity to pursue effective pedantic methods for increasing test scores. However, what the states lose in adaptability, the public gains in transparency. Nationalizing NCLB, if done well, has the potential to put the nation back on course to true standards based reform, wherein every student takes the same exam, is evaluated by the same measure, and benefits from curriculum standardization.[65]

A nationalized NCLB would create a "more coherent and consistent educational experience for American children" by eliminating current inequities in state standards.[66] Under NCLB, state education standards are in a state of disarray, varying in form from explicit rubrics to "vague platitudes" by which to measure student achievement.[67] In its 2006 State of the State Standards Report, the Fordham Institute notes "the quality of a state's standards matters hugely, much like the quality of an architect's blueprint."[68] The Fordham report assigns grades to state standards on a traditional A to F scale. On opposite ends of the spectrum are Indiana and Wyoming. Indiana's standards, which received an "A" score in all subject categories, were detailed, robust, thorough, and explicit in form.[69] On the opposite side of the spectrum, Wyoming's standards, which received a failing mark in all categories, were given this reprimand:

> Throughout the noxious fumes of vagueness waft. If Wyoming doesn't retool these standards, the state's teachers may all instruct their students from the same document, but still teach entirely different things and have entirely different expectations. That's not what standards are all about, Wyoming. That's not what they are about at all.[70]

Proponents of nationalized education standards have frequently revived and advanced the concept, but to no avail. Both President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton attempted to institute a plan for some degree of nationalized educational standards during their tenures.[71] President Bush's nationalization plan failed in design and Clinton's "voluntary national test" plan was disparaged for lacking clarity and transparency.[72] Precedent has shown that nationalized standards face a political quagmire. Although both Republicans and Democrats have, at times, supported nationalization initiatives, neither party can find a politically feasible and pragmatic policy solution. If left to the manipulation of various state and federal stakeholder groups, national standards face the same hazards as state standards; they could be clearly formulated and academically rigorous or completely ineffective if "vague, politically correct, encyclopedic, or fuzzy."[73]

To be successful, nationalized reform would have to navigate many political obstacles. Former Assistant Secretary of Education Chester Finn Jr. once deftly remarked that national standards would never work in America because "Republicans oppose any proposal with the word national in it; Democrats oppose anything with the word standards."[74] Political impediments, in addition to the high probability of lackluster reform, are weaknesses stemming from traditional American opposition to nationalization. Without the impetus of dramatic political or cultural

shifts, the short term success of any nationalization proposal is highly unlikely. To remedy the pressing problems of NCLB what is needed is not hard-wrought institutional change, but politically feasible incremental reform.

Solution 3: Growth Model Programs

NCLB's primary accountability model for AYP measurement is a static assessment tool. Congressman George Miller, chief architect of NCLB, noted that one of the most basic arguments posited against group status accountability models is that "you cannot assess the success or failure of a school on one test, on one day."[75] To transform the system from static to dynamic measurement requires the addition of longitudinal data to forecast a student's or group's rate of change over time. Many states have strongly lobbied for the inclusion of longitudinal or growth-based accountability models in NCLB AYP calculation. Growth models, which track individual student achievement over time, would create a new type of proficiency standard to recognize the "additional academic value" schools impart to their students and acknowledge progress made at all levels of proficiency.[76] Speaking on behalf of growth model assessments, Allan Olson, chief academic officer of the Northwest Evaluation Association, stated "Growth could be the best accountability measure. It is also the best possible way to improve our capacity to improve student learning."[77]

Department of Education Growth Model Pilot Program

In response to requests for alternative accountability provisions on November 18, 2005, Secretary Spellings announced the commencement of a pilot growth-based accountability program for NCLB.[78] Under this pilot program, states could propose growth model accountability systems as a method of AYP measurement in addition to the current group status model and the safe harbor provision.[79] Growth models, which had been a key feature of many states' accountability programs, would give schools credit for improvements made to individual student achievement from one year to the next as measured by state achievement tests.[80] The pilot strictly defined growth model proposals as having to meet a set of key criteria to ensure compatibility with NCLB's primary accountability provisions referred to as "bright-line" principles:

1. Incorporation of the goal of ultimate compliance by the 2013-14 school year.
2. Achievement gaps among subgroups must decrease in order to meet AYP.

3. Annual achievement goals must be set on the basis of a student's background or school characteristics and must be based on performance standards.
4. The accountability system must produce comparable grade-level and yearly results.
5. A state data system must be utilized to track individual student data. [81]

No more than ten states were allowed to take part in the pilot beginning in the 2005-06 school year.[82] In order to be approved, states' proposals had to pass two levels of peer review, completed by a panel of ten outside experts selected from academia, the private sector, and state and local educational agencies.[83] The panel approved proposals which were mathematically sound, executable, and in line with NCLB principles. Thus far, although twenty states have submitted proposals, only Tennessee and North Carolina were approved for and participated in the first round of the pilot in 2005. Six additional states-Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, and Iowa-have been subsequently approved to take part in the pilot. Ohio has been tentatively approved, on the condition that the state adopts a uniform minimum subgroup size.[84]

Attesting to the value of the pilot program, Secretary Spellings stated "A growth model is not a way around accountability standards. It's a way for states that are already raising achievement and following the bright-line principles to strengthen accountability."[85] Growth models provide needed flexibility to NCLB by offering a "more accurate assessment of school performance" and reducing the likelihood of schools being falsely identified as being in need of improvement.[86] Growth models also reduce the inherent inequity in NCLB accountability systems by acknowledging student progress made below the proficiency level. On a state-wide level, growth models effectively counteract the pressure put on states to lower proficiency standards in a "race to the bottom" and to petition the Department for special AYP exemptions.[87] The Department of Education now acknowledges the many potential benefits of growth models when used in conjunction with AYP. In addition to Secretary Spellings noting that growth models "hold promise as reliable and innovative methods to measure student achievement over time", Deputy Secretary of Education Raymond Simon remarked that the program "is a very, very important next step in the maturation of NCLB."[88] In January, 2007 the Department of Education released its report "Building on Results: A Blueprint for Strengthening the No Child Left Behind Act" in which "innovative methods" for progress measurement, such as growth models, were supported as "tools to achieve proficiency by 2014" rather than "loopholes to avoid it."[89]

Growth models may also offer increased value to the state beyond meeting NCLB proficiency targets. By tracking the progress of students

over time, longitudinal data can effectively highlight high-performing schools and teachers. The data could also be utilized for other types of educational research, including assessing the impact of multiple criteria on student achievement.[90]

Unfortunately, not all states have the technical capabilities to benefit from growth model systems. In order to be compliant under the growth model pilot program, all states must possess a sound technological infrastructure with the ability to track longitudinal data for individual students.[91] It is estimated that currently only 27 states have the system capabilities to track individual student growth from one year to the next and experts note that even those states with sophisticated data systems have not yet taken the steps to realize the full potential of growth model measurement.[92] States such as Florida and North Carolina with longstanding state pioneered accountability programs have existing databases with the capability to track individual student growth over time; states without preexisting accountability programs may find database creation and upkeep to be costly, technically challenging, and time and resource consuming.[93] To encourage database improvements, the Department of Education approved an initial appropriation of $24.8 million for 2005 and an additional $24.6 million for both 2006 and 2007 to qualifying state education agencies for the development and implementation of longitudinal data systems.[94] Currently, 27 states have received awards through the grant program as depicted in figure 2.

Figure 2: Longitudinal Data System Grant Recipients



Source: National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/Programs/SLDS/stateinfo.asp

Growth Model Pilot Development and Implementation

North Carolina's proposal serves as a model for how to structure NCLB acceptable growth models from existing state achievement measurement systems. North Carolina's state accountability program, called the ABCs of Public Education, has used growth models to evaluate school and district-wide performance since the 1996-97 school year.[95] In North Carolina's growth model pilot proposal, it is noted that under its nine year old accountability system "the achievement gap among ethnic groups appeared to be narrowing."[96] North Carolina's proposal calculates that some 40 of the 932 state public schools that failed to meet AYP targets in the 2004-05 school year would have been compliant using a growth model evaluation.[97] Tennessee, the other state approved for the first round of the pilot, estimated that their growth model would only bring eight schools into compliance under the law.[98] Although the number of schools affected seems small, Connie J. Smith, director of accountability services for the Tennessee Department of Education, maintains "it's always worth doing and using a growth model, even if it helps one school."[99] North Carolina's director of accountability services, Louis Fabrizio suggests that the number of affected schools in the state is lower because North Carolina is a high performing state under NCLB. "For states where fewer students now score at the proficient level, a growth model may prove to be more helpful."[100]

The foundation of North Carolina's growth model is a calculated four year constant "growth trajectory" for all non-proficient students.[101] By basing proficiency on forecasted performance targets, North Carolina plans to employ its growth model as a means to bring all students into NCLB compliance within four years time.[102] A growth trajectory is computed by comparing a student's initial test scores against scores from a later date. Most students' initial score is taken from a pretest administered in the beginning of the third grade.[103] For those unable to take the pretest, the earliest available end-of-grade evaluation is used as a baseline for measurement. Each year, the student's trajectory target is calculated as a "25 percent decrease in the difference from the pretest score on the state's growth scale to the score necessary to be proficient on the test in the fourth year in the tested grades."[104] Any student not meeting their growth trajectory will not be counted as meeting NCLB AYP. North Carolina's growth model will ensure that all students will be proficient or on the "trajectory toward proficiency" by the 2013-14 school year.[105]

Unlike North Carolina, Delaware did not have a functional growth model accountability program in place prior to 2001.[106] Nonetheless, the state did enforce specific accountability standards and was working on

developing a growth model before the passage of NCLB.[107] Delaware's proposed pilot program growth model was developed by a diverse NCLB stakeholder group composed of teachers, administrators, school officers, parents, state and local boards of education members, as well as business owners and representatives from advocacy groups.[108] Unlike the model proposed by North Carolina, Delaware does not set a growth trajectory, but employs a point system in which points are "based on the combination of a student's performance level in two consecutive years."[109] The state's model works hand in hand with Delaware's complex and robust data system, which has enabled state officials to track yearly student growth since 1984.[110] Delaware's technical capabilities put it at the leading edge of educational technology. The state's database is almost "real" time, updated by eighteen of nineteen school districts and nine of thirteen charter schools nightly.[111]

Delaware's growth model assigns points to individual students within a subgroup through the use of a point matrix.[112] The students' points are then added to the subgroups' points and then the average of the subgroup is taken and weighed against a growth standard determined by the NCLB stakeholder group. Real growth, as defined by the group, must be 50 percent of the potential growth, which has been assigned a 300 point value. Therefore, in order to meet AYP through the growth model, subgroups must score an average of 150 points or higher in both the reading and math content areas. [113]

Both North Carolina and Delaware's growth model proposals address how incorporating growth model measurement into current AYP calculations would enhance the flexibility, validity, reliability, and equitability of the NCLB accountability system:

> The intent of the proposed model is to decrease the number of schools falsely identified as being in need of improvement. These identifications are a drain on the limited resources available and dilute the effectiveness of interventions in the schools that are correctly identified as being in need of improvement.[114]

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

Given that accountability is the crux of NCLB, any type of modification to the law made before it is to be reauthorized should begin by reforming the AYP measurement system. Three possible remedies for NCLB's measuring methodology have been analyzed in this report: multiple indicator based AYP measurement, nationalized NCLB proficiency standards, and growth based accountability models. While

each of these three solutions involves both benefits and costs, this report endorses the most politically and economically feasible alternative, the incorporation of longitudinal data studies or growth models into the current group status AYP projection model.

Although the addition of a growth model accountability system would be a relatively small change to the current law, it would impart many benefits. Certain schools incorrectly designated as noncompliant under group status model AYP may meet new growth model targets. This is especially salient for schools that start at low achievement levels or have significant populations of English Language Learners or at-risk students who may need more time to reach proficiency. Improvements made to statewide data systems would increase transparency and efficacy by providing the state with the capability to evaluate the impact of specific influences on student achievement. In reducing the number of schools being misidentified as noncompliant, growth models would reduce the incentive for states to circumvent the law, bolstering the law's credibility.

The costs of growth model measurement, data system implementation, and management are already being partially subsidized by the Department of Education through Statewide Longitudinal Data System Grants. The President's fiscal year 2008 education budget calls for $49.2 million to be allocated to the grant program, almost doubling the amount allocated for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.[115]

If a provision authorizing voluntary growth model adoption is incorporated into the reauthorization of NCLB, it would act as an added incentive for states currently lacking adequate technical capabilities to invest in, or apply for grants to procure, appropriate longitudinal data systems. In keeping with NCLB's focus on increased state and local freedom and control, each state should be able to formulate its own growth model, but should not stray from the seven bright-line principles of NCLB. A standing regulatory panel similar to that used in the pilot program could act as a growth model oversight authority, inspecting the fairness and accuracy of state proposals and examining the impact of subsequent growth model employment.

Secretary Spellings once stated that she perceived No Child Left Behind as having similar characteristics to Ivory Soap, "it's 99 percent pure or something…There's not much needed in the way of change."[116] In truth the law is far from flawless, riddled with technical and systemic deficiencies. The Department of Education has quietly acknowledged some of NCLB's weaknesses by taking steps like the growth model pilot program to modify provisions that undermine the concept of educational accountability. "Higher standards and accountability for results", the main tenets of NCLB, are sound guidelines for education reform, but without a functional assessment infrastructure and proper oversight, these principles inevitably become muddled.[117]

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Min(d)ing the Orphans:
African Crises, Rescue Institutions, and the Economy of Orphanhood

Anila Rehman[1] and Parfait Eloundou-Enyegue

ABSTRACT:
African countries undergoing severe political or health crises must often manage large orphan populations with limited State support. In this effort, they can in principle rely on local and global humanitarian impulse, as channeled through three institutions: informal extended family systems, local NGOs, and international adoption. Using Zimbabwe as a case study, we assess the "caring capacity" of these three institutions, outlining their individual strengths and limitations in breadth, depth, and sustainability of coverage.

We find extended family systems to be increasingly strained, as orphans crowd out other needy children, and as the most desirable family destinations become scarce. Although extended family systems are by far the most potent of these institutions, they receive the least support and are often upstaged by better publicized contributions from NGOs and international actors. Although these three institutions could be complementary, realizing their synergy will require substantial coordination and State involvement. State and community protection is also needed against mercenary impulses to exploit the region's orphan crisis.

Recently, dramatic events have brought media attention to dormant crises in the global orphan care industry. Within a single week between October 30 and November 7, 2007, editorials at major US journals successively reported illegal smuggling of African orphans,[1] child abuse in a famous relief school in South Africa, and concern over mercenary fosterage in the US. Together, these stories exposed large holes in social safety nets for orphans and other needy children. Nowhere are these holes more visible than in sub-Saharan Africa where over 12 million children have been left orphaned in the wake of political and health crises, and where this number is projected to exceed 18 million by 2010.[2] The challenge is how to cover all orphans while meeting individual needs for a normal childhood. Which institutions can offer such broad and deep care, while also preventing exploitation? How to manage the tension between the humanitarian impulse and the temptation to "capitalize on disaster"?[3]

As of 2003, only a handful of African countries had developed national level care for orphans.[4] To fill this void in care, countries

have relied on three non-State institutions: extended families, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international adoption. The first is an informal institution, but a potential refuge in a region where the welfare of children is viewed as a *collective* responsibility; the second have sprouted in the 1990s to fill the service vacuum created by the withdrawal of government subsidies after economic structural adjustment programs; the third could offer a win-win response to current demographic imbalances between North and South. In practice however, the "caring capacity" of these institutions requires careful analysis, as do their interactions. One concern is that formal and better funded NGOs may displace traditional fosterage practices that had historically supported the vast majority of African children, despite a lack of acknowledgment or policy support. Another concern is the tension between humanitarian and mercenary impulses, especially among formal rescue institutions.

This article compares these three sources of orphan support, using three criteria: breadth, depth, and sustainability of coverage. We are interested in the tension between breadth – how many children are covered - and depth – how fully the children's needs are addressed. Perhaps more importantly, we are interested in the economy of orphanhood and the tension between minding these children versus mining their labor or advertisement value to potential sponsors.[5] Much of the analysis is grounded in the experience of Zimbabwe, a country coping with an epic economic downturn and a large orphan population. Because Zimbabwe is also a resourceful country with a strong NGO base and extended family system, it offers a good forefront illustration of the management of orphanhood under crisis.

This paper is structured as follows: First is a brief overview of the study setting. Then, after a summary description of the data used, we assess the caring capacity of extended families, local NGOs, and international adoption schemes, respectively. For each institution, we discuss the breadth, depth, and sustainability of coverage. The paper concludes with possible policy implications and recommendations that could enhance the overall national capacities to effectively care for vulnerable orphans.

Zimbabwe's Mighty Crisis

Zimbabwe's economic woes accelerated in early 1999 when conflict over land distribution - a fundamental tenet of the struggle of the liberation movement - took the forefront of the national political agenda. Historical inequalities in the distribution of land in Zimbabwe created by initial British settlers in 1890 were later reinforced through state laws such as the Land Tenure Act of 1930 that divided the country into black and white areas. The former were restricted to marginal

areas while the latter were allocated the most suitable agricultural land in terms of both climate and rainfall. Thus, at independence in 1980, the nationalist government of President Mugabe inherited a racially bifurcated system where about 4,500 white commercial farmers (0.03% of the population) controlled more than 70% of all arable land in the prime farming regions. Each of these minority farmers owned an average 1,640 hectares and yet they only used about 30% for agricultural purposes while the rest lay idle.[6] On the contrary, Black rural households who constituted about 60% of the population had access to an average two hectares each.

To redress these inequalities, popular movements launched a series of mass demonstrations that led to political and economic upheaval, and rapid reversals of the economic gains achieved since independence. The ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), called for nationwide reform and invested heavily in education and healthcare to improve the social mobility prospects of the marginalized Black majority population. However, tensions grew in year 2000, as Liberation War veterans began squatting on farmland owned by the white minority in an attempt to reclaim land previously taken by the British colonial settlers. At the root of this racial tension, was a clash between existing property rights that guaranteed the legal protection of land owned by white farmers and the needs of the Black majority that looked to its government to end the legacy of colonialism, and return Zimbabwean land to its people.

No longer able to ignore the widespread dissatisfaction with rural poverty and landlessness, President Mugabe's government demanded that all white commercial farmers vacate farmland that was to be returned to the majority Black population that remained landless after 20 years of independence. This authoritarian approach to land redistribution seemed to grant the Black majority *carte blanche* to squat on farmland, and to forcefully remove white farmers who resisted the stipulations of the "fast track" land redistribution program that involved redistribution of five million hectares (without compensation) to the impoverished landless people. Although the Zimbabwe Supreme Court ruled Mugabe's actions to be illegal, the displacement of white farmers and consequent disruptions of farming wrecked the economy that relied heavily on agricultural exports. By the end of 2000, the Zimbabwean economy declined rapidly and the government found it increasingly difficult to provide the new Black commercial farmers with the skills and infrastructure needed to sustain national agricultural productivity at its pre-1999 levels.

In 2002, Zimbabwe withdrew its membership from the Commonwealth due to accusations of human rights violations during the land reform. International sanctions followed and, as a result, even basic necessities became increasingly unavailable. Zimbabwe's GDP had

fallen to half its 1999 level and to one-third by 2004.[7] Approximately 80 percent of the population lives below the poverty line and 80 percent is unemployed.[8] Direct foreign investment is negligible. The rate of inflation in July 2007 was just below 8000%, up from 1600% in January 2007[9] and, by far, the highest in the world. Today, Zimbabwe currency (ZW$) stands at an unofficial bank rate of ZW$1,200,000 to one US dollar.[10] One loaf of bread now costs ZW$100,000 and the monthly salary of the average Zimbabwean worker lies at merely ZW$1,000,000. Thus, in a country previously known as the breadbasket of the Southern Africa region, the average worker earns just enough to afford 10 loaves of bread per month.

Compounding this economic devastation is a profound health crisis wrought by the HIV epidemic. While the prevalence rate for the sub-Saharan average is 7.5%, the rate for Zimbabwe is significantly greater (25%), with women constituting 58% of the adults living with AIDS in Zimbabwe.[11] Women between 15-24 years are particularly vulnerable: they are twice more likely to be infected with AIDS than men.[12] Infant mortality has doubled since 1990 and an estimated 3,200 people die of AIDS related illnesses each week (nine out of ten deaths), while life expectancy declined to a world low of 34 years in 2005.[13] Currently, of the 2.2 million people living with AIDS in Zimbabwe, 340,000 are children[14] and the epidemic has left an estimated 1.3 million orphans, the highest rate in the world.[15] Our study focuses on the coping mechanisms available to these orphans because they are a distinctive group. AIDS orphans are likely to be double orphans and are more likely to live with the elderly.[16] Moreover, prior to their orphanhood, they are more likely to be socially and psychologically scarred due to prolonged morbidity of their parents, which often alters their time allocation to school and childhood activities. The sheer number of orphans, combined with high adult mortality and a declining economy represented a perfect storm to weather. The question is whether institutions can effectively weather the storm of this orphan crisis.

Data

To assess the rescuing capacity of various institutions, we use a mix of secondary quantitative data from the Demographic and Health Survey[17] and primary qualitative data from field investigations by the first author. The survey data were used to study rates of enrollment among orphans, compared to other children. We also use qualitative data from focus groups, archival research, and personal observations. Three focus group discussions were conducted in Zimbabwe in June 2007. They were conducted with caregivers of orphaned children, non-orphans enrolled in school, and orphaned children both enrolled and not enrolled. The information from these discussions complements the survey data. Finally, we discuss World Vision, a prominent NGO

present in Zimbabwe, as a case study to explore some of the challenges facing NGOs working with orphans.

Extended family systems

Breadth

Fosterage is remarkably broad in its coverage. According to UNAIDS (2004) and UNICEF (2003),[18] 90 percent of sub-Saharan orphans are cared for by extended family networks. The experience of fosterage begins early and increases rapidly with age (Figure 1). By their early teens (10-14), about 1 in every 3 Zimbabwe children is living under fosterage. The data clearly show a historical rise in the incidence of fosterage in almost all age groups, but mostly among children over age 5, where a 50% increase occurred since 1994. Although this number covers both non-orphans and orphans, the latter represent an increasing share of the total number, from 30% in 1994, to 43% in 1999, to 60% in 2006 (data not shown on the chart). In other words, fosterage systems increasingly cater to orphans, in an apparent adaptation to the growing orphan population in this country. Previous studies have used the term "crisis fostering" in reference to fosterage under emergency situations, and AIDS-related deaths fall within that realm.[19] Notably, these households receive little State support for the care of orphans: 2% of the corresponding budget, according to Mutangadura.[20] On these grounds, their performance is remarkable, especially when compared to the total contribution of the country's orphanages.[21] Extended family systems thus play a crucial role in demographic terms, and they appear to be efficient in light of the limited resources they receive. Perhaps their weakness is in the depth of coverage.

Figure 1: Percentage of Zimbabwe children living with neither biological parent, by age and survey year



Depth

Extended families may well harbor many orphans, but they do not always meet children's basic needs. At times, children are fostered into very poor homes, making it useful to consider not only the prevalence of fosterage, but also the direction of fosterage flows[22] and the selectivity of fosterage. When orphans compete for extended family support, who decides which children will be helped, and on what basis? Research on this topic has shown this selection not to be entirely blind or need-based, but dependent on the closeness of kinship ties and the potential for reciprocity.[23] Such selection places double orphans at a disadvantage. Even after children join their new household, their treatment may likewise depend on kinship ties and reciprocity. Researchers have also debated whether orphans are placed on an equal footing with biological offspring in the destination household. Research remains divided on this issue. In one particularly insightful analysis of the benefits from fosterage, Akresh[24] shows this to be a win-win proposition, with both the fostered children and the biological children in the destination household gaining educationally from the transaction. Akresh sees this outcome as reflecting the uniquely broad and inclusive conception of the African household. Yet other studies show evidence of discrimination, with foster children being inordinately assigned to domestic tasks or steered into work in the informal sector.[25] Our data from Zimbabwe shows in particular that while orphans may receive some basic education, their educational attainment is likely to remain lower than that of non-orphans. Perhaps even when they are fostered by relatives, orphans have inferior educational outcomes because these relatives are not accountable to anyone, unlike a situation where they foster a child with living parents who expect positive outcomes. As Figure 2 clearly indicates, orphans are likely to enroll later but drop out of school earlier than non-orphans. According to our survey data, by the time they reach age 14, Zimbabwean orphans are about 18% less likely than non-orphans to enroll in school.

Figure 2: Ratio of non-orphans to orphans school enrollment by age



Furthermore, focus group discussions in Zimbabwe uncovered a variety of cases where orphans fostered into extended families were neglected, and consequently sought their own means for survival. One of these involved a young girl living with her uncle. The uncle's constant travel and lengthy absences from home without any remittances meant that she was forced to scavenge and beg for food from her neighbors. This placed great emotional pressures on her and compromised her school performance. In another instance, a participant lived with a grandmother who was too old to care for her, so she had to go out and beg for food on a daily basis for her meals and for her grandmother's meals as well. Yet a third instance involved a participant who lived with his uncle but was constantly being pulled out of school because the uncle would not pay his school fee, while he paid his own children's. Eventually the child left this initial foster home and moved in with another relative, where he was then able to return to school.

Clearly, this qualitative evidence underscores some of the limits in the quality of care provided by extended families. At the same time, it points to one important fact often obscured in quantitative analyses of household surveys: children can pull resources from multiple households. As a study in Northwestern Tanzania [26] showed, orphans can draw resources from non-coresidential relatives in ways that can help their schooling and other life outcomes. Zimbabwe thus presents a case where extended family systems, in part because of their deep roots in tradition, have been able to respond to the orphan crisis by fostering an increasing number of orphans.[27] The question is how long this institution will continue to adapt.

Sustainability

Although extended families have adapted remarkably so far, at least four signs suggest that they could be reaching a breaking point. First is the increased proportion of orphan children among foster children. In 1994, orphans represented only 30 percent, but today they fill nearly 60 percent of the total population of foster children. The same pattern had been reported by UNAIDS in other countries in the Southern Africa region. Clearly, competition for fosterage opportunity is emerging between orphans and other needy children. Second is the changing destination of fosterage. Traditionally in Zimbabwean society, aunts and uncles were the primary refuge for orphans. However, with the rising number of orphans in Zimbabwe, grandparents have increasingly become care providers.[28] These older grandparents are less capable of giving orphans the complex care needed. A third sign is the rising number in child-headed households,[29] most of which were reportedly formed as a result of children being turned down by relatives, or after the death of the last available relative, often a grandparent.[30] These three findings suggest possible saturation, and subsequent reduction in the

capabilities of extended family networks. A fourth and final sign is the growing number of street children, perhaps an indication of breakdown in the social protections offered by the extended family. An estimated 12,000 street children are currently found in Zimbabwe,[31] and they often live under situations of high vulnerability. Studies have indicated that girls living on the streets are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and exposure to HIV infection so that they may end up contracting the very disease that pushed them onto the streets.[32]

In sum, family systems offer a remarkably broad coverage and they appear to have actively responded to the rising orphan crisis. At the same time, the system may become strained both demographically and economically, as the number of orphans begins to exceed the number of adults capable of caring for them, in light of Zimbabwe's high poverty rates, and as orphans crowd out other needy children in the competition for fosterage assistance.

Local NGOs

Breadth of coverage

In 1998, Zimbabwe counted a total of 64 major NGOs registered with the United Nations, the highest per-capita count in the region. This number represented a six-fold increase since 1960.[33] Many of these NGOs dealt specifically with education, and the number of such NGOs had increased seven-fold within the same time period. Bornstein[34] attributes some of that steady rise in NGOs to the rise of Christian and secular NGOs formed during Zimbabwe's liberation struggle in the 1970s, and the influx of post-independence assistance to Zimbabwe. As Figure 3 indicates, however, the major up tick came a little later in the 1980s and may be associated with entry in the era of economic structural adjustment. Remarkably, most of these NGOs (over 80%) were not externally funded, suggesting a strong internal dynamic of NGO creation in the country. With such a vibrant indigenous NGO community focused on education, one would expect substantial support to children in need, including orphans. The evidence suggests however that the coverage of these specialized institutions tends to be narrow. For instance, all the 45 orphanages in the country were estimated to cover only 4,000 children. Beyond these estimates however, many other NGOs in Zimbabwe do not limit themselves to orphanages, but some like Plan International build schooling infrastructure and provide tuition and fee vouchers for thousands of orphans and vulnerable children. Yet these numbers do not come close to those covered by extended families. Perhaps the greatest strength of NGOs is depth.

Figure 3: Cumulative number of NGOs by year and type



Depth of coverage

We illustrate the depth of coverage by NGOs by focusing on the work of World Vision International. World Vision offers wide-ranging attention to all aspects of children's lives including schooling, education about human rights, child labor, or HIV/AIDS. In the area of HIV/AIDS for instance, it builds clinics to ensure access to health care, thereby freeing children from parental care-giving activities. It also seeks to establish community-based support groups for orphans, including clubs such as Sunday School Support, Anti-AIDS Clubs, Scripture Unions and Drama competitions for youth.

Even as it casts a wide net, however, World Vision is sometimes unable to deal with the influx of orphaned and vulnerable children. At times, children have been made to return to their grandparents and ask them for the money to cover their school fees, which is simply not feasible for the poor and elderly in the community. Children under these circumstances easily drop out of school and join the informal job market. One focus group participant, the head of a child-headed household, admitted to being involved in the highly illegal, yet highly lucrative industry of gold-panning. Although the child intended to use his earned money to support his schooling, he soon faced a catch-22: the tedious and physically demanding work of gold panning often left him with little time to do his homework, and often too tired to attend school. As a result, he often missed school because of the demands of his job. Thus, orphans who drop out of school do not simply miss out on their education but they also experience more radical transformations in their social networks. As Figure 4 shows, out-of school orphans have networks of friends that are age-asymmetric, meaning they do not often interact with age peers. As such they are likely to miss out on an

important type of interaction where they can form their identity and be socially integrated. Orphans appear to have a more varied response in the concentration of their networks. Non-orphans tend to have most of their friends clustered within a band of individuals around the same ages, while orphans appear to interact disproportionately with individuals both older and younger than themselves. This social consequence is an understudied aspect of the experience of being an orphan.

Figure 4: Social networks of orphans and non-orphans



Sustainability

NGOs must reconcile their humanitarian impulse with the demands of administrative management and fund-raising. Stories abound of NGOs where humanitarian mission and effective assistance to children have taken a back seat to the survival of NGO bureaucracy.[35] Even for the leanest and most conscientious, however, the capacity to grow or maintain funding streams requires being able to quantitatively demonstrate performance and show clear evidence of need. The delicate balance between the economics of fundraising and humanitarian needs raises several challenges in allocating resources. First, World Vision gives priority to children presiding over children-headed households. While these children clearly present a desperate case, their singling

out can be problematic when it leads to overlook orphans who may be officially absorbed into extended family networks but inadequately cared for. To the extent that NGOs may offer visibly better treatment, this creates an incentive for children to sever/downplay connections with extended families. It is in this arena that many NGOs are most open to criticism. While our analyses covered a single NGO, numerous other accounts question the breadth and effectiveness of NGO support. Even when these children are given school fees and food, who protects them from sexual and criminal predators in the absence of the NGO officers and community members? NGOs need to reassess their strategies of romanticizing and promoting institutions such as child-headed households that do not completely remove children's vulnerability, and may in fact reinforce it. In part, this and other practices – inflating the number of orphans, forcefully severing orphans from potential relatives, - have fuelled a broader perception of some NGOs as opportunistic and self-serving institutions bent on self-reproduction, rather than promotion of children's wellbeing. The following two testimonies are telling:

> "*Of all the problems [...] in the refugee camps, I was never aware that orphans was one [...] The tight-knit clan structure meant that every child had a relative around somewhere..... But nonetheless thirty or forty children were gathered together and loaded onto a truck and carted off to an orphanage in Mogadishu, while their clan's elders protested*" – (Maren: 95, in Somalia)

> "*I know that child headed households are few, but even then, well meaning philanthropists cannot deliberately choose to perpetuate the practice. Most always hide behind the [...] by saying these children cannot find relatives who are willing to host them but I do not find that persuasive*." (Zimbabwe informant).

Second, NGOs may unwittingly breed individualism and create inequality among children. A mid-term evaluation of World Vision acknowledged that not all children sponsored under World Vision received equal treatment in the type and number of gifts received. Rather, the benefits of sponsorship depended on the generosity of the child's individual sponsor, often a family from a foreign country. These differential fortunes created issues of jealousy and an altered sense of belonging and common fate among children. Because individual sponsorship represented the primary income source for World Vision

Zimbabwe, this institution had little room to correct for the inequalities engendered by uneven sponsorship.

Again, World Vision is heavily reliant on external funding from child sponsors as their primary source of income.[36] In 1998, approximately 30,000 children in Zimbabwe were sponsored by 26,000 donors worldwide.[37] This one-on-one sponsorship creates situations where one child in a household will be sponsored, and the others not. Again, this can breed resentment and jealousy within the household. Bornstein thus argues that sponsorship is an "individualizing force" where sponsorship resources are concentrated on a single child amidst the broader context of a family in deep need, thereby creating divisions within the home. While meeting the immediate material needs of one child, such sponsorship can disrupt the social ties with extended families.

Third, is a possible tension between sponsored children and administrators. Local managers of child sponsorship mediate the contact with sponsors. When correspondence arrives, they cut out the names and addresses of sponsors, and children are prohibited from directly soliciting from sponsors.[38] This puts children in a double emotional bind. One is suspicion that unscrupulous administrators could take a cut of the sponsor's contributions and the other is the emotional roller-coaster of dealing with a dear, yet distant and inaccessible, sponsor.

International adoption

The international community has begun to mobilize and respond to the global orphan crisis. The issue of orphanhood has been recognized as a human rights crisis, and international adoption is emerging as one response to this crisis.[39] In sub-Saharan Africa, it could complement extended family networks and NGOs. Approximately 15,000 to 20,000 international adoptions are completed per year. [40] On the surface, this solution presents several advantages. First, unlike the care provided by NGOs, it entails a full commitment to the child, and it could provide both economic security and emotional nurture. On those grounds, international adoption has been argued to be preferable to the institutional care of orphans, as it provides children with a nurturing home environment not found with NGOs.[41] Second, it offers in theory a win-win solution in demographic terms, between regions coping with an orphan crisis and those dealing with below replacement fertility. [42]

Yet, it is in practice a very limited solution. The numbers involved remain small. The highest number of adoptions from Africa occurred in 2005 when 441 children were adopted from Ethiopia.[43] Most African countries have lengthy adoption processes that make international adoptions difficult, while other African nations do not allow international adoption at all.[44] International adoption can also be a fairly traumatic severance of familial ties for children, depending on the age at which

they move. Perhaps more importantly, it is not immune to exploitation by "disaster capitalists,"[45] as the Zoe's Arc scandal suggested. In this story, a French NGO (Zoe's Arc) attempted to fly 103 children out of Chad to France, ostensibly for adoption. As it turned out, these were not orphans and the motives and funding of the Arc remain unclear. By stoking lingering fears that adoptions are in fact a channel for trafficking of vulnerable children,[46] this and similar stories limit the recourse to this third solution. Furthermore, although the altruistic intentions of some adoptive parents may provide the depth or care needed by AIDS orphans, it cannot unfortunately constitute a sustainable and wide-reaching response to the orphan crisis.

Conclusions

The idea in this paper was to examine how non-State institutions – notably extended families, local NGOs, and international adoption - could individually and collaboratively manage the orphan crisis in countries lacking organized State support. Each of these institutions has individual strengths. The deeply-rooted extended family system can extend its assistance to a large number of orphans while in theory maintaining ties with relatives and offering steady care throughout the orphans' childhood. The NGOs offer a formal and specialized structure to assist with training and human development and to mediate the remote humanitarian assistance, while keeping children rooted in their environment. International adoption could in theory replicate, at a global level, the deep and long-term care provided by extended families, although it uproots children from their birth environment.

Each of these institutions also faces severe limitations. Extended family systems remain by far the most potent of the three. However, they are being stretched demographically and economically, as the growing number of orphans and the dwindling numbers of healthy and solvent relatives raise competition for fosterage opportunity. Because of the competition, a growing number of orphans fall through the cracks of extended family systems, ending up in the street or in child-headed households. It also channels many children into situations where they receive minimal care and may drop out of school earlier and begin work at an early age. As the focus group data from Zimbabwe shows, missing the school experience substantially transforms the social networks and the peer interactions of children in ways that may ultimately bear on their human development. Local NGOs, especially when dependent on external funding, are limited in the number of children reached and face two fundamental problems. First, they may unwittingly introduce disparities and tensions between orphans (and between orphans and the broader community of children) by failing to correct for uneven funding. Second and more importantly, their effectiveness

and commitment to orphan welfare deserves scrutiny. Practices that unwittingly sever children from local communities, as a criterion for support, deserve special scrutiny. International adoption is subject to similar reservations, but so far its impact is limited because the number of children covered is small.

On many levels, the strengths of these institutions appear to be complementary, as they combine formal and informal systems, local and international actors, specialized and multi-functional institutions, broad-based versus focused interventions, primary strong-tied versus secondary weak-tied institutions. Given these complementarities and given the magnitude of the orphan crisis, it is remarkable that little coordination or strategic reallocation of resources exists among the three institutions: as an example, NGOs tend to select children in child-headed households, and they interact with relatives only in times of economic hardship. Perhaps more worrisome is the possibility of subtle competition between these three. One aspect of such competition appears in a selection of orphans that favors child-headed households and may thus encourage children to sever, downplay or not invest in, ties with relatives. Also troublesome is the potential tension between the humanitarian impulse driving these three institutions and the difficulties of resource allocation or even the motivations of individual care providers. As recent news events show all too well, the dangers of neglect, exploitation, or mercenary care-giving are never far from an orphaned child that lacks the social protections granted by parental care.

Banking on the potential strengths of these three institutions will require creative collaboration between the three. It is remarkable, for instance, that extended families that provide the most extensive care receive the least resources. Some resource reallocation among the three, and greater State involvement, are needed to strengthen the current safety nets available to orphans in this region.

Possible policy recommendations include an increased focus on – and support to - extended family system as an extensive safety net. The extended family is a traditional norm and somewhat naturally occurring institution that is deeply entrenched in the history of the African state. Although orphaned children may still be at risk of exploitation, even when left in the care of relatives, adequate funding to extended families caring for orphaned relatives can work to effectively mitigate this "mining" of children for reasons of economic hardship. This funding should be provided by NGOs who are not able to provide the depth of care needed by orphans, but clearly possess the financial backing needed to successfully meet all the needs of these children. Finally, international adoption should be perceived as a secondary safety net for children who are likely to slip through the cracks of the safety net provided by the extended family.

Essentially, the greater constraint faced by extended families is

economic. Because they have the capacity and the social obligation to care for relatives, some of the external and State support could be directed to these families in the form of orphan care subsidies. In that case, the NGOs or State would retain some oversight to ensure that these families continue to meet the orphans' needs and avoid discrimination in the allocation of household resources. The advantages of this collaboration would be threefold. First, this would continue to build on NGOs fund-raising infrastructure and their capacity to provide specialized training that families are ill equipped to do. Second, it would also reduce the uncertainty associated with historical fluctuation and variability in external assistance. Furthermore, it would avoid uprooting children from their communities and ensure smoother transition into adulthood when children go beyond the age group covered by NGOs. Finally, at the same time as it gives some oversight power to NGOs, it would also empower communities to monitor and evaluate the work being done by NGOs. NGOs would consult with communities and local families to agree upon spending priorities for the donations received. Such a system of double-checking would make it easier to weed out –or at least reduce—abuse from either families or NGOs. Lastly, the emphasis on subsidies and financial incentives should not obscure the fact that much of the historical assistance from extended families was borne out of a sense of family and community obligation. Formal and continued recognition of the diligence of these families is a first and necessary step.

Anila Rehman is a native of Zimbabwe and Hunter Rawlings Presidential Research Scholar, majoring in Development Sociology; Parfait Eloundou-Enyegue is Associate Professor of Development Sociology. *Much of the field work for this project was conducted in the summer of 2007, and early versions of the findings have been presented at Cornell. We are indebted to Vongai Kandiwa for substantive comments about Zimbabwe's background and about several interpretations of findings. We also received comments from Sarah Giroux. Responsibility for any remaining inaccuracy lies however with the authors.* *Please direct correspondence to the first author at ar383@cornell.edu.*

[Endnotes]

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Wasting Borrowed Time:
Why hurricane protection and wetland restoration policy in Louisiana is failing to address coastal erosion

Justin Villere

ABSTRACT:
This article reviews the relationship between Louisiana and the federal government regarding the state's efforts to protect its coastal wetlands. It investigates the shortcomings of present federal action and explains the impetus for change in current policies. The research focuses primarily on the recently released Master Plan, Louisiana's current policy dictating hurricane protection and wetland restoration. Findings indicate that the federal government has historically blocked progress on the issue, but for Louisiana to protect its coast in the future, the federal government must reverse its course and fund extensive restoration efforts.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exposed numerous flaws in Louisiana's hurricane protection system. While levee failures received much of the media coverage, the government's disregard for environmentally stable protection methods caused just as much devastation. Through most of Louisiana's 300-year history policymakers emphasized development in ecologically sensitive areas, ignoring sustainable expansion by encouraging industry to cut canals and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to erect levees all over the southern part of the state. Navigational shipping interests, energy industries, and residential growth dictated storm protection policies on the coast, ignoring environmental concerns. The development resulted in the erosion of the state's coastline. Consequently, the state's wetlands and barrier islands no longer have the ability to absorb the impact of violent hurricanes; this largely contributed to the destruction that Katrina and Rita wrought on Louisiana in 2005. To address this growing problem, Louisiana's Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) released its *Master Plan* in May 2007 to incorporate two traditionally incongruous goals, hurricane protection and coastal restoration, into one overarching objective: achieving "comprehensive coastal protection for Louisiana." [1]

The *Master Plan* is a confluence of several previous attempts since the late 1990s by Louisiana policymakers to reverse decades of myopic storm protection along the coast. The federal government has consistently denied the state's previous funding requests, causing Louisiana to rely on the *Master Plan* to change the course of wetland policy. Reluctance on the part of Congress and the White House to support an effective, sustainable storm protection policy has forced the state to evaluate the political plausibility of full restoration. However, despite the promising first step taken by the *Master Plan* towards coastal regeneration, it does not go far enough. Even if the state fully implements its proposals, the plan will only partially neutralize erosion rates. Only the federal government has the capability to fund comprehensive regeneration on the scale that most of Louisiana's leading coastal scientists recommend for a long-term recovery. To preserve the coast and prevent future Katrina-level disasters, politicians in Washington must relinquish their opposition to sustainable protection policies in Louisiana and extend the goals of the *Master Plan* to reengineer the Mississippi River to replicate original regeneration processes.

The Value of Louisiana's Coastal Wetlands

Protecting Louisiana's coast has numerous benefits. Wetlands act as barriers against hurricanes, slowing down and weakening storms. Hurricanes primarily form and gain strength because of abnormally high ocean temperatures. However, once a storm hits land, the ocean's heat no longer feeds the storm and it loses energy. Coastal wetlands, marshes, and barrier islands also blunt the effects of a storm. Their soil and vegetation act as sponges during floods and slow the ocean's storm surge due to the "frictional effects of marshland on wave energy and the reservoir capacity of the intervening area,"[2] protecting towns and cities further inland. Louisiana State University coastal geologist Gregory Stone modeled the effects of a Category Three hurricane on Louisiana given measured wetland area in 1950 and 1990 and predicted area in 2020. He charted the storm surges and found that the rates of decline led to a two and a half to three-meter increase in storm surges between those time periods,[3] equivalent to up to a ten-foot increase in the height of onrushing water from the Gulf during a storm.[4] Measurements taken from several hurricanes in the 1960s and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 have found that for every kilometer of wetlands extending into the Gulf, a potential storm surge decreases by five to seven centimeters.[5]

Figure 1: Map of Louisiana State

The Mississippi River runs along the Louisiana-Mississippi border, through Baton Rouge and New Orleans, and eventually into the Gulf of Mexico at the southeastern-most point of the state. Lake Pontchartrain is directly north of New Orleans and was responsible for a significant amount of damage to the city during Katrina.
Photo Courtesy of: Greenwich Mean Time, "U.S. State of Louisiana Map,"
http://www.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/usa/louisiana/map.htm

Not only are hundreds of communities and over two million residents in Louisiana protected by coastal barriers, [6] but multiple facets of Louisiana's infrastructure also rely on the natural function of wetlands. One-third of the country's oil and gas supply is produced near or transported through Louisiana, and 50 percent of the nation's refining capacity relies on Louisiana's services. Five particular ports operating in the region conduct nineteen percent of U.S. waterborne commerce. Additionally, 26 percent of the Continental U.S.'s fishing industry occurs off the coast.[7] *Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coast*, a restoration plan proposed in 1998, estimated that at recent rates of wetland degradation, the United States could potentially experience an economic loss of over $100 billion by the middle of the twenty-first century.[8] According to a cost-estimate study sponsored by Marshall University economists and scientists, Hurricane Katrina dwarfed these figures, accounting for over $156 billion in damages to the Gulf Coast region.[9] Unsustainable protection policies also diminish the ecological value of their biologically diverse and nutrient-rich habitats. The possible economic costs of coastal erosion necessitate immediate action to protect these ecosystems; the threat of degradation grows daily.

Wetland Erosion Rates

According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), 1,900 square miles of wetlands on Louisiana's coast disappeared during the twentieth century, overrun by the Gulf of Mexico. During the height of industrial development from 1956 to 1978, coastal wetlands disappeared by 39 square miles per year.[10] That rate has decreased slightly since 1990 as awareness and action have increased, but the 24 square miles disappearing each year[11] means that every half-hour the state loses a chunk of wetlands the size of a football field.[12] Even after accounting for recent restoration efforts, scientists like John Barras of the USGS estimated in 2003 that the coast would lose another 500 square miles by 2050.[13] Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exacerbated the situation, turning 217 square miles of wetlands into open water.[14] The state has been sounding the alarm for a decade, but unless the federal government adopts a radical change in policy, between one-quarter to one-third of Louisiana's original wetlands will be under water by the middle of this century.[15]

Louisiana is also naturally sinking. A satellite and radar study found that between 2002 and 2005, New Orleans' annual subsidence[16] rates were as high as 28.6 mm (about 1.12 inches). The study estimated that these rates had been consistent for four decades, meaning New Orleans has lost between three-and-a-half to four feet of elevation since the 1960s.[17] Some scientists predict New Orleans will sink by another three to four feet during the twenty-first century.[18] Conversely, worldwide sea levels have risen four to eight inches since 1900.[19] With global temperatures increasing, climatologists and oceanic scientists predict the rates could become even more significant,[20] further intensifying the negative impacts of erosion. According to Kerry St. Pe, Executive Director of the Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary Program, the government has only a few years to significantly reduce erosion rates before its effects become irreversible: "People think we still have 20, 30, 40 years left to get this done. They're not even close."[21] Louisiana hopes the *Master Plan* will stabilize erosion rates, but its measures are still not substantial enough to begin regenerating the land already lost.[22]

The Development Paradigm's Damaging Effects

Before the federal government can develop a comprehensive policy to regenerate wetlands, it must modify the development paradigm that stifles the Mississippi River's natural sedimentary overflow process, which southern Louisiana's wetlands rely on for regeneration. Runoff carrying mud, dirt, sand, and silt gathers volume as the river cuts along

its 2,300-mile route. Heavy rains cause the river and its sediment to overflow into adjacent floodplains along the riverbanks creating land in marshes and swamps. Mud and silt that does not spill over the banks diffuses along the coast. Over a 6,000 year period[23] this process created over 5 million acres (7,800 square miles) of wetlands and barrier islands along the Louisiana coastline.[24] Since the mid-nineteenth century actions by Congress, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,[25] and navigational and energy interests have disrupted this process. They have controlled and manipulated the river by building hundreds of miles of levees and digging thousands of miles of canals, choking off the natural sediment regeneration process instead of integrating wetland-preserving techniques with storm protection methods.[26] State proposals have asserted that this natural process should be restored, but the federal government's adherence to the development paradigm must first change.

Geological scientists and engineers have been publicly voicing their concerns about wetland degradation in the region for over 160 years. In 1846 Louisiana engineer P. O. Hebert warned New Orleans of its dangerous policies: "Every day, levees are extended higher and higher up the river—natural outlets closed—and every day the danger to the city of New Orleans and to all the lower country is increased."[27] The government's disregard for a holistic protection strategy became official policy in 1879 when Congress created the Mississippi River Commission to construct levees and diversions to protect the area's growing population. The commission, fundamentally controlled by the Corps, declared a "levees only" policy, sealing off the river from natural floodwater outlets and rejecting plans to create man-made outlets and reservoirs. [28] As the city's population exploded in the twentieth century,[29] dried-out lands became attractive sites for development. This created an impetus for even more levees, compounding the river's restrictions.[30] 2,000 miles of levees appeared during the twentieth century,[31] preventing 125 to 210 million tons of sediment from topping the Mississippi's banks and reaching nearby wetlands each year.[32] Although the Corps officially abandoned its "levees only" policy after the Great Flood of 1927,[33] its residual ethos continued to define storm protection in the United States. In June 2006, George W. Bush signed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, providing nearly $4 billion to fund levee improvements and water projects in Louisiana. Of that $4 billion, only $20.2 million was earmarked for coastal restoration. Most of the funds went to rebuilding higher levees in greater quantity.[34] Even after Katrina, the federal government fails to appreciate the need for long-term prevention by continuing to support failing policies.

At the state's request, the Corps constructed some levees not to provide protection for existing communities, but to spur development

on previously uninhabitable wetlands. According to an Environmental Impact Statement in 1974, the Corps built the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to extend a system of levees east of New Orleans to an undeveloped wetland ecosystem, an area subject to flooding from the lake. Not only did this project contribute to wetland loss, the homes protected by the project flooded during Katrina. Constructing levees around vulnerable areas in Louisiana and developing them has tripled the amount of damage done by flooding in real dollars over the past 80 years.[35]

Industrial interests have influenced this paradigm as well. Before environmental laws became more stringent in the 1980s, energy companies and the Corps carved more than 20,000 miles of canals through marshes and swamps to transport oil and gas reserves by pipeline and waterborne navigation.[3637] Protecting the infrastructure on these artificial waterways required the Corps to build more levees, exacerbating wetland loss. Each year, the Corps also dredges 40-45 million cubic yards[38] of potential land-building sediments from the Mississippi Delta's navigation channels to keep shipping routes unobstructed. The Corps then pumps the sediment off the continental shelf, where it settles too deep to generate any land.[39] Washington politicians have done little to limit these practices. The state surrendered its reliance on the development paradigm with its recent insistence on comprehensive protection,[40] sacrificing short-term profits in favor of long-term sustainability. However, this historical precedent still heavily influences the federal government.

Louisiana's Action

After the storms struck in 2005, the state rushed to enact legislation and secure funding to shield Louisiana from future disasters. However, the state met strong resistance in Washington. One year after the storm, five national and state environmental organizations[41] released a report card grading the state, Congress, and the Corps on their attempts to protect Louisiana's wetlands after the hurricane. The report card gives Louisiana consistently stronger marks than Congress and the Corps in all four categories and illustrates the areas in which the federal government has failed to support Louisiana.

Category Graded[42]	Congress	USACE	Louisiana
1. Funding wetlands restoration	D	----	A (inc.)[43]
2. Accelerated wetlands restoration	C	D -	C + (inc.)
3. Close MRGO, restore related wetlands	B	C -	Inc. (A -)
4. Conserving existing wetland resources	----	D	B

The report card faults Congress for not allocating enough money to wetland restoration activities and not adopting strict standards on oil

and gas companies operating off the Louisiana shore to prevent harm to coastal wetlands that results from their operations. The authors assail the Corps for planning to construct more levees during the rebuilding effort instead of balancing diversionary structures with restoration projects. On the other hand, the report's authors are pleased with the state's efforts to utilize limited federal funds to restore the coast. The state also earned high marks for its insistence on closing the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a canal carved in 1965 to provide a direct connection between the Mississippi and the Gulf. The MRGO, which serves on average less than one ocean-going ship per day at a $13 million per year cost, was responsible for a 20-40 percent increase in storm surge through New Orleans during Katrina.[44] Louisiana scored only a C-plus for its wetland restoration efforts, but this report was released before the final draft of the *Master Plan* proved to be so popular in Louisiana.[45] If the coalition were to reissue the report card in 2007, Louisiana's marks would be even higher still because of the plan, while the federal government continues to lag behind progress. Unfortunately, Louisiana cannot afford to have Congress, the Corps, and the White House trailing on this issue. The federal entities control valuable financial, political, and administrative resources that the state needs for policy change.

The *Master Plan*

Louisiana is depending on the *Master Plan* to negotiate the current disconnect between state and federal efforts to restore the coast. In December 2005 the state created the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) to establish "a comprehensive…master plan… that will integrate coastal restoration and hurricane protection."[46] CPRA drafted a plan titled *Integrated Ecosystem Restoration and Hurricane Protection: Louisiana's Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast*. In May 2007, after nearly eighteen months of research, planning, public input, and several rejected drafts, the state legislature voted unanimously to make the *Master Plan*'s recommendations state law.[47] Under the plan, hurricane protection and wetland restoration activities formerly conducted by the Departments of Transportation and Natural Resources are coordinated under the CPRA. This is the first time in state history that those objectives have been integrated under one agency.[48] The plan's four main objectives articulate the ultimate goals of comprehensive restoration:

1. *To protect the state's economic infrastructure, including oil and gas interests, the fishing industry, and residential and public homes and buildings*
2. *To allow natural processes to regenerate the coast*

3. To protect wildlife habitats in coastal ecosystems
4. To sustain local culture by protecting historical landmarks and natural environments[49]

The plan proposes an approach to hurricane protection that defies the state's historically development-minded storm defense policy, abandoning the "levees only" ethos that permeated past protection efforts. Many of the plan's proposals, if faithfully adhered to, would be a positive step towards full restoration:

- Restore the Mississippi River and the Mississippi River Delta by reducing the emphasis that Congress and the Corps have placed on navigational interests; water projects should focus on ecologically sustainable flood control coordinated between the Corps and local parish levee boards.
- Invest in further research and planning to create a massive land-building project to effectively simulate natural sediment deposits.
- Close the MRGO; a closure plan should compensate for the loss of a transportation route, but because few ships currently use the MRGO, these concerns are limited.
- Limit development in presently undeveloped wetland areas. The plan states: "The most state of the art hurricane protection system can actually increase the assets at risk if it encourages development in wetlands or areas near the levee footprint."[50]
- Encourage all southern Louisiana residents to purchase flood insurance and elevate and retrofit their homes with hurricane-protection measures. Evacuation routes must be updated and new building codes must be enforced.[51]

The *Master Plan* foreshadows the Corps' report to Congress in December 2007, which will inform Congress regarding future action. An early draft of their *Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Plan* shows that the Corps will follow the emphasis of the *Master Plan*,[52] building off its main themes with technical analysis of the plan's proposals. State officials hope the *Master Plan* directs a more engaged approach from the federal government. "Louisiana finds itself in the unexpected position of leading the Corps of Engineers, instead of following," said Sidney Coffee, chair of CPRA. "Because of the steps we've now taken and the commitments we've made, we also find ourselves with the credibility to ask Congress to…change the way they go about the business of large scale ecosystem restoration efforts by prioritizing projects and streamlining the interminable federal processes that impede urgent efforts like ours."[53]

Table 1: Legislation That Shaped Louisiana's Coastal Wetlands

Proposal	Date	Purpose	Initiator/Sponsor	Cost	Result
Mississippi River Commission	1879	Instituted "levees only" flood control policy to protect Mississippi Delta's growing population. This proved ineffective and was reversed in 1928.	U.S. Congress Operated by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	N/A	More levees, Intensified flooding
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act (CWPPRA)	1990	Constructed small-scale diversion and restoration projects on the LA coast. To date CWPPRA has funded 120 active or completed projects. Oversight is provided by 6 state and federal organizations.[57]	U.S. Senator John Breaux/LA Dept. of Natural Resources	$50-$70 million/yr	Active until 2009[56] Too small to significantly reduce erosion
Caernarvon[58] / Davis Pond[59] Freshwater Diversion Projects	1991/ 2002	Improve the health of estuaries by preventing salinity build-up from saltwater intrusion from canals connected to the Gulf. They are not effective land-building projects.	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers/ CWPPRA	$26.1 million/ $119.6 million	Active, with decencies in funding and maintenance.[60]
Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coast	1998	Created because CWPPRA's effect was minimal. Aimed to restore the natural path of the Mississippi, rebuild marshes and barrier islands by pumping sediment to eroded areas, and close the Miss. River Gulf Outlet.	Coalition of local, state, and federal officials. Widely approved by citizens and all 20 coastal parishes	None stated	Never initiated because it lacked a tangible plan for action[61]
Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) Comprehensive Ecosystem Restoration Study	2002-2004	Proposed to adopt Coast 2050's goals to stabilize coastal erosion rates, but contained more details and cost analysis. The Corps submitted a budget proposal for FY2005 to fund 80 projects outlined in the LCA study.	Same coalition that authored the Coast 2050 plan	$14 billion over 30 years	George Bush rejected the proposal, citing cost
Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP)	2005	Created to compensate the state for the effects of energy industries' operations on the coast. LA will receive $125 million per year from 2007 until 2010.	U.S. Congress	$125 million per year from 2007 until 2010	LA applied funding to fight coastal erosion
Integrated Ecosystem Restoration & Hurricane Protection: LA's Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast (The Master Plan)	2005-2007	Commissioned after Katrina to coordinate all LA hurricane protection and wetland restoration efforts under one authority (CPRA). Passed the LA legislature unanimously. Proposes to reduce the emphasis on navigational and developmental interests while increasing focus on ecologically sustainable flood control, invest in land building projects, and close the MRGO.	LA Coastal Protection & Restoration Authority (CPRA)	$80 billion ($25 bill. on restoration and $55 bill. on protection)	Pending funding and political support
Water Resources Development Act	2005	In response to George Bush denying the LCA study proposal, this requested significantly less money, 15 projects instead of the LCA's 80.	State of Louisiana, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Congress	$1.98 billion	Failed in Congress
Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act	2006	Mandated that the federal government share royalties with LA which are received from oil and gas companies operating off the Outer Continental Shelf. LA will receive up to $600 million annually beginning in 2016.	U.S. Congress	$200 million/ year from 2007-2016; $600 million/ year thereafter	By state law 82% of these funds have to be spent on restoration
Water Resources Development Act	2007	The $23 billion civil works bill allocates $7 billion to LA, half of which is to be spent on restoration. Mandates the closure of the MRGO	U.S. Congress	$23 billion over 14 years	Pending Congressional funding to the Corps

CPRA estimates that if the *Master Plan* is fully enacted, it will cost $55 billion to improve levees in southern Louisiana[54] and $25 billion to restore the coast.[55] However, when these totals are compared to past federal budget appropriations, full implementation of the *Master Plan* seems highly unlikely. In 1998, Louisiana formed a coalition of local, state, and federal officials, including Corps representatives, to draft the *Coast 2050* plan. The report called for restoring the natural path of the Mississippi River and rebuilding marshes and barrier islands by pumping sediment to eroded areas.[62] In March 2002, the coalition commissioned the Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) *Comprehensive Ecosystem Restoration Study* to apply technical details and a budget analysis to *Coast 2050*'s goals.[63] The Corps adopted its proposals and submitted a 30-year, $14 billion funding request[64] for fiscal year 2005 to the Office of Management and Budget in October 2003. George W. Bush rejected the plan, telling the Corps to submit a cheaper proposal.[65] The Corps obliged and submitted a new budget plan as part of the 2005 Water Resources Development Act, requesting $1.98 billion to fund fifteen projects instead of the original 80 that were identified by the LCA.[66] Despite the compromise, the bill failed again due to the White House's opposition.

Defenders of the *Master Plan* understand that the federal government is unlikely to support $55 billion for levee improvements and $25 billion for coastal restoration when the Corps cannot squeeze a mere $2 billion from federal coffers. Many of them, including Robert Twilley, a professor in LSU's Department of Oceanography and Coastal Science, have adopted the LCA's $14 billion figure as a benchmark to fund the basics of the plan[67] because it received Congressional consideration even before Katrina created further impetus for change. However, Twilley does not believe that amount will have the necessary impact. "I don't think, to be honest, that most of the plan is of a sufficient scale to really implement the kinds of change that most people think of when they think of fully restoring the coast," he commented. "Are people willing to change their way of life in the way that is required to completely reengineer the river system?"[68]

Coastal geologists generally believe that reversing past degradation requires a massive project to redirect the river. In September 2006, a panel of water experts evaluating Louisiana's system unanimously agreed that the best way to regenerate the coast would be to remove the large system of levees constraining the Mississippi and reroute its flow to run through more wetlands along the coast. This proposal indicates that transportation on the Mississippi River would be significantly altered, but they argue that new routes on the river could fulfill shipping needs.[69] This solution will not fully establish previous regeneration rates, as dams confining the Mississippi River system have reduced sediment flow by 50 percent since pre-levee volume in

1850.[70] However, fewer levees in Louisiana will increase the amount of sediments building lands in coastal wetlands. Thus far, this solution appears to be most comprehensive way to rebuild the coast. (see pg. 51, "Methods to Prevent Erosion and Regenerate Land")

The *Master Plan* acknowledges that the most scientifically effective way to regenerate the wetlands is to "turn the river loose" and allow sediments to naturally build land on the coast. However, because this would require very large land-building diversions to completely reengineer the river, the state did not draft a specific plan to accomplish this task.[71] The *Master Plan* must receive broad federal support before this option is feasible. While this strategy will be costly and likely will be opposed by energy, shipping, and development interests, the federal government should seriously consider the opinions of the region's experts.

Table 2: Methods to Prevent Erosion and Regenerate Land

Solution	Details	Effectiveness
Diversionary projects	Slow erosion rates by rerouting freshwater from the Mississippi to coastal bays and marshes to prevent salinization from destroying wetlands. They are not meant to be land-building projects.73 Examples include Caernarvon and Davis Pond Freshwater Diversion Projects. Costs vary, from $100,000 to over $1 billion per project.	Varies; usually effective in preventing further erosion, but not for land building
Redirecting the Mississippi	The tactic typically favored by coastal geologists in Louisiana. One possible option describes rerouting the Mississippi west to connect with the Atchafalaya River, where natural processes build about 8.5 square miles of new wetlands each year.74 With the Mississippi's sediment load, this rate could significantly increase. The cost estimates of these plans are larger than most other alternatives. Redirecting the river would also draw opposition from shipping and energy interests.	Considered by experts to be the most effective option remaining
Pumping sediment to offshore locations	Proven to regenerate lands, but current projects have yet to accomplish regeneration on a large scale. In March 2006 the LA Dept. of Natural Resources found that piping sediments in from the Mississippi and the Gulf could create 15 square miles of wetlands annually in the Barataria and Terrebonne basins. Estimates place project's cost around $10 billion,75 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers currently pumps sediment out of canals and off the continental shelf to clear shipping channels; this sediment could be used to regenerate land.	Will create land, but it is currently not cost-effective
Replicate the Netherlands' flood control policies	A system called Delta Works is composed of movable and stationary dikes and dams that protect the country from everything but a 1-in-10,000-year storm76 Delta Works cost the country about $15 billion,77 and the country spends $1.5 billion a year to maintain their flood defenses.78 Delta Works receded the Netherlands' coastline by about 375 square miles, destroying various ecosystems but shrinking their line of defense.79 80	Widely known for its complexity and effectiveness
Mississippi Coastal Improvement Program	This $40 billion proposal would give the government the authority to purchase over 17,000 homes along the Mississippi's coastline. The Corps would use the properties to erect levees and build barrier islands as part of a "hurricane-improvement zone." Proposed in Mississippi, the Corps is contemplating the plan in Louisiana as well.81	Status will be determined by the Corps' recommendations to Congress in Dec.
Revegetation	Saltwater intrusion caused by canals dug into wetlands kills native vegetation and increases erosion. Directly revegetating these lands occurs on a small-scale; current vegetation should be preserved by preventing saltwater from invading freshwater ecosystems	Difficult to plant a large amount of vegetation on a large scale

Mark Davis is the Director of the Tulane University Institute on Water Resources Law and Policy. He calculated his own cost estimate for full restoration: $45 billion,[72] trumping the $25 billion CPRA restoration cost estimation. In his view, Louisiana must find the balance between the short-term political security that levees provide and the long-term benefits from wetland regeneration, which are costly today but will save the coast in the future. "The pressure to do something soon trumps the pressure to do something smart. Emergency response shrinks the state's ability to do smart things because they want quick results to make people feel safe," Davis stated.[82] While improving the recommendations of the *Master Plan* may seem infeasible because of the lack of political support in Washington, Louisiana is running out of options as its coast recedes day-by-day. The onus of progress is on the federal government.

Congress's Concessions

Congress is slowly ridding itself of the development paradigm. It has passed several pieces of legislation to provide the state with funds to address the issue, but each action is still too minor to help the state implement a fully sustainable protection and restoration program. In 1990 Louisiana Senator John Breaux (D) orchestrated the passage of the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act (CWPPRA). CWPPRA authorized the construction and maintenance of small-scale restoration projects along Louisiana's coastline, granting between $50-$70 million annually in federal funds to the state.[83] To date CWPPRA has funded approximately 120 active or completed projects.[84] While they have had a moderate impact on land-building rates, CWPPRA projects are too small to reverse current erosion rates. A state assessment of CWPPRA in 1997 found that all of the state's planned projects would preserve approximately 180 square miles of wetlands by 2050,[85] not nearly enough to compensate for the 1,900 square miles already lost and the 500 square miles expected to disappear by 2050.

In 2006 Congress passed the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, mandating that the federal government share the royalties they receive from energy companies producing oil and gas off of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) with states that host these companies' operations.[86] The federal government will deposit approximately $200 million in OCS royalties into Louisiana's Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund each year until 2016, and then up to $600 million annually thereafter.[87] The state will use this fund to begin implementing the *Master Plan*.[88] [89] To ensure these funds will be protected "from the whims of politics when dealing with annual budgeting and appropriations,"[90] 82 percent of Louisiana voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2006 that

allocates all OCS revenues the state receives to coastal restoration and hurricane protection projects.[91]

In addition to its OCS income, Louisiana will receive a modicum of funds from federal resources. The Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP), authorized by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, compensates coastal states for the effects of the oil and gas industries' operations on wetlands and barrier islands.[92] CIAP grants roughly $125 million per year from 2007 until 2010 to the Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund.[93] A 1998 lawsuit settlement between four major tobacco companies and the federal government provided Louisiana with $4.4 billion in payments over a 25-year span. Louisiana citizens voted to allocate 20 percent of those payments (about $35 million per year) to state restoration activities.[94] CWPPRA still mandates that Congress appropriate at least $50 million each year for restoration projects, and the state also has a $1 billion budget surplus on hand from FY2007, which the state constitution mandates must be spent on "one-time uses" such as healthcare, education, or coastal restoration.[95] The state will decide how to allocate it in December 2007, but outgoing governor Kathleen Blanco (D) is lobbying for $200 million to fund several restoration projects outlined in the *Master Plan*.[96] Over the next ten years, Louisiana's Coastal Protection and Restoration Fund revenue from CIAP, CWPPRA, the OCS fund, the tobacco settlement, and possibly the budget surplus will reach approximately $1 billion-$1.2 billion. By 2017 the state will have the ability to fund the $14 billion LCA proposal without further federal support,[97] but that will not be enough to fully fund even the *Master Plan*, much less the larger amount needed for comprehensive restoration and protection.

Louisiana's restoration efforts may receive its most significant financial support to date from Congress due to the 2007 Water Resources Development Act (WRDA), which passed in November when Congress overrode President Bush's veto.[98] The WRDA is a $23 billion civil works bill authorizing the Corps to begin hundreds of water projects around the country. Much of the bill focuses on restoration and protection along Louisiana's coast, allocating $7 billion for wetland restoration, storm protection, and flood control projects to the Corps in Louisiana over the next 14 years, half of which will be spent on wetland and marshland restoration projects. The bill also mandates the closure of the MRGO by April 2008.[99] If Congress adequately appropriates the money, then the bill will bring necessary funding to the region. However, the Corps currently has a backlog of over $58 billion worth of projects while maintaining an annual Congressionally-mandated budget for new projects of only $2 billion.[100] The WRDA may just add to that backlog. If Congress funds the WRDA's authorizations and the Corps constructs the projects, Louisiana will finally receive long overdue help from the federal government. Recent history must change for this to occur, however.

Obstacles to Overcome in Washington

No single event, decision, law, or policy during the country's three century-long effort to provide flood and storm protection to the Gulf Coast region led to the acute destruction from Hurricane Katrina. Years of inconsistent policies and insufficient funding levels exacerbated Katrina's devastation. There have been several epic floods along the Mississippi River,[101] giving the federal government cause to focus its efforts on a single, coordinated water policy with explicit objectives. Each time however, it failed to outline comprehensive strategies to integrate storm protection with ecosystem restoration. Although Congress has passed several pieces of legislation signifying slight progress within the federal government, their actions are still too minor to solve the problem. The Bush Administration, on the other hand, has not even shown an interest in funding wetland restoration. For Louisiana's survival, Washington must overcome this model of ineffectiveness.

One of the primary reasons Congress has been so ineffective in dealing with coastal erosion is because for decades the Louisiana delegation supported appropriations motivated by patronage. The nation has no uniform strategy regulating the nation's water control policies, so money flowing out of Congress went to projects with inconsistent goals from district to district. "It was a contest among all of us to see who could make the best case, who were the best politicians, who could get the numbers up for your projects," recalled former congressman, W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (R-LA).[102] As of 2007 the Corps still does not have a coordinated national water policy, a disturbing oversight by Congress. A policy defining specific regional objectives while outlining broad goals for public works departments around the country would ensure the $7 billion earmarked for Louisiana in the WRDA would be used to coordinate projects along the entire coastline instead of on a district-by-district, politician-by-politician basis.[103]

In February 2007, the National Academy of Public Administration drafted a report on how the Corps has been hurt by the absence of a defining water policy. The report states that the Corps' previous mission, controlling rivers and meeting specific local and regional needs, is no longer applicable to today's political climate.[104] The Academy defined two overarching faults to the Corps' process: a limited range of criteria considered during project evaluation and a mysterious, unclear budget process in which decisions are not easily communicated to the public.[105] The Academy outlined several recommendations to the Corps to reconcile these issues, but the outcome of their proposals to Congress will determine the effectiveness of their other suggestions:

- *Congress should move appropriations from a project-specific basis to a functional system… Individual project earmarks should be replaced with division-by-division appropriations to*

the Corps, scaled to meet the strategic performance priorities in each geographic area established by the collaborative planning process.

- *Congress should authorize and fund multi-party river basin planning councils to significantly increase the effectiveness with which the nation's watersheds are managed.*
- *Congress should allocate adequate funding to fully support needed collaboration, planning, and technical assistance at the state and multi-state levels, as well as to strengthen the Corps' ability to perform integrated, systems-based, watershed and river basin studies unconstrained as to formulation of alternatives.*[106]

Louisiana has outlined achievable objectives in the *Master Plan*; Congress should have a structured policy defining its response to those goals. If Congress does not appropriate funds to the Corps with an overarching objective guiding its actions, the Corps will continue to fail to effectively meet Louisiana's needs, especially as Louisiana's goals continue to progress beyond the federal government.

Conclusion

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita proved what coastal geologists and environmental scientists in Louisiana had been saying for decades: as the Louisiana coastline continued to disappear at alarming rates, severe storms would wreak greater havoc on southern Louisiana. The disjointed approaches to this problem from the state and the federal government have stalled restoration efforts. Louisiana's attempts to move them forward have been ongoing since the early 1990s, but each report, proposal, or bill sent to Washington returns to Louisiana drastically under-funded or simply ignored. The latest initiative, the *Master Plan*, is a promising start for Louisiana, but if it is unsupported by federal action, the plan will fail to dramatically decrease erosion rates while simultaneously rebuilding once-lost land. Any feasible method that most represents the Mississippi River's natural processes is imperative to save the coastline and should be considered.[107] Previous cost estimates, such as LCA's $14 billion, the 2005 WRDA's $1.98 billion, the *Master Plan*'s $25 billion, and the $7 billion in the 2007 WRDA are all too low. Mark Davis's calculation that comprehensive restoration efforts would cost $45 billion[108] is likely more accurate. The federal government has failed to compare this figure to potential loss assessments from the next major hurricane that will sweep through the Gulf Coast, or the losses waterborne transportation or energy infrastructure will suffer without wetlands.

Congress has passed several pieces of legislation, but those actions have yet to go far enough to create a sustainable coast. Meanwhile,

George W. Bush has opposed any significant action to restore Louisiana wetlands. His refusal to sign the Corps' $14 billion appropriation in 2004 was representative of the shortsighted development paradigm that still pervades much of Washington. Over two years after Katrina and Rita, the state of Louisiana has recognized and reacted to the gravity of the problem. However, success in finding a solution that improves upon the goals of the *Master Plan* to restore the wetlands hinges on the support Louisiana receives from the federal government. Only Congress and the president can allocate the funding necessary to produce long-term sustainability along the Gulf Coast.

Justin Villere is a first-year MPA candidate with a concentration in social policy at the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs. *He wishes to thank all of the editors on The Current staff for their efforts on this piece. Dan Jackson deserves particular recognition. The author would like to dedicate this article to all of the victims who lost their lives and their livelihoods to Katrina, and to Blue 2, who was there to help clean it up.*

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[12] Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Taskforce, Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority, *Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana, an Executive Summary*.

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[15] Without restoration efforts, 2,800 square miles out of between 8,000-9,000 square miles of original wetlands (30-35 percent) would be underwater. With restoration, about 2300-2400 square miles would be gone (about 25-30%). National Wetlands Research Center, U.S. Geological Survey.

[16] Subsidence is the natural sinking of land, usually due to the compression of soil. Sediments have been building southern Louisiana's coast for thousands of years, but as silt, sand, and dirt settles it compacts and sinks. Levees inhibit regeneration, and when soil is sapped of its moisture the ground compresses as well.
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[22] Robert Twilley, Telephone interview by author, October 30, 2007.

[23] Chris Macaluso, Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority spokesperson, email interview by author, October 27, 2007.

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Michael Grunwald and Susan B. Glasser, "The Slow Drowning of New Orleans," *Washington Post*, October 9, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/08/AR2005100801458_pf.html (accessed September 16, 2007). Stokstad, 1264.

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US Census Bureau, "Louisiana Historical Population Counts."

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[31] Ryan Dodge, "New Orleans: Built and Altered," *San Francisco State University*, 2006 http://bss.sfsu.edu/urbanaction/ua2006/pdf/ua2006-Dodge.pdf (accessed November 9, 2007).

[32] Matthew Brown, "Study Challenges Thinking on Wetlands," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), September 22, 2006, Access World News (accessed October 10, 2007).

[33] American Experience, "People & Events: The Mississippi River Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers."

[34] United States Army Corps of Engineers, "Task Force Hope Status Report," June 25, 2006, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/hps/Status%20Report%20Newsletters/June_25.pdf (accessed November 3, 2007).

[35] Scott Faber, "Comprehensive and Integrated Approach to meet the Water Resources Needs in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," *US Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Hearing*, November 9, 2005, http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=248649 (accessed October 15, 2007).

[36] Bob Marshall and Mark Schleifstein, "Losing Ground," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), March 5, 2007, Access World News (accessed October 10, 2007).

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way of the artificial canals and speeds soil erosion and the decay of vegetation. Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Taskforce and Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Authority. *Coast 2050: Toward a Sustainable Coastal Louisiana*. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Department of Natural Resources) 1998, 40 http://www.lca.gov/net_prod_download/public/lca_net_pub_products/doc/2050report.pdf (accessed October 3, 2007).

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FEMA, "Debris Removal Surpasses 40 Million Cubic Yards," Press Release, May 3, 2006, http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=25838 (accessed October 25, 2007).

[39] Tibbetts, A43.

[40] State of Louisiana, Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority. *Integrated Ecosystem Restoration and Hurricane Protection: Louisiana's Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast*, 68.

[41] Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, Environmental Defense, the Gulf Restoration Network, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation, and the National Wildlife Federation.

[42] Environmental Defense, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, National Wildlife Federation, Gulf Restoration Network, Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation "One Year After Katrina: Louisiana Still a Sitting Duck," August 28, 2006, http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/5416_KatrinaReportCard.pdf (accessed October 3, 2007).

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[44] Grunwald and Glasser, "The Slow Drowning of New Orleans."

[45] Environmental Defense, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, National Wildlife Federation, Gulf Restoration Network, Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation.

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[55] Bob Marshall, "Atchafalaya Success Holds Lessons for Restoring Wetlands," *Sun Herald* (Biloxi, MS), March 8, 2007, NewsBank Newsfile (accessed October 6, 2007).

[56] Colonel Peter J. Rowan, "Breaux Act," *United States Army Corps of Engineers*, February 18, 2005, http://www.lacoast.gov/cwppra/slideshow/cwppra-TIcommittee-18feb05.pdf (accessed September 24, 2007).

[57] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, State of Louisiana Dept. of Natural Resources, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

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[60] Matthew Brown, "When the $120 million Davis Pond Diversion project opened in 2003, many supporters hailed it as a way to replenish the Louisiana marshlands. But it has been fraught with problems and the Corps of Engineers says it would cost another $100 million to do that," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), February 22, 2006, Access World News (accessed October 26, 2007).

[61] Stokstad, 1264.

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York Times, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.americaswetland.com/article.cfm?id=426&cateid=3&pageid=3 (accessed November 8, 2007).

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[75] Matthew Brown, "River's Mud Could Mold Coast," *The Times-Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), April 2, 2006, NewsBank Newsfile (accessed October 27, 2007).

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[77] Tom Hundley, "Katrina Bolsters Dutch Devotion to New Strategy on Flood Threat," *Chicago Tribune*, April 10, 2006, NewsBank Newsfile (accessed October 22, 2007).

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[79] John Bohanon and Martin Enserink, "Questioning the 'Dutch Solution'," *Science* 309 (2005), p. 1809, ProQuest Research Library (accessed October 22, 2007).

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McQuaid, "Dutch Defense, Dutch Masters."

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[82] Davis Interview.

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Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, "Five Breaux Act coastal restoration projects celebrated today at Grand Isle State Park," *LDNR Press Release*, June 16, 2006, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/sec/execdiv/pubinfo/newsr/2006/0616crm-five-projects-celebrated.ssi (accessed October 5, 2007).

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Office of the Press Secretary, "President Vetoes Water Resources Development Act of 2007," *The White House*, November 2, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071102-3.html (accessed November 8, 2007)

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[102] Grunwald and Glasser, "The Slow Drowning of New Orleans."
[103] Twilley Interview.
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[105] Ibid., 24.
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[107] Davis Interview. Twilley Interview.
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The Regional Problem in Greece:
Public Investment Policy and the Non-Diffusion of Development

Antonios Aggelakis and Efstratios Takis

ABSTRACT:
Over the past two decades, European regional economies witnessed a proliferation of a new policy paradigm, mainly crystallized through the imperatives of the European Union Regional Policy. This emergent policy pattern mainly intends to stimulate the endogenous innovation capacity of European regions such as the enhancement of research-industry relations and the institutional cohesion of regional productivity systems. More specifically, the new paradigm primarily aims to promote 'soft structures' such as the financing of R&D programs and the development of a series of supporting institutions (incubators, technology parks, competitiveness poles, liaison offices). However, the institutional differences between EU policies and the established Greek policy framework have systematically led to policy failure or inefficiency. This paper seeks to illustrate that the mismanagement of the period 1985-1995, as well as the problems encountered by the Greek government in 'rationalization' and 'modernization' attempts of 1996-2005, are mostly associated with what is called institutional and policy 'misfit'.

Under the economic pressure of strong forces such as the shrinkage of economic space, the de-regulation of markets and the increasing significance of technological change and knowledge as a productive force, national and regional economies were forced to re-construct their economic characters and developmental strategies. More specifically, internationalization has affected welfare states as well as the capacity of national economies vis-à-vis external pressures by encouraging governments to reconsider their policy paradigms and formulating, to a certain extent, the opportunities and constraints of governments in the formation of national policies.[1] European regions especially are going through a transition period that is characterized by the extensive introduction of new modes of production (post-Fordism) and the adoption of new policy styles.

In particular, the adaptation process of the "less privileged"[2] regions into new European Union (EU) public policy requirements constitutes a huge task. In those regions, the level of technological capacity and the established managerial practices affect in many respects the feasibility or the impact of a policy program. For instance, loose and

at some level conflicting relations between research and industry communities in Greek regions have prevented the efficient development of policy programs related to technology transfer, research-technology consortiums, regional innovation, and technology strategies.

The efficient management of European receipts through EU Structural Funds[3] constitutes a popular topic in Greek public policy debate for both politicians and academics. This paper seeks to contribute to the current literature about the impact of Europeanization over domestic policy in Greece. More specifically, this article explores the possible implications of the European Union's Regional Policy for Greek investment policy (Public Investment Program), examining the Greek government's management style concerning EU receipts and its consequences for the Greek political economy and fiscal relations between the EU and Greece.

The paper investigates a set of specific questions aiming to shed some light on the uneasy relationship between Europeanization and the established domestic practices in the area of regional policy in Greece. We primarily examine the issue of the Greek developmental state or, alternatively, we look at whether or not the Greek political economy has moved into a new stage of development ("new developmental state" assumption). In the same framework, similar questions regard the level at which the Greek public administration system has been decentralized over the last years and whether the so-called "developmental" and investment policies have been regionalized.

The hypothesis presented is two-fold. First, more receipts[4] do not necessarily generate more development or more cohesion, especially when they are not accompanied by a well-defined, planned and realistic developmental plan (efficient investment planning) or otherwise, by a so-called "high-reliability" program.[5] A profound research exploration of public money management in Greece indicates that support of internal infrastructures and creation of endogenous developmental mechanisms contribute substantially to the processes of development. The allocation of public money in itself does not necessarily presume any efficiency since it can lead to a greater dependence on external funds, or, simply, to a deficient absorptive capacity.

Secondly, growth is not only a matter of political will but also an issue of *material sphere synchronization*. The latter refers to the proactive role of economic and social actors in the development of policy programs and their inherent ability to efficiently meet specific goals and create synergies and multiplier effects. Deficient economic and institutional structures, vested interests and lack of experience are some of the parameters that drastically affect the process of development. Growth and economic performance are not independent from the regions themselves as long as economic development is primarily a spatial procedure. This issue, known as the "regional paradox," has

been described by Christine Oughton as a situation such that "where the need is greatest, so too are the barriers."[6]

Theorizing Europeanization

To understand the way in which European integration affects member-states, such as Greece, the meaning, scope, and mechanisms of Europeanization also must be understood. Europeanization is generally associated with the constraints imposed by the European integration process at the domestic level, as well as the necessity of institutional and policy adaptation to EU rules. Most scholars, however, conceive of Europeanization as a process of gradual convergence between member-states, assuming that all countries respond with a similar manner to European integration pressures.[7] Furthermore, most of these accounts also perceive Europeanization as a process that fundamentally alters the relationship between actors at the national level by favoring one group over the other.[8] In other words, European integration creates conditions that may be exploited by certain political elites while it imposes constraints over the actions of others, producing in such a way winners and losers in national political landscapes.

We can identify many theories about Europeanization in the international political science literature. According to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, the level of such redistribution of power between actors depends on two mediating factors, which determine the capacity of the actors to exploit the opportunities derived from Europeanization.[9] These mediating factors are: 1. multiple veto players that can substantially empower actors with diverse interests, and 2. formal institutions which may provide actors with material and ideological resources to exploit new opportunities.[10] For instance, in the case of Italy, negotiations for EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) reshaped the domestic balance of power in favor of a central executive vis-à-vis the traditional "partitocrazia."[11] The technocratic elite exploited the opportunities that emerged from the process, imposing its policy preferences as well as strengthening its institutional status by invoking the European integration pressures as "vincolo esterno."[12]

Another Europeanization theory has been developed by Vivien Schmidt. Schmidt has defined economic vulnerability as the chief factor for policy change in countries that are facing economic crisis and stagnation and, thus, tend to be more open to policy change.[13] However, economic vulnerability does not constitute the only stimulus for policy change since more than one factor usually influences policy change. The factors proposed by Schmidt are briefly summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Factors Affecting Policy Change

Economic vulnerability	Presence or absence of economic crisis, market competitiveness
Political institutional capacity	Principal actors' ability to impose or negotiate change
Policy legacies	Fit with long-standing policies and policy-making institutions
Policy Preferences	Fit with old preferences and/or openness to new
Discourse	Ability to change preferences by altering perceptions

Source: Vivien Schmidt, 2002: 898.

Finally, it is worthwhile to discuss the meaning of Europeanization in southern Europe. It is almost commonly accepted that this region, which is often identified in comparative politics as the "southern periphery," is characterized by certain peculiarities, such as a corporatist system of governance, late industrialization, and a somewhat weak civil society. As a result, it could be said that responses to Europeanization in Southern European countries, such as Greece, to some extent, diverge from those of the Western European countries.[14] Alternatively, in addition to the general framework of Europeanization, which is described above, it is important to take into account the peculiarities of southern Europe.

In the southern European experience, Europeanization is primarily synonymous with modernization. It is perceived as the essential force that has enabled structural changes in society and economy. Therefore, Europeanization is considered by many to create a critical juncture by serving as "a powerful force potentially capable of providing sufficient support and momentum for the social and political forces adhering to the reformist culture to bring about reforms, rationalization of the structures, and overall changes in... polity and economy."[15] Europeanization in southern Europe could be classified either as "responsive" or "intended".[16] Responsive Europeanization is associated with changes that occur without considerable effort by domestic actors to introduce EU norms and policy styles into the political system and, for that reason, it cannot be regarded as a modernization attempt. Intended Europeanization more appropriately qualifies as modernization since it is normally a result of the strong intention of domestic political and administrative elites to import into the national political system the organizational, behavioral and regulatory styles originally connected with European integration.[17]

Economic Policy and Development in Theoretical Perspective

It is essential to make two fundamental analytical and theoretical distinctions before addressing the main part of the paper. The first concerns the role of the state in economic development and the impact of public investments upon growth and development in a given economy/society. According to Joseph Stiglitz and others, public investments usually cause a "dislodgement" of private investments that otherwise may have taken place. In this respect, public investments seem to be a substitute or disincentive for private initiatives. However, in the antipode of this neo-classical approach, several scholars have developed different interpretations. The reasons for state intervention can be found mainly, as Stiglitz argues, at the unwanted and unintended consequences derived from the uncontrolled and deregulated market operation.[18]

State intervention can also be necessitated by other factors. For instance, David Aschauer, in his seminal research, concludes that public investments are of utmost importance for economic development.[19] Particularly, the significance of public investment lies in its ability to affect private sector productivity. Indeed, public investments support and increase the productivity and attribution of private capital and encourage the actualization of private investments.[20] According to the same research, public investments have a positive effect upon the marginal productivity of private capital by creating the necessary private investment incentives (crowding-in effect).[21] In contrast with the argument about the dislodgement of private investments by extensive public expenditure, Aschauer demonstrates the statistically significant and quantitatively vital impact of public investments on labor productivity and total productivity.[22]

A second theoretical distinction in discussion of economic policy is that between the neo-Schumpeterian and neo-classical approaches to development. According to the latter and its deterministic argument, economic and market forces lead automatically, evenly, and consistently to economic growth. On the other hand, neo-Schumpeterian approaches deal with issues of institutional structures[23] and their important role in developmental processes. Particularly, institutional and evolutionary economics underline the significance of the endogenous structures and the role of specific and case-oriented plans for the goals of growth and the economic convergence between economies.

The main assumption, developed in the following paragraphs, encompasses, either implicitly or explicitly, theoretical elements from both the Aschauerian approach, which clearly states the importance of public investments for the economy, and the neo-Schumpeterian

theoretical approaches, which pay a particular tribute to the significance of institutional parameters. More specifically, neo-Schumpeterian approaches, inter alia, assert that institutions contribute to the economic development process[24] through the "unlocking of wealth of regions"[25] and by overcoming growth barriers.

The Greek Public Investment Program in Empirical Perspective

Empirical evidence connects Greek economic and regional development to Europeanization. All the evidence used at the present point is extracted from a recent quantitative analysis, included in the Greek State Accounting Books of 1985-2005, compiled by the Hellenic Ministry and Finance. The main questions explored in our analysis concern the relation between recent years' developmental process in Greece and the level of contribution of public investments; the management of EU receipts by the Greek government; and possible obstacles that may have been raised, posing difficulties for growth and development.

At the first stage, a fiscal analysis of the Public Investments' financial flows is developed. Public Budget (PB) in Greece is being divided into two main parts. The first component of the Public Budget is the Regular Budget (RB) and the second part is the Public Investment Program (PIP). The Public Investment Program involves credit inflows, national contributions and EU receipts/funds. PIP is the official receiver of EU Structural Funds. Within PIP there is also one more considerable distinction, namely, the distinction between co-financed and national-financed projects. The totality of the investments carried out by the government, either through Ministries or through regional administrative institutions, is financed by the PIP.

More analytically, Public Investments have always been a small part of the total Regular Budget. Until 1996, PIP was a proportion less than ten percent of the Regular Budget. Since 1996 and the ascendancy of the Kostas Simitis[26] government, Public Investments have composed almost one-fifth of the Regular Budget, which constitutes an important increase. As Graph 1 demonstrates, Public Investments have increased since 1996 and are at their highest rate in 2000, when national elections took place.

Graph 1



Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Accounting Books 1985-2005.

However, as it is illustrated below, the increase of PIP as a proportion of Regular Budget has not been caused by a real increase in funding, but rather by an increment in an artificial category called "Public Participation in Public Organizations" (DEKO). This specific category regards potential inflows to the public purse deriving from the participation of the state on shares of Public Organizations.

As Graph 2 depicts, the Public Investment Program increased as a proportion of the Public Budget during the period of 1996-2005. Furthermore, internal borrowing appears to have increased significantly as well. The receipt of European funds is no longer an adequate factor to stimulate further developmental processes, for it is essential that a rational management of the funds and the construction of a stable and long-term developmental plan should accompany it.

Graph 2



Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Accounting Books 1985-2005.

The absence of such a plan, as well the lack of a relatively reliable and effective "institutional thickness,"[27] undermined the potential of any positive effects that the European receipts may have for the Greek economy. The term "institutional thickness" refers to the presence (role) of institutions, which may be able to bridge the projects (financial flows) with private interests and coordinate efforts at the implementation stage.[28]

Under the new Social Democratic administration of 1996-2004, fiscal conditions in the public budget fundamentally improved. Graph 2 demonstrates strong evidence in defense of rationalization of the management under the new administration of Kostas Simitis. The greatest part of the funds received from the EU after 1996 have been directed towards the Public Investment Program to boost economic development. We would expect European funds to lead to greater and more balanced development among Greek regions. However, paradoxically, the evidence demonstrates that more receipts do not create more development**.** This paradox observed in the Greek case becomes more obvious if we compare the data on Graph 3 and Graph 4.

Graph 3 denotes the mismanagement of inflows; the high horizontal line (100%) represents the total resources received while the fluxes below it represent the allocation of these resources. Hence, the distance between the colored fluxes and the top of the 100 percent scale reflects lost and mismanaged funds. EU funds were directed to the Public Investment Program only after 1996. In other words, as it is illustrated, prior to the flows' convergence (1996-7), most of the receipts were used for transmissive payments and not for investment purposes.

Graph 3[29]



Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Accounting Books 1985-2005.

However, after 1996-1997, when the inflows gradually shifted toward investment purposes, the variation between the "committed payments" and the "actual received payments" apparently increased as if the management rationalization was not combined with the desired efficiency. Instead, it appears to be characterized by a certain degree of absorptive incapacity and sclerosis. Thus, it is evident that as more funds were directed to the Public Investment Program, the Greek economy was able to absorb less. Hence, paradoxically, as the Greek government made steps toward a more "rationalized" financial management, the variations between the "committed" and the "received" funds were rather increased (Graph 4).

Graph 4



Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Accounting Books 1985-2005.

The rationalization attempts of economic management by the Greek government in the 1996-2004 period generated an unintended consequence, namely, the incapacity of full utilization of European funds. The main reasons for this, according to interviews conducted in the Ministry of Finance, were the inability of agencies to manage continuous and simultaneous financial flows; the lack of understanding in a number of technical issues; the structural constraints imposed by the lack of specialized/de-crystallized private interests to handle the projects; and, most importantly, the lack of an "institutional thickness."

This Greek paradox of non-absorption of growth and non-diffusion of growth confirms hypotheses about the developmental process in regions. Thus, the inability to receive and efficiently utilize European funds, especially after the "management rationalization," can be explained and interpreted by these two theoretical points. The lack of an "institutional thickness" is part of the absence of a long-term, well-

defined, and structured developmental plan (ineffective investment planning). In the same vein, the evidence proves that the less developed the "spatiality," such as a region or nation-state, the larger the number of barriers to overcome, including lack of expertise, absence of institutional base, lack of interests, and entangled interests. Thus, it could be said that Public Budget in the Greek political economy is still a politically loaded instrument, alternatively used either in favor of specific interest groups or simply for the disoriented completion of EU requirements.

The mismanagement of financial allocations in Greece also has a spatial dimension. Yannis Psycharis[30] recently published an article providing evidence for the mismanagement of allocations across the regions of Greece. Specifically, Psycharis claims, "allocations increased across prefectures in years preceding national elections,"[31] a fact that defends the argument of the politically loaded instrumentality of public finance in the country. In addition, beyond this argument, the data derived from the Public Accounting Books indicates that the "decentralization policy" itself was rhetoric. Graph 5 indicates the reverse tendency, which defines the allocation of European funds among the Greek regions. European structural funds are supposed to promote regional development and sustainability ex officio. However, Greek regions gradually have been receiving fewer funds in comparison with centrally administered funds, despite the EU's intention for European Regional (Structural) Funds to represent a greater portion than national funds in regional development.

Graph 5



Source: Ministry of Finance, State Budget Accounting Books 1985-2005.

Rationalization of public money management not only came with a "non-diffusion-of-growth syndrome," but also brought an even more

intensive centralization. The empirical evidence proves that the Greek government has been ill-equipped to diffuse large amounts of receipts from the EU. Additionally, the absence of "institutional thickness" in the regions also prevented the regionalization of growth, by imposing an insuperable barrier for further development. Nevertheless, the importance of the last systemic parameter is still questionable, since the financial flows were increasing in periods of elections. As a result, it could be said that the non-diffusion of European receipts was not simply a "structural" case, but it was also a matter of political intention. In other words, although there is a certain lack of institutional learning and low responsiveness to the European policy stimuli, it could be said that the response to Europeanization is still a political affair. Thus, when the Greek government proceeded to increase the amount of public expenditure in order to serve their electoral-political purposes, they managed to exploit European receipts in an effective way.

Conclusion

The above analysis provided empirical evidence that leads to three economic development policy conclusions. First, most of the European funds received by Greece until 1996 were allocated for transmissive payments, but not for investments, as they should have been in order to foster further economic development. Secondly, after 1996, a rationalization of public money management took place, accompanied by the unintended consequence of "non-diffusion" of growth (deficient absorptive capacity). Thirdly, even after the "rationalization" of financial management, the government continued to behave in an irrational way with respect to the spatial distribution/allocation of European receipts. As a result of insufficient political will and the lack of institutional efficiency, Greek regions received less European money each year, with the exemption of the pre-election period.

Thus, political unwillingness, lack of know-how,[32] low institutionalization,[33] non-synchronization of the material sphere and the absence of a well-defined developmental plan counted as the main barriers to economic growth and development, as well as the main causes of the mismanagement of European receipts and the "non-Europeanization" of the Greek public budget. In short, as the level of the obtained EU funds was increasing over the years, it was more difficult for the Greek government to effectively utilise those funds due to a series of negative structural, systemic and political parameters which are permanently present in the Greek political economy. The "regional sclerosis" phenomenon should be interpreted based on the assumptions of "new geographical economics" (history matters) and

"evolutionary economics" (institutions matter).

More analytically, regional economic development is to a large extent a historical, path-dependent process;[34] what regions face first are their own developmental past and their productive specialization. However, the transition to a new developmental strategy is not an automatic and linear process. It requires institutional, as well as systemic, changes and reforms. As Peter Klein claims, "economic development is institutional development."[35] The role of intermediate institutions and the interactive manner in which economic progress evolves should then be approached as imperatives. Where the dominant paradigms are conditioned by dualisms (state against market), it seems that effective interaction is the key framework.[36]

As Kevin Morgan[37] observes, EU regional policy recently adopted a different pattern that is less oriented to tangible infrastructures and more concerned with intangible info-structures.[38] In Greece, though, Structural Funds have been mainly directed towards the creation of "hard structures" by investing in physical capital, transportation, and telecommunications systems. At the same time, in contrast with the direction of EU regional policy, Greek governments had not always exploited potential opportunities and conditions to develop what is called *soft competitiveness*. This mainly refers to R&D programs and the required institutional and legal framework for effective, interactive and co-evolutionary cooperation among the private and public sectors and universities, as well as public and private research agencies.

Based on the above analysis, Greece appears to be dependent on EU financial support. Mostly, however, Greece remains dependent on the economic growth model/paradigm followed over the last fifteen years. The low rates of innovation and economic extroversion of Greek businesses, the insufficient R&D expenditures, and the obsolete strategies for knowledge dissemination and information transfer[39] are aspects, as well as consequences, of the policies followed. Jan Fagerberg asserts that in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, reforms have not included ambitious goals such as the changing of industrial structure (technological change, investments in progressive industries, i.e. ICT). In fact, the results in terms of economic performance, accumulation of skills, and technological capabilities[40] were modest.

Furthermore, it could be argued that the low response of the Greek government to Europeanization pressures for greater regional development is also a result of the long established dominance of the central government over political and economic life in Greece. Put differently, the Greek central government was traditionally the veto-player for any attempt that may have provided the regional and local authorities with further political and economic autonomy. Thus, since the effective utilization of EU funds presupposes the development of a strong, extensive, and to a certain extent, autonomous regional

institutional structure, the central government regarded this tendency suspiciously as long as the political elite of the country intended to maintain a monopoly in the allocation of resources.

In addition, according to Schmidt's framework for the analysis Europeanization, we could argue that the new imported policy trends were in natural opposition with the long-standing policies and policy-making institutions. Moreover, the policy preference of the Greek government to monopolize the distribution of financial and institutional resources by no means fits with the purposes of Europeanization. However, Europeanization to a certain extent is responsible for specific modernization initiatives concerning regional policy over the past two decades.

Pressure from the European Union led the Greek government to establish elections for the second degree of local government, the so-called prefectures, by loosening the ties between regions and any given government party. Indeed, the Greek government of the 1990s and the early 2000s promoted the administrative separation of the country into several regions in order to achieve higher absorption rates and more effective utilization of the European Structural Funds. However, taking into account Ioakimidis' distinction between responsive and intended Europeanization, we could assert that since domestic actors did not make considerable and intensive efforts towards a more independent regional institutional framework, the case of regional development in Greece is rather a responsive Europeanization and should not be seen as a modernization attempt.[41]

Moreover, the Greek experience does not yet symbolize a clear shift to a developmental state; nor does the Greek administrative body represent what is usually meant by the term regionalized/decentralized administrative system. Policy makers and public managers must seriously consider the argument that economic growth should no longer be regarded as a linear process relying quantitative dimensions but it should be considered as a response to the evolution of institutions that support economic but also social and non-market relationships.

Finally, the established Greek growth model locks-in the possibilities for a shift into a new innovation and research-oriented, endogenous developmental paradigm. The major obstacles that private and public agents need to overcome are low innovation and economic extroversion; the fragmented and disjointed labor market; the antiquated dominant production model (Taylorism);[42] the deficient innovation system (lack of R&D expenses, lack of venture capital, institutional inertia and outdated institutional forms); as well as the lack of intermediating institutions. In the age of technology and innovation, the significance between technology, economy, institutions and policies should be fundamentally reconsidered. Hence, the Greek government, in order to secure satisfactory development for its regions, should adopt a set of

strategies such as synergies, interactive innovation, regionalized external economies and clustering, associational networking, institutional learning, and local skill pools.

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Endnotes

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[2] The term 'less privileged' regions refers to those European regions which have experienced late industrialization, weak and inefficient economic institutions and, as a result, they have been historically characterized by low levels of economic development.

[3] Structural Funds are the main programmatic and financial instruments of the Regional Policy in EU over the last two decades. The role of Structural Funds traditionally has been to support the poorer Regions of Europe through European receipts. Specifically, European Union in order to secure a more economically balanced and cohesive Union of States grants financial assistance to the poorer regions to resolve economic, structural and social problems.

[4] Structural Funds support financially investing activities in EU member states by complementing policies such as regional policy, innovation policy, economic and social policy. More specifically, the Structural Funds are the European Regional Development Fund [ERDF] which is the most extensive program, the European Social Fund [ESF], the European Agricultural Guidance & Guarantee Fund (FEOGA) and the Cohesion Fund. FEOGA is

divided in two parts, Orientation and Guarantees; in this paper is examined the Orientation part as the one which concerns investments and it is financially included at the Public Investment Program. FEOGA-Guarantees regard mainly subsidies and are directed to a different budget section.

[5] According to Albert Hirschman, development is not prevented by the lack of resources as from the lack of 'high reliability' programs which are projects of optimal conception, planning and implementation. A. Hirschman, A, "Investment Policies and 'Dualism' in Underdeveloped Countries", *American Economic Review*, 47, no. 5 (1947) : 550-570

[6] Oughton argues that deficient physical (hard) and 'soft' infrastructures have always been an obstacle to any developmental reform

[7] T. A. Börzel "Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanization in Germany and Spain" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, no. 4 (1999) : 573-96

[8] Ibid.

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[10] Ibid., 58.

[11] *Partitocrazia* is the term which is used to describe the traditional dominance of political parties over the state structures in Italy during the greater part of 20th Century.

[12] The term "Vincolo Esterno" means external coercion/imposition. K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, "Italy and EMU as a "Vincolo Esterno": Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State" *South European Society and Politics*, 1, no. 2 :272-299

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[21] The central argument of Ashauer is located in the production function: Yt = At * f (Nt, Kt, GKt), where: Yt the real product of private sector in the period t, Nt the employment during the same period, Kt the capital stock excluding private housing in the beginning of period t, GKt the capital stock of public sector in the beginning of the period t and At the indicator of total productivity in the sense of Hicks' neutral technological change (Panteion University, 1998): 50

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[26] Kostas Simitis has served as Prime Minister of Greece from 1996 to 2004.

[27] By the term 'institutional thickness' is meant the presence of supporting institutions in the region such as enterprise support agencies, political institutions, intermediate institutions (trade associations etc).

[28] Hellenic Ministry of Economy and Finance, State Accounting Books, 1985-2005

[29] European Regional Development Fund-ERDF, European Social Fund-ESF, European Agricultural Guidance & Guarantee Fund (FEOGA) and the Cohesion Fund (see endnote 3).

[30] Yannis Psycharis is a specialist on regional development and regional policy in Greece; he is a Faculty member (Assistant Professor) in the Department of Planning and Regional Development at the University of Thessaly, Greece

[31] M Lambrinidis, Y Psycharis, and A Rovolis, **"**Regional allocation of public infrastructure investment: the case of Greece", *Regional Studies*, 39, no. 9 (2005), 1231-1244.

[32] As Siriopoulos claims, the rich countries have the ability to educate their people as they grow rich and the endogenous ability to accumulate the knowledge upon which these efforts are made; while poor countries like Greece face a lack of experience (Siriopoulos, 1998: 545), by meeting difficulties on adapting themselves upon new requirements. **C** Siriopoulos and D Asteriou,"Testing for Convergence Across the Greek Regions", *Regional Studies*, (1998) : 537-546

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A Dialogue on Climate Change and Adaptive Strategies: *The 60th Annual UN DPI/NGO Conference*

Amanda LaBelle and Denise M. Ziobro

> We cannot go on this way for long. We cannot continue with business as usual. The time has come for decisive action on a global scale.[1]
>
> Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations Secretary-General, 2006-present

Titled "Climate Change: How It Impacts Us All," the sixtieth annual conference, held at the United Nations (UN) headquarters from September 5–7, 2008 and sponsored by the Nongovernmental Organization section of the UN Department of Public Information, brought together representatives of 469 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) from 62 nations[2] to address the inescapably universal nature of climate change. The far-reaching effects of climate change were evidenced by the wide variety of topics covered at the event. From health to education to food and water security, workshops spanned demographics and disciplines. Grateful for the opportunity to attend the conference as representatives of *The Current*, we are pleased to share with you these remarks about the event.

While the title of the conference suggests a discussion limited to a global impact assessment of climate change, dialogue tended to focus mainly on adaptive strategies, paying homage to the universality of the problem by placing emphasis on harmonized, holistic responses. In her presentation of the 2006 United Nations Human Development Report, titled "Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis," Cecilia Ugaz, Senior Policy Advisor of the UN Development Programme, declared it essential that international and scientific communities come together to address impending water crises.

Presenters also emphasized that such international, cross-sector tactics necessitate a change in the way we collaborate with one another. The need for greater public involvement, increased transparency, and policies that encourage efficient resource usage was reiterated throughout the conference. Eleanor Jones of Environmental Solutions Ltd. spoke about these issues in the context of water policy, underlining

the value of engaging users of watershed land in resource protection efforts, the need to make relevant data more accessible to policy makers, and the requisite nature of collaboration among sectors.

Initiatives such as these are becoming increasingly crucial as policies that address issues of adaptation to climate change look to overcome the obstacles to implementation. The necessity of engagement on all levels was made apparent as NGOs, policy-makers, and international institutions alike were called to action. The conference also highlighted numerous challenges these actors face in their attempts to render successful and enduring policy responses to climate change, ranging from governance and regulation to management initiatives aimed at conservation and sustainable practices.

Participants produced a Conference Declaration, the first of its kind to emerge from the annual conference. The declaration reflects the need for immediate action made evident throughout the three days of dialogue, and recommends:

1. All governments and civil society foster an ethical, moral foundation for ongoing sustainable development in our interdependent world, making the well-being of all of humankind our priority.
2. All educational institutions and media organizations more effectively educate about the issue of climate change with special emphasis on youth.
3. Governmental authorities consider penalties for excessive consumption and pollution as a method of financing climate change improvements, as well as financial incentives to foster climate-friendly technologies so that fossil fuel and nuclear based technologies can be phased out.
4. Governments recognize that war is damaging to the climate.
5. All governments ratify UN conventions on climate change, the Kyoto protocol and other relevant climate conventions.[3]

The public policy questions generated by the conference are a first step toward the unification of various stakeholder groups and toward bringing together those poised to create policies that will facilitate adaptation to climate change. Perhaps most importantly, the conference signified the beginning of what will hopefully be a transparent global dialogue. Although answers to the questions raised by climate change

are often not immediately apparent, policymakers need to become cognizant that these questions should be asked in a global setting, for a global audience.

As Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated, we must act now. It is our hope that policymakers will take this to heart and begin to work towards the policy goals and proposals set forth in this conference, which will be addressed further at the upcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007.

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VIEWS & REVIEWS

Perspectives on and analyses of current public policy discourse

Euro-Islamic Religious Pluralism for Europe:
An Alternative to Ethnicity and to "Multiculturalism of Fear"

by Bassam Tibi

This paper aims to apply the political democracy concept of pluralism[1] to the existing community of multiple religions viewed as cultural systems. In a civic culture based democracy, diversity is restricted to political orientations and does not apply to the core values and rules of the political culture of democracy. These democratic values are shared by all regardless of their diversity. This concept of political-democratic pluralism combines diversity with commonalities. Shared core values and rules are highly relevant in the age of global migration and the related crisis. In this context, there are two competing concepts for the inclusion of newcomers. First, multiculturalism based on cultural relativism and, second, cultural-religious pluralism in the meaning outlined above. The deliberations made in the present paper focus on Islam and Europe, while my experience in West Asia (Middle East) and in Southeast Asia are considered. Difference is not denied legitimacy, but is attached to the acceptance of the civil values of open society.

I set out in looking at the transformation of sectarian-ethnic strife in violence in Iraq and join Jacob Levy in his theorization on "multiculturalism of fear." He draws our attention to the "dangers of violence, cruelty and political humiliation, which often accompany … ethnic politics."[2] Within the outlined framework I present in this paper my concept of Euro-Islam based on a religious pluralism as an alternative to an ethnicization of Islam in Europe. This process could result in a long-term perspective in such a "multiculturalism of fear." The point of departure is the fact of the present age that people of different cultures and religions migrate and as a result are compelled to live with one another in the same society. Under these conditions inner-societal peace requires concepts other than pure multicultural ones. In addition to recognizing difference and diversity, there is a need to combine the right to difference with an acceptance of shared values and rules. In short, a Euro-Islamic pluralism is proposed for twenty-first century Europe, which is undergoing a global migration crisis. This proposition is the alternative to multiculturalism. If Islam is Europeanized and becomes part of Europe, the misgiving of disunifying

Europe - similar to that of disunifying the United States - would be off the table.

I. Why Religious-Cultural Pluralism Matters

The recent debate on religious and cultural pluralism has taken a global shape. Conditions created by globalization matter to Europe and equally to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. On many counts, Islam stands at the core of this debate with a pertinence to each of these three world regions. I set out with a reference to the novel "*Mansur oder der Duft des Abendlandes*/Mansur or the Fragrance of Europe"[3] because it includes a most telling story, highly pertinent not only in its inquiry into how Muslim immigrants live in Europe but also in its general address of the religious and cultural pluralism debate. This novel deals with the increasing significance of Islam to Europe - be it as faith, culture, or Islamism. Its author, the Iraqi Hussain al-Mozany has a biography highly pertinent to this inquiry. A comparison between Islam in Europe and Southeast Asia, with some Iraq-focused hints to the Middle East, viewed as the core region of Islam promises some global perspectives. Of course, the comparison can only be done in passing and the focus continues to be on Europe.

The novel by Hussain al-Mozany recounts a telling story of an Iraqi asylum seeker who managed to get to Germany hoping for a better life. Mansur ends up, however, in an asylum ghetto-diaspora, not in the society where he was seeking to become a member. The advantage of the novel is that it equally covers the recipient German ethnic-exclusive society and the equally designed community of Arab-Muslim immigrants. The author himself came to Germany in this manner as an Iraqi asylum seeker, then became a legal immigrant who was able to accomplish even more: al-Mozany is today a German citizen and a successful author of novels and contributor to prominent newspapers. The problem of the author of the Mansur-novel resembles the one of its hero. Mansur fails to be accepted as a member of the society that hosts him. European societies are all democratic, but nevertheless share, if to varying degrees, the inability to be inclusive vis-à-vis incoming aliens. The explanation for this is to be sought in the ethnic-exclusive character of most European societies. The hero of Hussain al-Mazany, namely Mansur, does not have a German name, and even though he is light-skinned his belief that he could be viewed as a German is disillusioned by the facts on the ground. The issue in short is how an immigrant could become a German in an ethnic society. In European exile, it becomes the destiny of Mansur to live as an alien among aliens. What these aliens have in common is living in a society that socially excludes them. It follows that the lack of cultural pluralism on the side of receiving society coincides with a similar lack on the side of the newcomers. This situation ignites conflict. Mansur's story is not a personal one of an alien, since

it is related to ethnicity on many counts. Even though Mansur comes to Germany as a persecuted Arab Muslim, he is specifically an Iraqi who fails to share the concerns of non-Iraqi Arabs. The exile situation does not diminish his despise for Syrians or for other non-Iraqi Arabs. These people are simply ethnically different - at least this is the way they perceive themselves. They cannot deal with cultural diversity. Islam and ethnic Arabhood are only valid in the identity politics vis-à-vis the Germans, but not within the respective community itself. The tragedy is that these aliens who seek refuge in Europe and suffer ethnic exclusion behave exactly like the society that discriminates against them. Both Europeans and the Middle-East Muslim Arabs who come to Germany or to another place in Europe share the lack of a culture of pluralism. Instead, their thinking about difference is determined by ethnic terms.

The Iraqi immigrant Mansur and his story in Germany written by the Iraqi writer Hussain al-Mozany is a telling record with implications that are neither restricted to the individual Mansur, nor to Germany. The issue is of general concern. My reading of the novel coincided with the preparing of this paper. The editorial in the *International Herald Tribune* of Friday, August 17, 2007, published under the title "Iraq's Intolerance," comments on the way Iraqis of different ethnicities deal with one another through indiscriminate killing presented on the example of a mass slaying of 250 Yezides, the Iraqi minority. Ahead of this mass murder, Yezides themselves publically stoned a Yezidi girl, who converted to Sunni Islam.

To be sure, pluralism is a political culture that cannot unfold and thrive if the communities that are supposed to live in peace with one another - be it in Iraq, Europe, or Southeast Asia - insist on their exclusive culture that is often combined with a religious-ethnic identity. The lack of this culture of pluralism corresponds with the ethnicity of fear. It is not my way to engage in panicking, but I believe that the following description of reality on the grounds in Iraq would also apply in a situation of crisis to Europe and to Southeast Asia if the ethnic and religious communities fail to embrace the political culture of pluralism and make it their own. The International Herald Tribune commentary states that the

> diffuse phenomenon in Iraq that US policymakers have failed to comprehend and that cosmopolitan Iraqis have long ignored or denied - a ruthless intolerance of the Other. ... Sunni Muslim Kurds ... or Christian sects, or Shiites, or Iraqi Jews ... were persecuted for being different. ... At issue is a collective refusal to accept differences, whether of one individual from a community or of one group from another. ... Beyond the obvious struggles for power and resources, old sectarian and ethnic animosities ... are being revived.[4]

The commentary continues in arguing that in such a society "an invading power cannot ... expect to harvest a pluralist democracy. The lesson for the disparate Iraqi communities is that if they don't find a way to live together, they will go on killing one another."

This is a reality of a multiculturalism of fear, and the only solution for it is an acceptance of religious pluralism. I am familiar with the three worlds of the Middle East and Southeast-Asia and Europe, because I lived and worked in many countries within these regions. This familiarity includes knowledge about the ethnic-religious divides which shape the social reality in all these societies and also lead to conflict. IR scholars deal with conflict in depicting scenarios of its unfolding. I see two opposite scenarios for dealing with this reality, one of which is described in the cited editorial commentary "Iraq's Intolerance." This kind of scenario develops from any politicization of the existing divides and leads to blood-letting. What happened in Indonesia in 1965-66 and currently in Iraq could be repeated anywhere, even in Europe. The Intifada of young, socially marginalized Muslims in the suburbs of Paris named "banlieues de l'Islam"[5] of 2005 was just a warning sign in this direction, but the alert was not well-taken nor the challenges underlying it.[6]

The other scenario is positive and relates to embracing the political culture of religious and cultural pluralism by the exclusive communities involved. To be sure, the notion of pluralism is, in its origin, a political one. As noted in the introductory remark, it refers to diversity within a parliamentarian system of democracy combined with sharing values and rules. In such a system, parties of the left, the right, and in between accept one another and - despite all diversity - share a set of the very same rules and values as grounds for dealing with and acknowledging one another.

Could one apply this notion of political pluralism to culture and ethnicity? Is it possible to view cultural, ethnic, and religious communities living in a society as if they were political parties? The notion of ethnic and cultural pluralism exactly suggests this model. What are the requirements for establishing the feasibility of this model?

Underlying all of these questions is that the culture of religious and cultural pluralism matters in dealing with ethnicity. Add to this the assumption that there is a predicament. For finding solutions, the involved communities are challenged to engage in cultural change and religious reforms in their societies. In my study of Islam and Islamic legitimacy in Asia - West, South, and Southeast - I came across the fact that the existing cultural diversity is not only a blessing but also could be a source of conflict after carried out in identity politics. Proposing the political culture of pluralism as a remedy faces the opposing fact, however, that the ethnic and religious exclusive cultures of the involved communities have a problem with the pluralist culture proposed here.[7]

I single out Islam and study its predicament with the culture of

pluralism. In 2005, I observed from my base in Singapore the failure of the interreligious dialogue promoted by Prime Minister Badawi of Malaysia. The *ulema* of the Malayan Muslim community ignored the fact of religious and ethnic diversity in their country and refused to debate with non-Muslims about rules of pluralism to be shared by all. The Muslim argument presented was unacceptable because it was based on a supremacist positioning of Islam in multiethnic-religious Malaysia, where Islam is ethnicized as being identified with Malay culture. This ethnic-exclusive attitude is related to Islam's predicament with cultural and religious pluralism.

In applying the Asian experience to the emerging, significantly growing and parallelly ethnicized Islam diaspora in Western Europe, certain things become apparent.[8] In 1950 there were only 800,000 Muslim immigrants. Today, in 2007, they are 20 million. One encounters also in Europe two strange bed-fellows, religious Muslims and ethnic Europeans who, in the age of global migration and the related crisis,[9] need to live with one another in respect and peace but instead reject one another. What then can be done? The recipe of religious and cultural pluralism seems to promise a remedy out of this impasse of mutual ethnic othering.

To be sure, it must be stated that I hate to see in this issue a purely Muslim problem - it is a European problem as well. After living in Europe for four and half decades and, despite my embracing of all civic European values and rules, I failed to be accepted as a German citizen beyond the legal status guaranteed by the passport. I learned in my life about this kind of ethnic-exclusive society. My contention is that this German experience of ethnic othering applies - in varying degrees - to other European countries.

It is worthwhile and makes sense to go back to the novel of the Iraqi Hussain al-Mozany to see two processes at work that are described by the novelist obviously without fully recognizing the implications of his story. Most of the "Arabs" he describes - as subdivided in conflicting ethnicities - are mostly a social underclass of uneducated people looking for a better life in Europe. The interaction between them and the society in which they live as aliens is based on mutual othering. The more migration increases, the more Europeans become ethnic-exclusive. This happens despite all the window-dressing to the contrary by European media. European hypocrisy is simply disgusting in this regard. In response to the rejection inflicted on them, the newcomers ethnicize themselves and use their universal religion of Islam to press forward a process of self-ethnicization in the form of identity politics. The tensions between two ethnic-exclusive communities are neutralized by Europe's stable democracy and generous welfare-state. But simmering troubles in crisis-ridden situations are ahead. What happened in Paris in October/November 2005 was just an alert. As J. Levy puts it, under conditions of a multiculturalism of fear, "recurrent social and political dangers must be avoided, but cannot be escaped."[10]

What is to be done?

As a Muslim immigrant with a multiple European-Islamic identity, I believe that only a mutual acceptance of a culture of pluralism could provide promise. To this end, Europeans need to de-ethnicize the notion of the citizen, and Muslims need to abandon their supremacist attitudes based on phased out doctrines. My vision of Euro-Islam is a policy recommendation, to be introduced in the next section as grounds for a "citizenship of the heart" that needs to be fostered and promoted by both parties.

II. Euro-Islam: A Concept for the Integration of Muslims in Europe

Against the ethnicization of a ghetto Islam, I developed the idea of Euro-Islam. It is a concept which I claim and first introduced in Paris back in 1992. Religious and cultural pluralism constitutes the core of it. The source of the concept of Euro-Islam is not Tariq Ramadan, the grandson of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, but rather my paper of 1992 "Les Conditions d'un Euro-Islam."[11] This paper was presented at a project of the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris. The claim is supported with related references to the history of the concept. However, neither the origin nor the copyright of Euro-Islam is the pertinent issue but, rather, its unequivocal meaning that separates my work from the views of Ramadan.

Essentially the concept of Euro-Islam means "Europeanization of Islam." *Time Magazine* outlined the concept with a reference to my work in this phrasing: "people like Bassam Tibi, … who coined the term Euro-Islam, insist that the integration of Europe's Muslims depends on the adoption of a form of Islam that embraces Western political values such as pluralism… 'The options for Muslims are unequivocal,' says Tibi. 'There is no middle way between Euro-Islam and a ghettoization of Muslim minorities.'"[12] The rival vision of Salafists and Islamists is an Islamization of Europe.[13] It is expressed in some mosques of the Islamic diaspora in Europe. To be sure, Euro-Islam is a vision to be accomplished, not yet a reality as some prematurely and wrongly state. The existence of a European diaspora of 20 million Islamic people does not mean Euro-Islam. Without the required religious reforms, this pluralism-based concept of Euro-Islam cannot be introduced into the Islamic thought of Muslims living in Europe.

To present Euro-Islam as a form of religious pluralism I proceed in three steps. After introducing the subject matter, the second step is to ask: Why do we need a Euro-Islam? More specifically, why do Europe and the Muslims involved need a European Islam? The third step is to explain the concept itself. As stated, I have been elaborating on this vision since 1992. Today, the pertinence of the vision of Euro-Islam is higher than ever before. It matters also to Turkey in its bid to join the

EU as much as it does to Muslim immigrants heading to Europe for a better future.[14]

In contrast to some Islamists who exploit the Jewish suffering in European history to equate anti-Semitism with anti-Islamism, I prefer to look at the partly positive aspect of the story, namely the fact that European Jewry, before the crimes committed by the Nazis, succeeded in establishing a Jewish-European synthesis. It is my aim to revive this success story as a model for Muslims in a democratic Europe. Prior to 1933, it was not a contradiction to be a Jew and a European at the same time. In this regard, I emulate Heinrich Heine and ask: Why cannot we Muslims be European citizens of the heart[15] in contrast to merely Europeans by passport? One can belong to the religion of Islam as a faith and equally to Europe as a citizen. Of course, the original reference in Heine is restricted to his Jewish identity and leaves aside the issue of his disputed conversion, matters I leave aside in the present context. My focus is citizenship versus religionized ethnicity.

It is worth mentioning a debate between Bernard Lewis and myself on this subject-matter. The debate took place in Germany but was covered and well received in Washington by the *Weekly Standard* (see the issue of October 2004, pp. 15-16). Professor Lewis had polemically argued in an interview with *Die Welt* that Europe was destined to become a demographically Muslim space by the end of this century at the latest. I contested this view in *Welt am Sonntag* by arguing that the issue is not whether Muslim immigrants will become the demographic majority, but, rather, what Islam is being introduced in Europe: a sharia Jihad-Islam or a Euro-Islam?

Unfortunately, most Europeans do not have the political will to address these issues candidly or in-depth. In projects conducted in the United States (University of California/Berkeley and Cornell) and even in Turkey it was easier to engage in this business. At the University of California at Berkeley, the project "Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe"[16] was an inquiry into the Islamic culture entering Europe and adding more to its diversity. There are two options: *Muslim Europe* or *Euro-Islam?* I continued this work at Cornell University in the project "Religion in an Expanding Europe" (see note 13).

In returning to the question of why a Euro-Islam is needed I assume that the idea of Europe is an inclusive model, and not exclusive as Europeans mostly behave. I argue for the feasibility of a Euro-Islam as an alternative to the mushrooming Islamic enclaves that create an extension of *Dar al-Islam* in Europe itself.[17] These parallel societies[18] are detrimental both to Europeans and to Muslim immigrants; Islamic enclaves not only separate the two groups from each other, but also contribute to mutual ethnic othering. In contrast, Euro-Islam bridges between them, and that is why it is needed.

In a further step I introduce the concept[19] that I already mentioned,

first presented in Paris with my paper "Les conditions d'un Euro-Islam" (see note 11). I do not touch on religious beliefs out of respect for Islamic sensitivities. Therefore, I look at Islam exclusively as a cultural system in order to incorporate into it the five major aspects of the idea of Europe as a civic political culture: (1) separation of religion and state; (2) acceptance of secular democracy; (3) acceptance of individual human rights; (4) religious pluralism and tolerance that requires going beyond the notion of *dhimmitude* as an Islamic concept of tolerance; and (5) the idea of civil society. In my view, this project, as a Europeanization of Islam, is possible within an "Islamic reformation."[20] In this thinking, I contradict the Turkish scholar Serif Mardin who views "civil society" as "a Western dream that does not translate into Islamic terms." In Istanbul, I presented a paper with exactly the opposite argument: *laïcité*, democracy, human rights and civil society do translate into Islamic terms.[21] However, this can only be done if Muslims are willing to engage in a "rethinking of Islam," as Mohammed Arkoun puts it. A part of this rethinking is the integration of values of civil society into Islamic thought of which religious pluralism is the core. As already stated, the concept of Euro-Islam is also most pertinent to Turkey's admission into the European Union (see note 14). It is in fact the entry ticket for a Muslim country to join the secular European community of the EU. To be sure, Europe is not a Christian club as some Turkish politicians polemically contend. The very integration of Muslim immigrants in European societies as citizens of heart (rather than passport citizens) takes place as their incorporation into a secular polity (see note 15) and this argument applies also for Turkey as a requirement and the platform for this accomplishment. However, I fail to see this Euro-Islam on the agenda of Turkey's AKP, which has ruled the country since February 2002. Moreover, and to be sure, an AKP-shaped Turkey is not in line with the vision of Euro-Islam. I believe that the US press in its pro-AKP stance either fails to understand political Islam or it engages in a judgment of convenience related to the foreign policy needs of the US and not to the issue itself.

In concluding this section, it can be stated that an implementation of the concept of Euro-Islam serves as an avoidance of "political dangers of multiculturalism of fear." This requires sufficient political will, which is not yet in place. Both parties, Muslims and Europeans, need to work hard to establish religious pluralism in a joint Muslim-European venture. It is not a digression to mention that a pluralist orientation of Euro-Islam is also of great interest to the Jewish communities in Europe. In 2005, I was hosted at the third meeting of the Presidents of Jewish Communities in Europe to speak on the Islamic diaspora that took place in the Swiss city of Basel. There, I had to allay fears about the growing Islamist anti-Semitism in Europe.[22] The pluralist concept of Euro-Islam is suited to be the best guarantee for dissociating Islam

from any Judeophobia. The research of Bernard Lewis supports this concept with evidence that anti-Semitism historically has no roots in Islam.[23]

It is a fact that Islamism in our time, however, is one of the sources of the new anti-Semitism spreading in Europe.[24] The embracing of the political culture of religious pluralism by pro-democracy Muslims is not only the best guarantee for integration, but also a strategy for countering the totalitarianism of Islamism, which is definitely not to be confused with Islam.[25]

III. Euro-Islam as an Inclusive Alternative to an Islamic Exclusive Enclave within Europe

This paper opened with a reference to the potential that grows from mutual rejection of ethnic-religious communities that results in blood-letting. I argue that this can happen in Europe too, if the integration of Muslim immigrants fails. The rioting in the French suburbs labeled "banlieus de l'Islam" made clear that the European Union faces an Islamic and an Islamist challenge (see note 6) while it lacks a policy framework for an appropriate response. For experts, the Islam diaspora-based uprising of Paris came to no surprise, but European politicians were unprepared and therefore shocked. After calming, they continued their attempts to ignore challenging realities. In the footsteps of Myron Weiner's analysis of the global migration crisis (note 9), I look at the European Islam diaspora in an approach combined with security. There is a need for a policy based on learning lessons and drawing consequences from the kind of Islamic Intifada that took place on European soil. In addition to a social policy that rectifies the effects of marginalization of Muslims in Europe, a concept of Euro-Islam provides a vision of a Europeanized Islam as grounds for inclusion. It is possible to make Islam compatible with the ethnically blind and secular concept that underlies the civilizational identity of Europe.

The extension of this vision can be accomplished through educational channels. This Euro-Islam needs to be incorporated into a policy for integration. To be sure, when young Muslims living in Europe torch some 12,000 cars and thereby call *Allahu Akbar* and think of themselves, despite their poor knowledge of Islam, as believers waging *jihad*, the Europeans need to respond with an appropriate policy. Security is needed, but is always a short-term perspective. It is necessary to make clear that there can be no space in Europe for *jihad* or *shari'a* as an alternative to the European rule of law. In order to accomplish this, more than policing is required. The message is to engage in policy instead of policing. This policy can only be promising, if guided by the outreach and institutionalization of a culture of religious pluralism

for accommodating the Muslim diaspora and making immigrants in Europe feel at home.

The percentage of Muslim immigrants is skyrocketing throughout Europe in comparison to migrations from other parts of the world. The French rioting compels Europeans to see that they are under pressure to deal with this new Islamic factor in their societies. As acknowledged in the UC Berkeley project, this issue is not only changing the composition of population, but also the identity of Europe itself. In contrast to populist unacceptable Islamophobic solutions, some speak of a multiculturalism by which they - in a cultural-relativistic manner - mean that "anything goes." This results in the emergence of parallel societies, as I pointed out earlier. I quoted John Kelsay (see note 17), who describes these societies as Islamic enclaves in Europe that not only belong to its culture but are also an ethnic challenge to it.

The events in Madrid, London, Amsterdam, Paris, and later Copenhagen make clear, that the proper response to the challenge is a politics of integration based on religious pluralism. As shown earlier, the difference between the opposite extremes of multiculturalism and assimilation lies in dealing with diversity. In contrast to both a combination of civics with economics, in which a sharing of core values by Europeans and non-Muslim immigrants associated with integration in the workplace (no migration into the welfare system) could help to contribute to inclusion. At issue is how to make Muslim immigrants true European citizens beyond the legal status of passports. It is in this context that I developed the concept of "Euro-Islam." Of course, it is important to note that this concept is not only rejected by Salafist leaders of the bulk of Muslim community and mostly by Islamists, but also by European multiculturalists, because I put democracy above cultural difference.[26]

Still, my overall concern is the framework for an integration of Muslim immigrants for their inclusion into the polity as citizens at heart. They could only live in a secular society peacefully if they abandon their absolutist views and subsequently their supremacist vision of Islamizing Europe. This ideology is taught in many mosques and faith schools. However, it is often not spelled out for tactical reasons. A multiculturalism of "anything goes" is not the solution, nor is any assimilation.

Against both extremes, a Euro-Islamic integration inspired by an inclusive approach limited to civic values and to the workplace is the best policy. It is compatible with democracy on the grounds of a reformist interpretation of Islam along the lines of cultural modernity.

My observations of Islam in Africa are the background of the concept of "Euro-Islam." There, Islam is basically African as much as it is Indonesian accommodated to *adat* (traditions) of local cultures in Indonesia. Why cannot Islam be European along similar lines in Europe? If Muslim immigrants were willing to become European

citizens at heart instead of being aliens and *muhajirun* (migrants in the Islamic meaning of a proselytizing diaspora) and if Europeans are honestly willing to be inclusive, not only in rhetorical pronouncements but also in practice then integration can be accomplished. The values of secular democracy, individual human rights, pluralism, civil society and the enlightenment-culture of tolerance are the core values of religious pluralism to be embraced by Muslim immigrants for becoming Europeans. In this situation, there can be no half-solutions: either a "citizenship of the heart" or citizens by passport will never be real members of a European civil society based on pluralism. Exclusion and self-ethnicization are two sides of the same coin.

VI. Conclusions

The proposition of a Euro-Islam is the best alternative to a multiculturalism of fear that results from ethnic conflict. The Islamic rioting in France in 2005 is the alert. On the occasion of the first centenary of the assassination of van Gogh by an jihadist Islamist, the dangers resulting from "violence, cruelty ... in ethnic politics" (Levy, note 2) were addressed in frankness by the political Dutch elite in dialogue with enlightened Muslims under the formula: "One Year On: Radicalization and Society's Response." There I again had the opportunity to present in a key-note speech my concept of Euro-Islam in which the point of departure has been both the normative and factual. The murderer of Theo van Gogh, the well-connected Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri, committed a crime perceived however as a religious action against unbelief. This is also the thinking of those burning cars in France while contesting their social marginalization. The letter of Bouyeri fixed on the slain body of van Gogh included the phrase: "Europe! It is now your turn." For averting the arising cultural tensions, both Islam and Europe need to change in the direction of religious pluralism. This means again a combination of diversity with shared values and rules. To put the blame either on Muslim immigrants or on Europeans in a blame-game leads nowhere. Instead, European civil society should become home for Muslims in Europe. This could relieve Muslims and Europeans from the divisive effects of diasporic identity politics that uses cultural tensions to elevate the fault-lines into deeper conflicts.[27]

In short, if Muslims living in Europe cannot be Europeans and if integration aimed at their inclusion fails, then radicalization taking place in the world of Islam shall spill over to Europe. This would result in an ethnic conflict and in a state of fear. A civil Islam[28] is the alternative. Regrettably, time is running out for Europe and a double-track strategy for dealing with Islam and Islamism[29] is urgently needed. First, there needs to be a dialogue with pro-democracy Muslims who are willing to abandon the sources of tensions, i.e. the jihadization and

shari'atization of Islam and are instead receptive to Euro-Islam. Second, a security approach for dealing with Islamism has to be developed in a European-Islamic venture. The poor integration of Muslim immigrants in contemporary European societies continues with the second and third generation of those born in Europe but neither accepted as Europeans nor - on their side - view themselves as such. There has been a positive change in citizenship law (e.g. new German law for naturalization of non-ethnic German immigrants in 2000, that however exists side by side to the still valid 1913 citizenship law based on blood), but no culture of citizenship based on the religion-ethnicity blind concept of the "citoyen" the French Revolution promised. The repercussion is the perceptual ethnicization of belonging to the umma-community living in the diaspora. Of course, this imagined community is composed of real ethnic subgroups (Turks, Arabs, Pakistanis, etc.), which exist as a majority in discrete European countries (Turks in Germany, Maghribi Arabs in France, South Asian Muslim in the UK). However, the intensified global migration has been changing this structure. For example Turks still continue to be the majority in the Muslim community in Germany, but no longer one of the 95%, but rather of only 70%, 2.5 million of 4 million Muslims. In Kreuzberg and Neukölln, the immigrant ghettos of Berlin, Turks have to share the space with Arabs (mostly Palestinian) with sub-ethnic tensions. There are further 1.5 million Turks in other European countries where South-Asian (UK) or Maghribis (France) are the majority. Despite these sub-ethnic tensions the Muslim umma community ("we") conceives itself as an ethnic one versus ethnic Europeans ("they"), ethnicity returns to Europe.

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Endnotes

[1] The term "ethnic pluralism" is a contradiction in terms, because it is based on the politicization between "we" versus "they". In pluralism there is a combination of diversity with shared values. On the values of pluralism and on the unavoidability of conflicts see: John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism,(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[2] Jacob Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[3] Hussain al-Mozany, Mansur oder der Duft des Abendlandes (Leipzig: Reclam, 2002).

[4] Editorial article in: "International Herald Tribune," August 17, 2007, p. 6

[5] See Gilles Kepel, Les Banlieues de l'Islam. Naissance d'une Réligion en France (Paris: Seuil, 1987), and the more recent study by Paul Silverstein, Algeria in France, Transpolitics, Race and Nation (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indianapolis University Press, 2004).

[6] B. Tibi, Die islamische Herausforderung. Religion und Politik im Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2007), 6.

[7] See the NUS (National University of Singapore) research on this issue by B. Tibi, "The Pertinence of Islam's Predicament with Democratic Pluralism for the Democratization of Asia," Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft, vol. 7.1, 2006, p. 84-117. The project is forthcoming as Anthony Reid, ed, Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia (New York: Routledge, 2008).

[8] The presence of Islam in Europe was studied at the University of Leiden in a project chaired by W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld and published by both as editors in two volumes. The first was published under the title: Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe and the second: Muslims in the Margin (Kampen/Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1995 and 1996). The second volume includes my contribution on the pertinence of the Indian Islam-model (Muslims as a minority within a dual legal system) for Muslims in Europe.

[9] Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis (New York: Harper & Collins, 1995).

[10] J. Levy, Multiculturalism, 11.

[11] This note includes some references about the concept of Euro-Islam and its further development. The paper by B. Tibi, "Les conditions d'un Euro-Islam" was presented in November 1992 at the Institut du Monde Arabe/Paris (see the F.A.Z.-report referenced in note 19). The paper was later published in: Robert Bistolfi and Francois Zabbal, ed, Islams d'Europe. Intégration ou Insertion Communautaire (Paris: Editions de l'Aube, 1995). On the history of the concept combined with the references see the comprehensive chapter "Euro-Islam" completed for the new, fully rewritten and expanded edition (624 pages) of: B. Tibi, Im Schatten Allahs. Der Islam und die Menschenrechte (Munich: Ullstein Verlag, 2003), 491-529. There are three basic texts in English with this concept: (1) N. AlSayyad and Manuel Castells, (2) Katzenstein and Byrnes (note 13),(3) Fletcher Forum

[12] Special issue on: Islam in Europe, Times, December 24, (2001): 49.

[13] On this competition see my chapter "Europeanzing Islam or the Islamization of Europe. Democracy vs. Cultural Difference," Religion in

an Expanding Europe, Peter Katzenstein and Tim Byrnes, ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 204-224. In a book published in German by the Muslim immigrant Ralph Gadban, Tariq Ramadan und die Islamisierung Europas (Berlin: Schiler Verlag, 2006), the views of Ramadan, which are falsely presented in the media as the source of "Euro-Islam" in Western Europe are discussed critically by Ghadban who presents Ramadan in the context of the envisioned Islamization of Europe.

[14] B. Tibi, "The Quest of Islamic Migrants and of Turkey to become European," Turkish Policy Quarterly, vol. 3.1,(2004): 13-28.

[15] B. Tibi, "A Migration Story. From Muslim Immigrants to European Citizens of the Heart," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 31.1 (Winter, 2007): 147-168.

[16] Nezar Al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells, eds, Euro-Islam or Muslim Europe? (Berkeley: Lexington Books, 2002): 31-53.

[17] John Kelsay, Islam and War (Louisville/Kentucky: John Knox Press, 1993): 117-118.

[18] B. Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung. Die gescheiterte Integration (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2002): 3-4.

[19] The term Euro-Islam was for the first time used in Europe in my Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung report "Euro-Islam oder Ghetto-Islam" of December 7, 1992, p. 14. The report was on the Paris meeting related to the project, referenced in note 11. The notification is necessarily not only to claim the concept, but also to dissociate its meaning from Tariq Ramadan (see note 13).

[20] This is the term coined by Abdullahi A. an-Na'im in his book: Towards and Islamic Reformation (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990). In the nineteenth century Jamaladdin al-Afghani already envisioned such a venture in emulation with Martin Luther.

[21] On this debate see the contribution of the Turkish US-educated Serif Mardin, Civil Society and Islam, in: John Hall, eds., Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995): 278-300, and in contrast, B. Tibi, "The Cultural Underpinning of Civil Society in Islamic Civilization" Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World ,Elizabeth Ozdalga and Sune Persson, ed., (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), p. 23-32. See also Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam (Boulder/Col.: Westview Press, 1994).

[22] On this issue the Center for the Study of antisemitism at Humboldt University of Berlin completed a research project related book edited by its director Wolfgang Benz, which includes: B. Tibi, "Der djihadistische Islamismus: Quelle des neuen Antisemitismus," Antisemitismus und radikaler Islamismus , Wolfgang Benz and Juliane Wentze, ed., (Essen: Klartext, 2007): 43-69.

[23] Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton/NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[24] A similar project to the one referenced in note 22 was run at the University of Potsdam/Brandenburg See Klaus Faber, Julius Schoeps et al., ed, Neuer alter Judenhass. Antisemitismus, arabisch-israelischer Konflikt und europäische Politik (Berlin: Verlag Brandenburg, 2006). My chapter on Islamist antisemitism is on p. 179-202.

[25] B. Tibi, "The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, vol. 8.1 (2007): 35-54.

[26] In contrast to Seyla Benhabib, Democracy and Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), I place democracy above cultural difference. See my contribution to the volume edited by: Peter Katzenstein (referenced note 13).

[27] B. Tibi, Islam, " Between Religious and Cultural Practice and Identity Politics," Conflicts and Tensions, Vol. 1 of The Cultures and Globalization Series , Y. Raj Isar and Helmut Anheier, ed, (London: Sage, 2007): 221-231.

[28] Islam in Indonesia provides an interesting experience, see Robert Hefner, Civil Islam. Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). See also my contribution to the Jakarta proceedings: B. Tibi, "Islamic Civilization and the Quest for Democratic Pluralism," in: Dialogue in the World Disorder, edited inter alias by Karlina Helmanita for Jakarta's Center for Languages and Cultures (Jakarta: Hidayatullah Islamic State University, 2004):159-201.

[29] B. Tibi, "Between Islam and Islamism: A Dialogue," Redefining Security in the Middle East , Tamy A. Jacoby and Brent Sasley, ed (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 62-82.

Understanding the 1992 Los Angeles Uprising: *Economics vs. Ethnicity*

Denise Rodriguez

ABSTRACT
Focusing on the 1992 Los Angeles Uprising, this paper considers the merits of economic and ethnic competition theories of race riots. Traditionally, popular opinion and policy response to American race riots have focused on economic conditions and racial inequality as primary causes. However, there is little support in the literature for this perspective. Newer research supports an ethnic competition model, built upon neighborhood-level data rooted in an assumption that blacks are an established majority. As American cities diversify, it becomes more important to understand the complex dynamics that produce mass racial violence in order to develop appropriate policies that enhance the potential for peaceful coexistence among racial/ethnic groups in urban settings.

This paper considers the literature on the causes of race riots in general and the Los Angeles Uprising in particular. I will summarize the economic and ethnic competition theoretical explanations for riot behavior and consider what existing research has to offer in support of these theories. I use a definition of race riots in which riots "involve an assault on persons and property simply because they are part of a given subgroup of the community."[1] This definition expands our conceptual framework on race riots to include riots predicated on ethnicity, race, and even religion. Though much of the literature produced early in the 20th century focused on a race-based, black vs. white concept of race riots, post-Civil Rights era research often uses the term ethnicity in its discussion of the identity variables of race riots, offering room for a more complex picture that includes Latinos, Asians, Arabs, and other groups that did not fit into the white/black dichotomy that has historically dominated discussions of race relations in America. In this paper, I use the terms race and ethnicity fairly interchangeably as a reflection of the language of the relevant literature, and, in a way that can be interpreted to mean that the communal identity of riot participants holds either race or ethnicity as the salient identifier of group belonging.

The Los Angeles Uprising of 1992 was the largest outbreak of racial violence since the riots of the 1960s and one of the worst riots in United States history. After four days of rioting in South Central Los Angeles and Koreatown neighborhoods, 50 to 60 people were dead,

over 2000 injured, and 8000 arrested. Property damage was estimated at more than $800 million.[2] Latinos made up 51% of those arrested during the riot. Thirty-eight percent were black, 9% were Anglo, and 2% were Asian American or "other."[3] At the time of the riots, the South Central neighborhood was 60.4% Black (48.4% non-Hispanic Black), 43% Hispanic, 4% Non-Hispanic White and 2% Asian. Only 38% of the population had incomes at least twice the poverty level.[4] Koreatown is predominantly Latino (49%), with some 20% Asians and 15% Black.

Historically, analyses of such outbursts of racial unrest have consistently focused on economic conditions in "ghettos" and racial inequality as the underlying causes of riots. According to the 1967 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, also known as the Kerner Commission Report, "Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans."[5] After talking to riot participants the Commission also concluded that, "Pervasive unemployment and underemployment are the most persistent and serious grievances in minority areas. They are inextricably linked to the problem of civil disorder."[6]

Yet, social science research since the turn of the 20th century has consistently failed to find evidence that economic factors like segregation, poverty, and unemployment are the primary causes of race riots. Likewise, tests of ethnic competition theories have returned mixed results. Most research in this area has not found a consistent causal role for ethnic identity factors. New research, however, suggests that a simple shift in perspective legitimates ethnic competition models.

Economic and Ethnic Competition Theories of Race Riots

According to basic price theory, people buy a good when the benefits of purchasing that good outweigh the costs. Based on this simple calculation, Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser offer a basic economic theoretical framework for understanding riot participation.[7] According to their theory, a person will be motivated to riot as long as the benefits of rioting outweigh the costs of rioting for that individual. The benefits for each individual (i) can be represented by B(i,X,Y), where an individual's net benefit of rioting (B) is determined by a vector of characteristics that affect a person's cost of time and potential financial gain from rioting (X) and a vector of characteristics that influence the non-financial and communal rewards for rioting (Y). The number of riot participants will be determined by the following equilibrium formula:

$$B(N,X,Y) = C(X)\ P(N,X)$$

In this formula, N is the number of rioters, C(X) represents the

cost of rioting, and P(N,X) represents the probability of getting caught, which decreases as the number of rioters increases. The marginal benefit of rioting also decreases as N increases, as those with a high taste for rioting will already have entered the fray.

Based on this formula, a person who is low-income or unemployed would have a very low financial cost of time and would, therefore, be more likely to enter the riot. We could also conclude that the cost of getting caught is much lower for someone who places a low value on his or her time. Thus, this theory seems to support the conclusions of "deprivation theories" of riot participation. Deprivation theories hold such factors as unemployment or labor market inequality, poverty (relative or absolute), and substandard housing to be the prime motivators for riot participation. Because this formula includes non-financial and communal benefits of rioting, it offers insight into other salient characteristics of race riots. The ethnic or racial identity and ethnic diversity within the communities where rioting takes place is of particular interest. If resources are scarce within the community, various ethnic groups will be forced to compete against each other for these resources. These resources can take the form of jobs, housing, or public space.[8] Such models of race riots are called "ethnic competition models" because they focus on the competition between ethnic groups as the underlying cause for race riots.

The Los Angeles neighborhoods that were the focal point of the 1992 riot, like those of other riot-prone cities, are both racially diverse and overwhelmingly poor. The demographics associated with the area could indicate both economic deprivation and ethnic competition as causes of the riot. An examination of the available literature on race riots will help us tease out which of these theories has more to offer our understanding of the causes of race riots and what interactions may exist between economic and ethnic variables.

Do Poverty and Unemployment Cause Rioting?

Salary is frequently considered a measure of one's cost of time: the lower one's salary, the lower one's cost to give up that salary to purchase goods, leisure, or—according to deprivation theories—participate in a riot. Since unemployment equates with a very low cost of time, we could hypothesize that an unemployed person would be more likely to enter a riot. Likewise, if many people in a community are living in poverty, we would expect that community to be more likely to have a riot since it is made up of people with low or no incomes and who have a correspondingly low cost of time.

In their foundational study of race riots, Lieberson and Silverman examined government characteristics, population growth and composition, work situation, and housing characteristics of cities with

riots.[9] The researchers paired each of 76 cities with riots between 1913 and 1963 with a city of comparable size and region that did not have a riot in the preceding ten years. For the largest cities, like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, comparisons were made with other large cities of comparable population without regard to region.

The authors found that high unemployment among blacks did not appear related to riots, nor did they find a connection between differences in white-black relative unemployment rates and rioting. In fact, in 15 out of 25 city pairs, the differences were smaller in the control city and black unemployment was lower in the riot city. These results indicate that neither absolute nor relative measures of black unemployment are related to riot occurrence.

Regarding these unemployment variables, Lieberson and Silverman's data has some weaknesses. First, their sample size of only 25 pairs of cities for which all the required data on this variable was available was quite small. Second, they used census year data to determine unemployment rates, but unemployment rates are far more volatile than a ten-year span can capture. Aware of this, the authors conclude that the data cannot disprove the relationship between riots and unemployment, only that it cannot confirm a relationship.

Other researchers also find that poverty measures, including unemployment, do not cause rioting. The extensive work of Spilerman uses data on riots from 1961-1968 and is among the most frequently cited work on race riots.[10] After examining black unemployment, median income, and educational attainment, he concludes that neither absolute nor relative measures of black deprivation distinguish between riot and non-riot cities.[11] In fact, quite often, non-riot cities have higher levels of income disparity than riot cities.

It is important to examine the applicability of data from the riots of the 1960s to present situations. The national character of the Civil Rights era black consciousness movement may have created a more unified sense of the economic circumstances of blacks across the nation.[12] As a result, poor conditions and deprivation in some areas could have instigated unrest in other areas. Additionally, we cannot assume that the causes of riots have remained the same over time. A variable that was a significant predictor in 1968 may not be an accurate predictor today.

This concern may be addressed by expanding the time frame for the data, as Olzak and Shanahan did in their study on deprivation and race riots.[13] They expand on Spilerman's analysis to include data from riots 1954-1992 (including the 1992 L.A. riot). They also consider absolute and relative deprivation. In bivariate correlations, they find that non-white unemployment is unrelated to rioting, as is non-white unemployment relative to white unemployment. Additionally, the likelihood of a riot increases with an increase in non-white median family income.

The studies mentioned above are among many that fail to find that higher levels of black deprivation lead to rioting. In fact, they seem to find evidence that, where there is less relative deprivation, riots are more likely. This holds true for educational attainment, incomes, and occupational status.[14] Though this may seem counter-intuitive given the general public's acceptance of economic explanations for riot behavior, consideration of ethnic competition theory offers some insight into this phenomenon.

Tests of Ethnic Competition Theories

Though measures of black deprivation have consistently returned insignificant results in statistical tests, the size of the black population has frequently been significant. In Spilerman's work, the size of the black population has been the only variable with a significant positive relationship to rioting.[15] This may be a matter of basic human resources. Going back to DiPasquale and Glaeser's formula, a higher number of participants (N) can be achieved if there are more people available.[16] Spilerman also focused on the predictors of riot intensity and found that the size of the black population is a significant predictor of riot intensity.[17] While population size may predict the size of a riot, however, it does not inform a prediction of whether or not a riot will occur.

Some academics theorize that the size of the black population is important because it indicates greater potential for racial competition. These theories attribute racial strife in cities with larger black populations to the increased competition between blacks and whites for jobs, housing, and political capital.[18] This could explain why we find less disparity between blacks and whites in cities with riots as it may indicate that blacks in these cities are more able to compete with whites for resources.

According to this ethnic competition theory, segregation should decrease the tendency to riot because groups occupying non-overlapping niches experience less competition.[19] Desegregation triggers an increase in competition, which triggers the majority to protect their advantage, something that Sugrue highlights in his case study of Detroit.[20] In Detroit, blacks that crossed the race line into traditionally "white jobs" or "white neighborhoods" (those jobs and neighborhoods restricted to whites during segregation) were often met with violent opposition. Sugrue views black-instigated riots as attempts to resist this exclusion.

Even as far back as Lieberson and Silverman's 1965 study, we can find support for ethnic competition as an underlying cause of race riots. In 28 out of 43 pairs of cities with available information on the occupational distribution of blacks and whites, the percentage of black men holding the types of jobs to which blacks had traditionally been limited due to

labor market segregation was lower in the riot city. Sixty-five percent of the time, black men were working in occupations not typically held by blacks.[21] Furthermore, in 30 of the 43 pairs, the difference between the number of whites and blacks in these traditionally black occupations (labor, domestic, and service) was smaller in the riot city.[22] The authors conclude that encroachment of blacks into occupations previously restricted to whites is a significant underlying cause of race riots, lending support to the ethnic competition theory forwarded by Olzak.

Olzak and Shanahan directly test Olzak's ethnic competition theory by assessing competition as a function of minority population growth while overall unemployment is high.[23] This measures the degree to which an increase in the supply of potentially cheaper labor combines with a decrease in demand for labor to increase competition. Using data from 1954-1993, their Poisson regression confirms that increased competition between blacks and whites was a significant predictor of riots.[24]

Despite the fact that their data included the 1992 Los Angeles riot, there are some issues with the applicability of this finding to Los Angeles. First, the traditional white-black conceptualization of race relations in the U.S. is outdated. It cannot account for the much wider variety of ethnicities that make up our cities today. For example, both Miami and L.A., cities with the two largest post-Civil Rights-era race riots to date, experienced significant immigration in the decade prior to their riot incidents. In Los Angeles County, for example, there were more foreign-born residents than in any other SMSA in the United States.[25] Between 1980 and 1990, the composition of the city changed from being 28% to 40% Latino, 48% to 37% white and 17% to 12% black.[26] If we hope to understand riot behavior in today's America, we must consider immigration and its implications for racial competition in the United States.

If we consider cities at the neighborhood level, we would find that immigration of Latinos and Asians into Miami and Los Angeles has occurred at the highest rate into neighborhoods that had been traditionally black (Liberty City in Miami and South Central Los Angeles in L.A.). This puts blacks in the position of being the territorially established majority in our ethnic competition scenario and suggests that their riot activity may be related to the increased competition with these minorities rather than competition with whites. For example, South Central Los Angeles, the epicenter of the 1992 riots, was 60.4% black at the time, while the black proportion of Los Angeles overall was only 11.7%. Therefore, for any analysis of this neighborhood, we should treat blacks as the majority.

There is little support, however, for the idea that there is much economic competition between blacks, Latinos and Koreans in the labor market. At least one study using data specific to Los Angeles has shown that immigration has had no impact on black unemployment in the Los

Angeles labor market.[27] Additionally, in a review of several studies on black unemployment and wages, Heer finds that there has been little to no effect on black wages as a result of immigration.[28] If these studies are correct and evidence of labor market competition between ethnic groups is weak or absent, the validity of ethnic competition theory becomes questionable. Alternatively, the competition could occur in a sector of society other than the labor market.

The Potential of Hyper-Ethnic Succession Theory

As a result of these considerations, Bergeson and Herman offer a "Hyper-Ethnic Succession Theory" that focuses on ethnic competition at the residential level, which results when a new ethnic group immigrates into an area with an already established majority ethnic group.[29,30] Hyper-Ethnic Succession Theory is not about competition for housing or jobs; it is about territory or space. Bergeson and Herman consider that the impact of immigration on race relations in a given neighborhood is felt before desegregation fosters economic competition, opting instead to focus on the perceived change in ethnic composition of the neighborhood.

To test their theory, they use data specific to Los Angeles in 1992. Their analysis used United States Census data to compare the characteristics of census tracts in Los Angeles with riot-related fatalities to those census tracts without riot-related fatalities. With blacks traditionally holding the demographic majority in the neighborhoods where rioting took place, they consider the immigration of Latinos and Asians as the "minority threat." By mapping the riot fatalities against the ethnic demographics for each SMSA as reported in the 1990 census, they show that most fatalities clustered along the border between heavily black tracts (over 50% black) and heavily Latino tracts (over 50% Latino), in areas that were at least 40% black and 40% Latino. The same is shown for property damage.

Statistical analysis reveals a highly significant relationship between riot fatalities and a tract's percentage change in Black, Latino, and foreign-born population between 1980 and 1990. This is true when comparing tracts within South Central L.A./Compton[31] and even more significant when comparing the riot tracts to all Los Angeles County tracts.[32]

None of their variables are significant for Koreatown or Pico Union. Though these neighborhoods saw rioting and fatalities associated with the riots, the tracts in these neighborhoods with riots were not significantly different in Latino, foreign-born and Asian immigration than those without fatalities. Surprisingly, this too supports the hyper-ethnic succession model. Neither Pico Union nor Koreatown were predominantly black neighborhoods in 1980 or 1990. Both were

predominantly Latino and saw more Latino immigration during that decade. Thus, the ethnicity of the immigrants largely matched the ethnic majority already established, so ethnic competition was not triggered.

Despite the fact that much of the property damage during the 1992 riot was directed at Korean-owned businesses in South Central L.A., the percent change in the Asian population is not significant in that area. Clearly, the dynamic of ethnic competition is more complex than a simple change in community residential demographics. This speaks to the importance of perception in determining riot behavior and participation. Regardless of the actual demographics, there may be a perception that a particular group is a threat, just as there may be a perception that unemployment causes rioting. Perception does not require empirical validation to be both persistent and motivating.

Conclusion: Back to Economics and Next Steps

Evidence has shown that non-economic theories of rioting seem to more adeptly address the importance of perception and group, or community, consciousness in the consideration of the underlying causes of riots. There is evidence that non-economic criteria play into an individual's decision to riot or, perhaps, that the non-monetary results of socioeconomic status play a role.

Both older studies and more recent research support the significance of more abstract concepts like identity and group consciousness as an important part of motivating riot behavior.[33] Abudu offers insight into how these factors play into an individual's decision to join a riot, suggesting,

> The concentration of ghettoized blacks in certain census tracts creates a community consciousness and mass base from which, even in the absence of the incentive for quick, material gain, personally risky and outwardly hostile communications of violence can comfortably spring, and calls upon us to view the black ghetto as an emerging social movement.[34]

Let's relate this back to DiPasquale and Glaeser's formula. A riot will have more potential to occur and be large (reach a higher N) if there are a larger number of potential entrants, (i). Additionally, if these potential entrants identify themselves as part of a group, they may be willing to incur individual costs that outweigh their individual benefits because of a perception that benefits will accrue to their group. This would be captured by the Y vector in the benefits calculation ([B(i, X, Y)] where Y = community level benefits) if the right community level variables were included.

Furthermore, if we expand the benefits of rioting to include non-monetary benefits, like political rights or equality (which also have substantial public good components), then the benefits do not necessarily decrease for each marginal riot participant. The calculation becomes difficult because we cannot know the value an individual will place on something like equal political representation. What cost will a person consider "worth it" to risk entering the riot?

In particular, if a person ascertains that other avenues for gaining these rights or assets are closed to them, rioting may become more worth it. Alternatively, a person might enter the riot based on a perception of injustice or inequality even if none exists. Thus, though an individual may stand little to gain from rioting on a personal financial level, he or she might be motivated to riot by the perception of injustice. Perception matters, but is difficult to quantify.

DiPasquale and Glaeser offer a good foundation for conceptualizing riot behavior, but we need to be sure we include the right benefits and costs in the formula. Further research into the mechanism by which group benefits or injustices motivate individuals will add to our understanding of riot behavior and racial violence. Additionally, we need to tease out the differing influence of the economic and demographic reality of riot prone areas from riot participants' perceptions of those factors. While real measures of economic variables may not be significant, personal perception of inequality may still motivate rioters.[35] Perhaps the perception of absolute or relative deprivation plays a more important role in motivating riot behavior than measurements of deprivation.

In addition to asking questions about what causes riots, we need to examine the complementary question of "What causes peace?" The riot behavior evidenced in Los Angeles is not typical. Why don't more ethnically diverse places have riots? In his book, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life*, Ashutosh Varshney asks this very question about Indian cities and offers a solid foundation for further exploration of what causes peace in multi-ethnic communities.[36] Ultimately, Varshney concludes that it is the connection between the different ethnic groups in civil society that prevents violence. According to Varshney,

> Though not anticipated when the project began, the pre-existing local networks of civic engagement between the two communities stand out as the single most important proximate cause. Where such networks of engagement exist, tensions and conflicts were regulated and managed; where they are missing, communal identities led to endemic and ghastly violence.[37]

Though oriented towards Hindu and Muslim relations in India, Varshney's work also offers a potentially rewarding direction for

future research of ethnic relations in American cities. As American cities diversify, it becomes more important to understand the complex dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in order to develop policy approaches that can both reduce the likelihood of violence and enhance the potential for peaceful coexistence. By turning our attention to both what causes riots and what prevents them, we are more likely to develop a complete model on which to base development of successful programs of intervention and prevention.

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Endnotes

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[8] See S Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992; and Bergesen, Albert, and Max Herman, "Immigration, race, and riot: The 1992 Los Angeles Uprising." *American Sociological Review*, 63, no. 1 (1998): 39-54. JSTOR database (1 March 2007).

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[20] T.J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton Classics Edition). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.

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[22] p=.0073, single-tailed test.

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[24] P<.05, two-tailed test.

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The goal of *The Current*, the public policy journal of the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs, is to present timely, relevant research and analysis on contemporary issues in public policy. Articles and views presented generally emerge out of a range of fields and disciplines while holding in common the scope of policy examination and consequent recommendations. While many of the contributions presented comprise the original research of CIPA Fellows, contents are supplemented by contributions from other scholars at Cornell University and academic institutions, along with those of practitioners in the public and non-profit sectors. Shorter pieces with more of a policy paper format are welcome under the Views & Reviews section, as are book reviews. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are the author's sole responsibility; publication does not imply the endorsement of the editors or publisher. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars or practitioners who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

Style

Articles and views should be written in clear, jargon-free English with adequate documentation. We aim to be accessible to a variety of readers ranging from scholars to policymakers both foreign and domestic. Textual style generally follows the *Chicago Manual of Style*. References and citations should be included as endnotes presented at the end of the text.

Format

Article text should be preceded by a maximum 100-word abstract setting forth the topic under discussion and the public policy dimensions in view. The author should indicate the central thesis of the article and how particular arguments will be presented in its support.

Submissions should be approximately no more than 30 pages double-spaced. An 11-point Georgia font is preferred. Pages must be numbered. Please prepare your submission with appropriate subheadings if applicable. Consult recent issues of *The Current* as a guide (www.thecurrent.cipa.cornell.edu).

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